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THE POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE: A re-evaluation based upon the 
intelligence work of the German Section. 
Conventional interpretations regarding the role of the Political Warfare Executive 
during the Second World War have concentrated almost exclusively on the propaganda 
output of the organisation. The role of the intelligence sections working for and 
within the organisation have been largely disregarded or overlooked in the existing 
history of Executive. This thesis offers aa re-evaluation of the PWE which includes 
this `missing dimension', specifically here the intelligence work of the German 
Section of the Executive. This approach widens the scope of enquiry to include an 
exploration of the links between intelligence and propaganda, subversion and sabotage 
and considers the importance of this relationship for the way in which the PWE 
emerged. The examination of the Weekly Reports of the German Section identifies 
a different `type' of intelligence which can be described as `sociallpolitical' 
intelligence, which provided the British government with a unique view of the social 
and political conditions in Germany throughout the duration of the war. 
The thesis concentrates on the period after the announcement of Unconditional 
Surrender in January 1943 to the early months on 1946, when the personnel and 
expertise of the German Section were transferred to the Foreign Office. The analysis 
of the intelligence reports of the German Section is focussed on three particular issues 
of interest to government at the time and to historians today. These are German 
resistance and public opinion, British occupational rule, and the emergence of the 
perception of the Russian `threat' in Whitehall which signalled the beginning of the 
Cold War. Taken together these illustrate the way in which the PWE incrementally 
expanded it's activities over this period of time, and provide the basis for the re- 
evaluation of the Executive. 
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CHAPTER 0 
Introduction. 
On 11th September 1941, the formation of the Political Warfare Executive' was 
announced in the House of Commons. ' Little information was given, and answers 
were refused on grounds of secrecy. ' This new department was established to 
conduct all forms of political warfare `against enemy, satellite and occupied 
countries'. ` The specific intention was `to undermine and destroy the morale of the 
enemy, and to sustain and foster the spirit of resistance in enemy-occupied 
countries'. ' Working in conjunction with the Special Operations Executiveb, the dual 
strategy adopted was to `create fear, doubt and confusion in the minds of the enemy' 
on the home- and battle-front, ' whilst simultaneously `persuading Europe to 
participate in its own liberation' .' 
The formation of the PWE was the result of the decision to separate the operations of 
SOE which had been set up in July, 1940 when Winston Churchill had given Hugh 
Dalton then Minister of Economic Warfare, the task of `setting Europe ablaze' using 
'Hereafter PWE. 
'Hansard 1 1th September, 1941. Column 294. 
3R. H. B. Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. (London: Putnam, 1947) p. 126. 
`Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945. Organisations, Policies and 
Publics in Britain and Germany. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). p. 91. 
'Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. p. 125. 
'Hereafter SOE. 
'John Baker-White, The Big Lie. (London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1955) p. 59. 
` Michael M. Stenton, `British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940-44: A 
Study of British Views on how to Address Occupied Europe'. Unpublished Ph. d 
Thesis. (Cambridge 1980). p. 3. 
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sabotage and subversion. ' The establishment of SOE had been a direct response to 
the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the recognition in Whitehall that 
subversion was a potentially important means of warfare alongside the more 
`traditional' instruments of war provided by the military, naval and air forces. In 
May, 1940, the Chiefs of Staff had identified subversion as an important weapon with 
air bombardment and economic blockade as the instruments of war that, used 
together, could give Britain a hope of changing the situation to her advantage10 In 
SOE in France, M. R. D. Foot illustrates the importance attached to this "irregular' 
warfare in Whitehall when he points out that the British strategic situation was so 
desperate that high hopes were placed in the new executive, and sabotage and 
subversion, alongside sea blockade and air bombardment were indeed seen as the main 
devices for bringing Germany down. " At this time SOE was responsible for all 
subversion and `black' propaganda activities, and identified as a potential `Fourth 
Arm' with an independent strategic role comparable with the army, navy or air force. 
At the beginning of the war with Germany the principle behind British propaganda 
had been based upon the recognition that, `every state leadership, be it democratic, 
authoritarian, or totalitarian, requires a certain degree of acclamation to exercise 
power in the long run'. 12 British propaganda, both `black' and `white', sought to 
split public opinion in Germany and destroy the consensus, and therefore the requisite 
consent, for Hitler to remain in power. This would be achieved through a strategy of 
projecting a picture of the British liberal democratic way of life as the `good' way, 
and identifying the authoritarian dictatorial methods and practices of the Nazi regime 
as the `bad' way. One of the most important distinctions which Government felt it 
'Churchill's legendary instruction to Dalton. Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 90. 
lo See J. M. A. Gwyer and J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy. Volume III, Pan I, July 
1941 - August 1942. (London: HMSO 1964) p. 42. 
"Michael R. D. Foot, SOE in France. (London: HMSO, 1966). p. 9. 
12 Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and The Germans: Public Mood and Attitude 
During the Second World War. Edited and Translated by Thomas E. J. Witt. (Athens, 
Ohio USA : Ohio University Press 1977). p. 1. 
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should make in their appeal to the German people was that the British people 
acknowledged and valued the existence of `two' Germanys, and that the British 
Government would support the efforts of the German people to challenge, reject or 
overthrow the Nazi regime. 
A changing sequence of events at national and international levels during 1940 and 
1941 culminated, however, in a change in attitude towards the German people and the 
emergence of a distinctive Allied strategy and policy towards Germany. It also 
resulted in a re-appraisal of the concept of subversion and the importance of SOE as 
a `Fourth Arm' which was eventually resolved by the break-up of SOE and the birth 
of the PWE. 
The first influential factor was the changing international situation. The conflict was 
no longer confined to a war with Germany in which Britain was the only other 
combatant. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22nd 1941 was followed by 
an agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt that they would give maximum aid to 
Stalin in his battle against Germany. This was underwritten in the details of the 
Atlantic Charter which set out an Anglo-American commitment to a post-war world, 
pledging that Britain and the'United States would act to restore sovereign rights and 
self-government to those countries which had been forcibly deprived of them. " In 
addition to Germany's attack on Russia, the Battle of Britain was also instrumental in 
changing public opinion towards the German people. Those willing to make the 
distinction between `good' Germans and Nazis became increasingly difficult to find 
in Britain, and eventually the distinction disappeared from official policy in Whitehall 
with the setting up of the PWE in 1941. 
The second factor which led to the re-appraisal of the `Fourth Arm' concept was that 
the plans put forward by SOE in June and re-drafted in July 1941 were flawed by 
"Martin Gilbert, The Second World War. Revised Edition. (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1989). p. 222. 
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serious logistic and strategic problems. " The third factor, which tied in closely with 
the separation of SOE activities, was the increasing interest in Whitehall concerning 
important advances in the techniques and potential for the use of propaganda in war. 
During the inter-war period the knowledge and expertise gained during World War 
One had increased and now incorporated the new techniques and skills available as a 
result of technological progress. The recognition of the limitations of subversion 
operations reinforced the need to use propaganda as effectively as possible. But the 
organisational problems and personality clashes within SOE were a serious threat to 
this aim, and the internal wrangling, `dog-fighting' and damaging political rivalry 
had so far only served to obstruct the use of propaganda and political warfare in the 
war. Whilst it was understood that subversion and propaganda could still be 
potentially useful, if subsidiary weapons, the need to divorce propaganda operations 
from subversion activities was recognised. Within weeks of the JPS judgement on 
SOE operations, propaganda and political warfare activities were taken out of SOE 
control and established as a separate entity to be conducted by the PWE. It was 
intended that the two organisations would work together in that PWE would supply 
indoctrination material, propaganda, information, directives and other materials and 
SOE would organize and operate the agents in the field and be responsible for 
transport, security and other necessary operational functions. In theory this appears 
to be quite logical and an effective use of resources. In practice SOE and PWE found 
it almost impossible to work together. " 
There has been no shortage of opinions about the efficiency and value of the work 
of the PWE, including many from individuals involved in the organisation and related 
departments. As already mentioned above, - the relationship between the PWE and 
SOE was difficult from the very beginning. In a thesis concerned with British 
propaganda and political warfare during the period 1940-1944, Michael Stenton 
describes the relationship between SOE and PWE as based on the absolute need for 
14 Gwyer and Butler, Grand Strategy. VoI. 1IL pp. 42-48. 
IS See M. R. D. Foot, SQE in France. Balfour, Propaganda in War. Charles 
Cruickshank, Special Operations Executive in Scandinavia: The Official History. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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co-operation between the two organisations if either were to have any chance of 
success. Unfortunately, as Stenton concludes, co-operation was not to be a feature 
of their relationship and, `long before they were in a position to do the enemy much 
damage with their political warfare, PWE and SOE had commenced operations against 
each other'. " These `operations' were, however, only a small part of the ensuing 
`major inter-department ... battle about the control of propaganda'. " A battle which 
SOE ultimately lost. The denigratory and dismissive opinions of the PWE by those 
working in SOE serves to illustrate the bitterness between the departments. 
The Chief Organiser for SOE, Flemming Muus, obviously had no regard for the work 
of the PWE and argued that not only was a huge amount of propaganda `wasted 
totally', but that it was also sometimes counter-productive. He firmly believed that 
the only `propaganda' the German understood was bullets and high explosives which 
spoke louder than words. 1° One of the major problems between the two 
organisations was that some SOE members believed the propagandists were less 
security-minded than they should be and that this could lead the Gestapo to the 
saboteurs. Others within SOE dismissed the propagandists as `the froth and bubble 
on the surface of resistance ... the glamour boys'. 
" 
However, William Casey, as Chief of Secret Intelligence for General Eisenhower's 
European operations working with both SOE and PWE, rejects these conclusions 
claiming that `the propaganda produced by the PWE was some of the slickest of the 
war and often drew admiration from the old German master himself - Dr. Paul Joseph 
16Stenton, `British Propaganda and Political Warfare.. ' p. 2. See also Charles 
Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm : Psychological Warfare, 1938-1945. (London: Davis- 
'Poynter, 1977). 
" M. R. D. Foot, `Was SOE Any Good? '. Journal of Contemporary History 16 
(7anuary, 1981). pp. 167-181. 
'8F. Muus cited in Charles Cruickshank, Special Operations Executive in 
Scandinavia. (Oxford: 1986). p. 220. 
19Turnbull cited in Cruickshank, Ibid. 
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Goebbels'. m As to the accusations of the `glamour' of the PWE, Casey describes 
SOE as `the most swashbuckling of. the British organizations' with its own problem 
of `image', particularly in the eyes of the European governments-in-exile, who `were 
appalled when Special Operations pulled acts of sabotage that had little military 
significance and led only to brutal German reprisals. " 
The disagreements about the PWE were not always conducted in private, and the 
sensitivities of those involved in political warfare activities were illustrated by the 
following correspondence and the forum in which the discussion took place. In an 
open `debate' conducted in The Times in the summer of 1973, concerning the 
effectiveness of the PWE in the use of subversion and `black' propaganda during 
World War Two, Richard Crossman, who worked for the PWE, claimed that 
`subversive operations and black propaganda were the only aspects of war at which 
we achieved real pre-eminence'. ' In an angry reply George Martinelli, who was 
Head of the Italian Section, replied, 
`Reading Richard Crossman's article of May 16, I was once again 
reminded that he never loses an opportunity of cracking up the 
propaganda services in which he worked during the war and ended up 
as chief. It is thus that a myth has been constructed almost to the point 
where we are asked to believe that Mr. Crossman won the war 
practically single-handed. .. his latest effusion on the subject ... is 
such outrageous and dangerous nonsense that I cannot allow it to pass 
without comment'. ' 
Martinelli argued that for the three years he worked for the PWE he had yet to see 
any evidence that the results achieved `were more than minimal'; no doubt because 
`the truth, as Winston Churchill knew, is that propaganda only becomes effective 
20 William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler. (London: Simon and Schuster 
1990). p. 27. 
"Ibid. p. 26. 
'The Times. Wednesday May 16th 1973. 
'The Times. Monday June 4th, 1973. 
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when the enemy knows he is beaten, and then it is a useful auxiliary but no more'. 
In conclusion he added `the whole of the Woburn Abbey set-up ... was a gigantic 
waste of human effort and public money'. This attack on the PWE brought forth an 
immediate reply from Lord Ritchie Calder, Director of Plans and Operations of the 
PWE. In this reply, also published in The Times, Calder took both Martinelli to task 
over his description of the operations at Woburn, which he hotly disputed, and 
Crossman for the claim of `pre-eminence' of the PWE. Calder argued that any 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the PWE were extremely difficult to make, but 
added `We were on the whole more efficient than others'. 24 
The history of the PWE has been recorded as the history of a department established 
for, and concerned solely with, the invention and implementation of propaganda 
campaigns in a supporting role to hasten the end of World War Two. Importantly, 
the historiography of the PWE has been dominated either by those involved in the 
PWE and related departments', or by the `official' historians of the British 
Government and post-war biographies of those involved', all of which offer a 
consensus about the role of the PWE. This consensus is based upon the premise that 
the PWE was only involved in political warfare activities to support the Allied 
The Times. Monday June 11,1973. 
'See : Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. Balfour, Propaganda in War. M. R. D. 
Foot, SOE in France. M. R. D. Foot, European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). Baker-White, 1955. Patrick Beesley, Very Special 
Intelligence. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977). Charles Cruickshank, The Fourth 
Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1938-45. (London: Davis-Poynter, 1977). Charles 
Cruickshank, Deception in World War Two. (Oxford 1979). Ellic Howe, The Black 
Game: British Subversive Operations Against The Germans During The Second World 
War. (London: Michael Joseph, 1982). Ronald Seth, The Truth Benders. (London: 
"Leslie Frewin 1969). Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 
1931-1945. 
(London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957). Anthony Eden, The Reckoning. (London: 
Cassell, 1965). 
'J. M. A. Gwyer and J. R. M. Butler (Eds). Grand Strategy. Volume III Part I, 
Volume III Part II. (HMSO 1964). Ben Pin loft, The Second World War Diary of 
Hugh Dalton, 1940 - 1945. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986). Tam Dalyell, Dick 
Grossman. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989). John Charmley, Duff 
Cooper. " The Authorized Biography. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986). 
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military forces in bringing about the defeat of Germany. The two most influential 
authors underpinning this consensus are Michael Balfour and Charles Cruickshank. 
In The Fourth Arm, for instance, Charles Cruickshank concluded that British 
propaganda had not been used as effectively as it could have been because the 
government had failed to prepare plans for an `efficient propaganda department'. The 
reasons for this failure are attributed to the Foreign Office who wanted to preserve 
their `empire', the desire of the `mandarins of Whitehall' who all wanted to put off 
the `evil day when Britain would have to contemplate engaging in foreign propaganda' 
and the failure to establish a single department concerned with subversion in all its 
aspects. ' 
Michael Balfour in Propaganda in War, 1939-1945, goes much further in his 
explanations for the failure of British propaganda. For Balfour, Germany's defeat was 
a military one, brought about by the failure of Nazi strategy and politics. He makes 
the point that in the closing months of the war the `Government and people made a 
remarkable effort in the face of heavy odds', still resisting until the bitter end and 
proving, for Balfour, that `British propaganda to Germany must therefore be said to 
have failed'. " However, the importance of Balfour's conclusion is that he lays the 
blame for the failure of British propaganda on the Allied policy of Unconditional 
Surrender in 1943 and argues that the failure of propaganda must be attributed to this 
`notoriously controversial decision' and not to any lack of skill on the part of the 
propagandists. " 
Both Balfour and Cruickshank illustrate the assumptions about the potential power of 
propaganda which existed then and, to a lesser extent, today: Balfour by arguing that 
had the PWE been allowed to offer the German people concessions in order to bring 
about a surrender by political means that it may have been successful, and 
Cruickshank by suggesting that decisive government action in the re-organisation of 
2'Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. pp. 177-179. 
"Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 438. 
-' Ibid. -- 
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political warfare may also have given the PWE a better chance of success. Secondly, 
from Balfour's conclusion it follows logically that the announcement at Casablanca in 
1943 and later the inevitability of a German military defeat must have reduced the 
importance of the work of the PWE, which then became less important in direct 
proportion to the military successes of the Allied forces. Finally, the focus on the 
propaganda output as the only basis for the analysis of the PWE has resulted in the 
overly simplistic conclusion that the PWE failed because the propaganda output was 
subsequently judged to have failed. 
There are a number of problems with these conclusions. The first is that they are 
based on the premise that the effects of propaganda can be identified and measured. 
But, the impact of propaganda on human behaviour cannot be easily assessed, and 
attempts to produce a scientific and quantifiable measurement of the impact of 
propaganda on social and psychological attitudes and behaviour have so far been 
limited in success. Secondly, the argument that if government organisation and 
Allied policy had been different then propaganda may have been successful is highly 
debatable . If government organisation 
for propaganda and the Allied policy of 
`Unconditional Surrender' had been changed, and the war ended earlier, it would still 
remain a formidable task to assess the importance of propaganda in the complex 
conditions that together contributed to the ending of the war. This does not detract 
completely from the force of Balfour's argument, but it is important to see how it 
serves to marginalise the other activities in which the PWE was engaged which have 
not been adequately considered in the historiography. 
This brings us to the central problem, which is the focus on the PWE as an 
organisation which was only involved in propaganda activities, and the omission in 
the evaluation of the Executive of the specialist `intelligence' sections working for and 
within the organisation. There does exist in the literature some reference to the 
intelligence work of the PWE, but it is found within the history only in terms of the 
supporting role it played opposite the propagandists in the context of the charter it 
was given in 1941. There has, to date, been no research which has focussed on the 
intelligence work of the PWE, and the way in which this intelligence work acted to 
9 
expand and diversify the activities of the PWE beyond the narrow confines of 
propaganda and political warfare to end the war. 
This is the `missing dimension' in the history of the PWE, and the omission is 
important because, as Andrew points out, ' any analysis of government policy, 
particularly on foreign affairs and defence, which leaves intelligence out of the 
account is bound to be incomplete'. " There are a number of reasons for this 
omission. As we have seen, the limitations of the analysis of `traditional' historians 
has focussed primarily on the propaganda activities of the Executive. Added to this, 
the political constraints existing in the national security atmosphere of the Cold War 
resulted in a restriction of access to the intelligence archives which were fundamental 
to any research activity. The `official' history of the British intelligence services, 
British Intelligence in The Second World War, " cites four sources from which 
Britain gained her intelligence : physical contact in the form of captured documents; 
the censorship of mail and interrogation of prisoners; espionage and aerial 
reconnaissance; and Signals intelligence (Sigint). The intelligence produced by the 
PWE is not to be found in the `official' history. 
In the last fifteen years, however, the situation has changed dramatically. Events in 
Britain and America in the mid-1970s led to an intense interest in the clandestine 
activities of governments and this has been aided by an emergent `open' approach by 
government to archival material containing the previously restricted and necessary 
documents and information for research. However, in Britain the problems of 
researching a department designated and functioning as `secret' is still problematic 
because of the very nature of the activity which often led to documents being 
destroyed, the location of surviving documents and, finally this is compounded by 
"Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community. (London: Heinemann, 1985) p. xvi. 
"F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in The Second World War. Volumes I and II. 
(London: HMSO 1981). 
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the current government restrictions on papers relating to the PWE. 'Z 
Nevertheless, the study of intelligence is now a firmly established area of study in the 
academic community, and the rapid expansion of intelligence studies has led to the 
conclusion that an `intelligence revolution"' has (or is still) taking place. 
In Espionage: Past, Present, Future? Wesley Wark outlines the parameters of the field 
of intelligence studies responsible for this `revolution', identifying the many different 
inter-related areas of study each with their own community of scholars, research 
agendas and problems. " The inter-disciplinary nature of the field which incorporates 
academics from the disciplines of history, political science, social science and 
international relations has, however, resulted in a lack of orthodoxy and the absence, 
to date, of a general theory or approach to the study of intelligence. Wark makes a 
significant point concerning this new field of study when he argues that the perennial 
question about proof of significance will be central to the future of intelligence 
studies, and more research funding and new scholars moving into the field are vital 
if it is not to `die from lack of sustenance'. " 
The revision of the history of the PWE in this thesis will seek to make a contribution 
to the intelligence revolution not least because the intelligence produced by the 
Executive, which can be identified as social/political intelligence, is a different `type' 
of intelligence and therefore also a `missing dimension' within the existing field of 
32CAB102/610 is still retained under Section 3(4). CAB 81/87-136 (JIC 
documents) released in April, 1995 are very heavily weeded, in some cases whole 
files are still retained under Section 3(4). Requests for information from Lockhart's 
relatives have also received a negative response. 
"Wesley K. Wark (Ed. ), Espionage: Past, Present, Future? (Essex: Frank Cass, 
1994). p. 2. John Lewis Gaddis, `Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', 
Diplomatic History, 13 (Spring, 1989). pp. 191-212. p. 191. 
'Ibid. Introduction. 
11 Ibid. p. 8. 
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intelligence studies. ' The history of the PWE has not previously been included in 
the area of intelligence studies, and there are two reasons for this omission. The 
majority of academics working in intelligence studies have been guided in their 
research by the theorists working on foreign policy studies in the disciplines of 
Politics and International Relations. Subversive and political warfare organisations 
exist within what is perceived to be a secondary or less important area of foreign 
policy studies, and this has led to their marginalisation and almost exclusion in both 
foreign policy and intelligence studies. The second problem is the difficulty of 
identifying the links between subversion and political warfare and intelligence. The 
need for the revision of the history of the PWE, and the reasons for the invisibility 
of its intelligence operations, can be understood by looking at these two issues. 
Addressing the first problem, the location of the PWE within the governmental 
framework for foreign policy-making in Whitehall will identify why it has been 
overlooked by academics in the disciplines of International Relations and Politics, and 
also therefore in intelligence studies. In broad terms the foreign-policy activity of 
government can be identified as being located into four areas or components. These 
are political, security, economic and cultural components, and all four components 
of foreign policy have their own intelligence services. " The instruments available 
to governments to implement the cultural component of foreign policy are 
information, disinformation, propaganda, psychological warfare and political warfare. 
These instruments can be used alone or in a variety of combinations, almost always 
with other elements of the other three components, in order to pursue foreign policy 
objectives in both peacetime and during periods of war. Propaganda, which has a 
long history as part of the cultural component of foreign policy, is the mechanism for 
conducting relations with other states, as well as influencing opinion on the domestic 
I Ibid. See also Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi 
Germany, 1933-1939. (London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1985). Michael Handel, 'The 
Politics of Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security. 2 (1987). pp. 5-46. 
"Foreign policy studies have concentrated research mainly on the political and 
security and to a lesser degree on the economic, components almost to the exclusion 
of the cultural component. Thus within intelligence studies, the intelligence element 
of the cultural component has also been excluded. 
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scene. It is concerned with the desires, aims and objectives of government, and thus 
society, attempting to influence, or in extreme situations such as war, to force their 
ideas, values and beliefs on to another society. " In the Second World War the PWE 
was one organisation established by the government to pursue these aims. 
The reason why the PWE is still missing from the field of intelligence studies is that 
of all the four components which have been identified as specific categories of foreign 
policy the cultural component is the one area which suffers from a lack of academic 
interest. Foreign policy studies concentrate on the political, security and to a more 
limited extent on the economic dimensions of foreign policy, almost to the total 
exclusion of the cultural dimension. This is no doubt a reflection of the political 
climate of the Cold War years when national security issues dominated international 
relations, but is also a result of the idea that `cultural' components of governmental 
policy were the concern of those studying international communications, media 
theorists and the comparatively new field of cultural studies. The concentration in 
foreign policy studies on the political and security components has also been emulated 
by the field of intelligence studies, who therefore also exclude the intelligence work 
of those involved in the cultural dimensions of foreign policy. 
A further problem surrounds the difficulty of understanding the relationship between 
propaganda, political warfare and intelligence. The hidden dynamics of this 
relationship has been an important factor in complicating the analysis of the decision- 
making process and the way in which intelligence impacts upon that process. The 
way in which foreign policy is made and the `secrecy' surrounding the intelligence 
services means that it is incredibly difficult to ascertain the contribution of intelligence 
to any policy outcome and such is the ambiguity surrounding the relationship that it 
is `practically impossible to distinguish between policy-making on the one hand and 
3sUfote B. Inamete, `The Nature and Management of the Cultural Components of 
Foreign Policy :A Comparative View'. Paper given at the Annual Conference of the 
International Studies Association. Atlanta, USA. March 1991. 
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intelligence input on the other'. " However, whilst it is difficult to be absolutely sure 
about the impact of intelligence on foreign policy, an understanding of the way in 
which propaganda, political warfare and intelligence operations exist in a mutually 
beneficial relationship can be explained and is important for the re-evaluation of the 
work of the PWE. 
Propaganda 
The understanding of the modern term propaganda has emerged from the events of 
both World War One and World War Two, and today a wide variety of definitions 
are available. ' As Gary Messinger observes, `as sometimes used, the word seems 
to refer to almost any kind of systematic effort to win over an audience'. " The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines propaganda as `publicity intended to spread ideas 
or information', whilst Collins incorporates the pragmatic ' organised dissemination 
of information, allegations etc. to assist or damage the cause of a government or 
movement'. 
Propaganda can also be defined in a more sinister way as `the presentation of 
"Michael Handel, `The Politics of Intelligence' in Intelligence and National 
Security. 2 (1987). pp. 5-46. Handel also excludes this type of intelligence from his 
analysis, dealing with the army, navy and air forces only. 
'See Balfour, Propaganda in War. Robert Jackall(Ed. ), Propaganda. (London: 
Macmillan, 1995). Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in The World War. 
Originally published in 1927 (reprint New York: Peter Smith, 1938). J. W. Baird, 
The Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda 1939-45. (Minneapolis, USA: Minessota 
Press, 1974). Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda. (Oxford University Press, 1964). 
John Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument : The British Experience. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the 
State in the First World War. (New York and Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992). Mariel Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War 
Britain. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Charles Roetter, Psychological Warfare 
(London: Batsford, 1974). R. M. Christenson and R. O. McWilliams (Eds) Voice of the 
People. Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda. 2nd Edition. (New York: 
Mcgraw Hill, 1967). 
"Messinger, British Propaganda and the State.. p. 9. 
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information in an emotionally appealing manner for a purpose that is not candidly 
announced, and in support of a point of view we would probably debate if we were 
presented with all the available facts that might bear upon the opinion and were 
invited to scrutinise the evidence prudently' . 42 It has been defined as the technique 
of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations`. " A more 
informative definition includes the aims of propaganda and the way in which is used. 
as a policy instrument by government : `Propaganda and information services 
represent ways of... organising influence and mobilising prestige to reach certain 
policy objectives, in alliance with the normal instruments of power'. " 
Intelligence 
The problem of defining intelligence is as difficult as the problem of defining 
propaganda, and is , as Wesley Wark admits, a 
`slippery problem'. `s The English 
word `intelligence' originally meant the gathering of `news' or `information', but as 
Andrew and Dilks point out the word has now taken on , as the word propaganda 
has, 
a political complexion. ` One of the primary functions of intelligence is now 
identified as `to obtain by covert means, and then to analyze, information which 
42 Ibid. p. 9 
43 H. D. Lasswell in Jackall, Propaganda. p. 13. 
"D. W. Ellwood, in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring (Eds. ), Politics, Propaganda 
and Film. 1918-45. (London: Macmillan, 1982) p. 51. 
45Wark, Espionage: Past, Present, Future? p. 4. See Also Christoper Andrew, 
Secret Service (1985). Christopher Andrew and D. Dilks (Eds. ), The Missing 
Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century. 
(London: Macmillan, 1984). Christopher Andrew and P. Noakes, Intelligence and 
International Relations 1900-1945. (Exeter: University of Exeter 1987). Patrick 
Beesley, 1977. Defence Analysis Special Issue on Intelligence. 3 (June, 1987). F. 
H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol. II and III. Richard 
Langhorne (Ed. ), Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). John Lewis Gaddis, `Intelligence, 
Espionage and Cold War Origins'. Diplomatic History. 
46Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension. p. 4. 
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policy-makers cannot acquire by more conventional methods. " According to John 
Lewis Gaddis intelligence is `the open and clandestine collection of information, the 
organization and implementation of covert operations, and the systematic analysis of 
adversary intentions and capabilities' . 41 According to a CIA booklet, Intelligence: 
The Acme of Skill, `Simply put, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the 
world that surrounds us'. 49 That knowledge and foreknowledge is gained, according 
to the CIA, by `information management; gathering raw information; analyzing it; and 
disseminating evaluated information to decision makers, some of whom have been 
elected to make national security decisions'. -' Thus whilst providing information, 
data and facts the intelligence reports also provides a `picture' of the situation at any 
given moment and presents `images' which policy makers consciously or sub- 
consciously draw upon in their consideration of any particular strategy or policy. 
Of course, the reverse also occurs, when the policy-maker disregards intelligence for 
any number of political, personal or strategic reasons. 
Propaganda and Intelligence 
`Without intelligence there could be no propaganda : or at least no effective 
propaganda'. " The link between propaganda and intelligence is plain. Philip Taylor 
believes that `propaganda and intelligence are different sides of the same medallion. 
Although they are contradictory in intent - with'one devoted to secrecy and the other 
to publicity - in practice the distinction is rarely so clear ... official propagandists 
have long recognised the importance of secrecy and anonymity; practitioners of 
intelligence have equally long understood their connection with propaganda'. " The 
" Ibid. p. 5. 
"caddis, `Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins. p. 191. 
"'James Der Derian, `Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance 
Practice' in Wark, Espionage: Past, Present, Future? p. 29. 
30 Ibid. p. 31. 
"Cruickshank, The Fourth Ann. p. 59. 
"Philip M. Taylor. International History Review. xv, i. February 1993. p. 210- 
211. 
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fundamental aim of propaganda is to manipulate public opinion, and to influence 
behaviour, mood or attitudes. To do this, an accurate knowledge of the audience is 
an essential pre-requisite. Thus `an exact knowledge of the prevailing climate and 
constellation of opinion is necessary for the successful influence of public opinion'. " 
In addition to the need for an `exact` knowledge of existing opinion, there is also a 
generally accepted criteria of the necessary elements for effective propaganda. 
According to Aldous Huxley, `political propaganda is effective, it would seem, only 
upon those who are already partly or entirely convinced of its truth'. ` It appears to 
be most effective when appealing to existing beliefs and values, and bearing some 
relation to reality, and `influential only when it is a rationalisation of the desires, 
sentiments, prejudices and interests of those to whom it is addressed'. " On the other 
hand `the limits of effectiveness were reached where propaganda ran against existing 
values and norms, encountered more plausible counter-propaganda (or counter- 
prejudice) and contradicted obvious reality and the evidence of people's own eyes'. 56 
Discussing the potential for the successful manipulation of public opinion, Huxley 
concludes that `written propaganda is less efficacious than the habits and prejudices, 
the class loyalties and professional interests of the readers'. "' 
The need for accurate and timely information about the audience in question is 
itemised within the criteria above for the effective use of propaganda. An accurate 
intelligence service to provide the required `exact knowledge' of existing opinions and 
attitudes and a comprehensive knowledge of the political, social and economic 
s'Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans. p. 1. 
-`Aldous Huxley, `Notes on Propaganda', in Christenson and McWilliams, Voice 
of the People. p. 326. 
"Op. cit. 
I Kershaw in David Welch, Nazi Propaganda. (London: Croom Helm, 1983). 
pp. 200. 
"Christenson and McWilliams, Voice of the People. p. 325. 
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situation within which opinions are formed is also necessary. Knowledge of the 
history, sentiments, desires and prejudices is also an important factor in the 
formulation or `invention' of propaganda. Importantly, as David Welch points out, 
the reality of the situation or conditions of the audience is vital, as the element of 
`truth' within the propaganda which will make the whole message credible to the 
audience. Intelligence is necessary, then, of the past, present and future aspirations 
and desires of the target audience. 
The Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment recognised the fundamental links 
between propaganda and intelligence. In 1945, documents salvaged by the American 
authorities in Berlin included minutes ostensibly dictated by Goebbels as a diary and 
which included his `Nineteen Principles' that appeared to underlie his propaganda 
plans. Principle 1: Propagandists Must Have Access to Intelligence Concerning 
Events and Public Opinion. In theory Goebbels maintained that he and his associates 
could plan and execute propaganda only by constantly referring to existing 
intelligence. " Michael Balfour confirms this, pointing out that `an essential part of 
any effective propaganda operation is a good intelligence service, not only to provide 
material for output and to guide policy, but also to supply an accurate estimate of the 
enemy's intentions'. " 
Political Warfare 
Robert Bruce Lockhart, Director General of the PWE from 1942 - 1945, defined 
political warfare , incorporating propaganda, as an instrument of warfare that 
`practises every form of overt and covert attack which can be called political as 
distinct from military. It seeks both to counter and by intelligent anticipation to 
forestall the political offensives of the enemy'. In addition to the use of propaganda 
to `persuade' or change public opinion and behaviour, `black' propaganda also 
includes what Lockhart describes as `a whole series of secret or `black' operations 
"Leonard W. Doob, 'Goebbels Principles of Propaganda' in Jackall, Propaganda. 
p. 193. 
''Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 100. 
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which can be suitably classified under the headings of subversion and deception'. 60 
These operations involved providing educational information in sabotage skills such 
as loosening of railway lines, the manufacture of home-made bombs, extraction of 
poison from hedgerow plants and information about ways of producing short-lived 
illnesses in order to be absent from work. All this was designed to put a brake on the 
German economy and thus disrupt the military plans of the Nazi regime, and advance 
knowledge of the anticipated movements of the regime would increase the value of 
operations. There is evidence, however, that this policy failed and that the German 
economy remained strong and effective. " 
Political Warfare and Intelligence 
If political warfare, in all its forms, was to have any chance of success then the PWE 
had to obtain information on a wide variety of issues. They required an intimate 
knowledge of the social and political conditions, and the latest, detailed and accurate 
information concerning public opinion and the `state of mind' of people in Germany. 
Additionally, they needed access to particular information for the `black' operations 
and activities outlined above. In short they needed to be as familiar with German 
society as the Germans were themselves. A huge task, and a `new' task for the 
intelligence officers in the PWE. Political, military, economic and strategic 
intelligence was a well-established and understood function within Whitehall, whereas 
the nature of intelligence required by the PWE about German society was not 
available at the time, posing particular problems of its own. 
Lockhart outlined the relationship between political warfare and intelligence when he 
stated that ' it demands a highly specialised intelligence service of its own and, 
60Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. p. 155. 
61See Tim Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Jane Caplan (ed. ) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Chapter Two, `The primacy of 
politics'. Richard Overy, Why The Allies Won. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995). 
Chapter Six, `A Genius for Mass-production: Economies at War'. Noel Annan, 
Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany. (London: Harper 
Collins, 1995). Chapter Five, `The Air Offensive'. 
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above all, an accurate estimate of the enemy's intentions'. '2 The importance of 
intelligence for the maximum gains in political warfare was expanded to include an 
assessment, or at least a partial idea, of the future situation. An accurate intelligence 
service would enable the PWE to anticipate the future moves of the enemy which 
could be incorporated into plans for propaganda and political warfare in order to 
negate, or at least create problems for the Nazi regime. 
Having outlined why the revision of the history of the PWE is required it is still 
necessary to ask the central question of any research: 'So What? '. ' So what 
difference will the focus on the intelligence component of the PWE make to existing 
knowledge ? In broad terms, this `missing dimension' is an important part of the 
evaluation of the PWE and as Christopher Andrew warns `the great danger of any 
missing historical dimension is that its absence may distort our understanding of other, 
accessible dimensions'. ` This is an important addition to the history of the PWE for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, it will contribute to an exploration of the links between 
intelligence and propaganda, subversion and sabotage. Secondly, the intelligence of 
the German Section is of a different `type' of intelligence than previously produced 
in Whitehall. It is intelligence of the political and social conditions in Germany and 
represents a hitherto undiscovered dimension of the 'intelligence revolution'. ' 
Directly relating to this, the content of this intelligence is useful as a source of 
information for those researching into the political and social history of Germany. 
The analysis of this intelligence will also be useful to those involved in the evaluation 
of British foreign policy during WWII, since it illustrates clearly the depth and 
breadth of information available to the policy-makers of particular issues at the time 
decisions were being made. Finally, the revision of the history of the PWE will 
'Ibid 
6'Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961. 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987). p. 63. 
`Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension. p. 1. 
9Hinsley does not mention this type of intelligence, nor do any of the scholars in 
the field of intelligence studies to date. 
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identify the many different activities in which it was involved alongside propaganda, 
and will also trace the continuity of thinking and ideas in government after World War 
Two about the use of propaganda and political warfare as instruments of foreign 
policy. 
The thesis argues that any evaluation of the PWE must be made on the basis of the 
nature of the work of the PWE which included, but was not wholly comprised of, 
propaganda activities. The emergence and evolution of an intelligence service to 
support and inform the PWE within the Executive is central to the history of the 
PWE. Essentially, it will show that the PWE became more and not 1kS important 
after the announcement of Unconditional Surrender at Casablanca, as a result of the 
expansion of intelligence services at that time which facilitated a diversification of 
the activities in which it was involved after 1943. For this reason the thesis 
concentrates on the period from January, 1943 to the Spring of 1946, when on the 
directions of the JIC1, the intelligence operations of the PWE were transferred to the 
Foreign Office. An additional reason for the concentration on this period is that the 
sixteen-month period between the setting up of the Executive in 1941 and the end of 
1942 was a period of intense internal political rivalry. It is only after the resolution 
of the main problems of political control that the PWE really began to expand and 
function in a co-ordinated way within Whitehall. 
The first section of the thesis traces the evolution of government involvement in the 
organisation of propaganda and political warfare activities in the first half of the 
twentieth century from which the PWE emerged, and includes a detailed examination 
of the people, policies and operations of the PWE. The second section concentrates 
on intelligence documents of the PWE, focusing primarily on the Weekly Reports of 
the German Section, but also incorporating related documents produced within the 
PWE and the links between the PWE and the JIC. This part of the thesis will 
evaluate the content of the documents, not only for the particular value of the 
information they contain but as an indication of the changing role of the PWE 
'Joint Intelligence (sub-) Committee (of Chiefs of Staff). 
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between the period 1943 to 1946. The case studies of this section will therefore exist 
as a separate historical analysis of their content and at the same time illustrate the 
chronological phases of the diversification of work which the PWE became involved 
in. As a whole the thesis will locate the work of the PWE within the wider context 
of the British intelligence services during this period and illustrate the continuity of 
the belief in Whitehall concerning the use of political warfare as an instrument of 
British foreign policy. 
The chronological historical approach of this thesis is based upon archival research, 
personal interviews and communications with individuals who had worked within 
PWE and SOE, and is informed and supported by secondary source material. In 
addition to the general and specific problems of research outlined above, the 
problems of using the intelligence reports and documents need to be outlined, and also 
the ways in which these were resolved. 
The first problem concerned the relative value of this intelligence. The need to know 
the value of the Weekly Reports before concentrating on them as historical documents 
was a primary concern both in terms of the empirical content and the potential 
importance for inclusion into the evaluation of foreign policy. This was addressed by 
ascertaining the status of intelligence reports, since this usually indicates the value 
attached to the information they contain and the accuracy and reliability of that 
information. Additionally, the circulation list of such documents also indicates the 
value attached to them, and also identifies the people and departments who received 
them. This in turn indicates the potential influence this intelligence might have had 
in particular areas. Obviously different types of intelligence would be seen by 
different levels of departments, depending on the nature of the content. The `Secret', 
or `Confidential' documents would have a different and wider circulation than the 
`Top Secret' documents which would only seen by a chosen few. 
Research on Foreign Office and Cabinet Office files produced information about the 
organisation, administration and propaganda functions of the PWE, but little about the 
German Section organisation itself. A report produced in 1946 by A. R. Walmsley, 
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who was intimately involved in PID/PWE intelligence work, specifically the German 
Section, was important. The specialised knowledge of Michael Balfour, Assistant 
Director of Intelligence and the brother-in-law of Duncan Wilson, the Director 
responsible for the German Section, was particularly helpful in understanding the 
importance of the reports. 
From here some conclusions could be drawn. The first is that the status of the reports 
was `high', with the information being seen as the `base-line' for objective intelligence 
about Germany, the German people and the Nazi regime. According to Walmsley, 
the Weekly Report was an `invaluable document' which was eventually circulated to 
all departments dealing with Germany, other than military or economic' The 
circulation of the documents increased from the initial use by the propagandists and 
the BBC European Service and BBC to include the Foreign Office, JIC, and Joint 
Intelligence Staff. Additionally, the PWE was always represented at JIC meetings, 
either by the Ministers of Economic Warfare and Information or by the attendance of ' 
one of the Directors of the PWE for specific discussions on current issues. " The JIC 
and Chiefs of Staff had always been aware of the desire to have up-to-date 
information on morale and conditions in enemy countries, and in December, 1939 the 
JIC asked that the Weekly Report of the PID (continued after 1941 in the PWE) be 
made available to the JIC Sub-Committee. ' At the beginning of March, 1940 the 
Chiefs of Staff drew the attention of the JIC Sub-Committee to the `necessity of 
keeping a constant watch on propaganda with a view to obtaining possible indications 
'A. R. Walmsley, `EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence. Recollections 
of A. R. Walmsley', 20th January, 1946. Received from Walmsley, 5th February, 
1995. 
"PRO/CAB81/122 JIC (44) Report No. 177.1st May, 1944. 'Effects of the 
Allied Bombing Offensive on the German War Effort with Particular Reference to 
"Overlord"'. CAB 81/122 JIC (44) 215 (0). 25th May, 1944. Discussion on the scale 
of opposition to "Overlord". CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 4th Meeting. 16th January, 1945. 
(London: Public Record Office). Assessment of the effects on German of heavy air 
attacks on Berlin in conjunction with Russian offensive. Also the potential use of 
German generals in British hands for political warfare to bring about surrender. 
d'PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC (39) Minutes of the 18th Meeting. 29th December, 1939. 
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of German intentions'. " At the JIC meeting on 23rd April, 1940 it was agreed that 
the Ministry of Economic Warfare and `Sir Campbell Stuart's organisation will be 
asked to detail an officer by name who would be prepared to join the Intern-Services 
Project Board when matters affecting their respective departments were under 
consideration'. " Campbell Stuart's organisation was the Department of Propaganda 
in Enemy Countries, known as `EH', which after 1941 was absorbed into the PWE. 
The role of the intelligence of the PWE can now be seen in the context of the wider 
picture of the organisation of intelligence services in Britain during this period. 
A third problem was the amount of material contained within the reports. George 
Martinelli complained that on visiting Woburn and seeing what he described as `vastly 
inflated intelligence sections' he once calculated that `one hundred times as much 
intelligence material was being churned out daily as anyone expected to make use of 
it could possibly digest'. ' Produced every week throughout the war, the reports 
were sometimes twenty-two to twenty-three pages long, covering a wide range of 
issues reflecting the priorities of research for the section at the time. They also 
included a large amount of `low level' information such as the `greying' of Hitler's 
hair or the tone of voice of Goebbels on a particular day. This was not problematic 
as such, but merely time consuming in the sifting of the relevant information from the 
irrelevant. 
Having discussed the aims and problems of this research all that remains to be done 
in this chapter is to give a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. 
CHAPTER TWO offers an overview of the period from the beginning of the 
twentieth century to 1941 and traces the emergence and evolution of the propaganda, 
political warfare, subversion and intelligence activities of successive British 
governments. It identifies the key events and issues at home and in Europe which 
"PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC(40) Minutes of the 11th Meeting. 5th March, 1940. 
"PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC (40) Minutes of the 24th Meeting. 23rd April, 1940. 
n The Times. Monday June 4th, 1973. 
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led to the creation of organisations for the manipulation of public opinion. The aim 
of the chapter is to illustrate the necessary parallel growth of organisations for 
propaganda and intelligence during the inter-war period, and the political climate in 
which the PWE was established in 1941. It also charts the changing attitudes in 
Britain towards the German people, which was instrumental in the way in which the 
role and functions of these organisations was defined by government. Finally, the 
focus on the people working within these organisations from 1916-1941 is used to 
illustrate the continuity in thinking and expertise in Whitehall and belief in certain 
circles concerning the potential power of propaganda as an instrument of policy. 
CHAPTER THREE concentrates on the organisational structure, the people and the 
changing policy and diversification of the activities of the PWE. It will identify the 
events of 1940 to 1941, which resulted in changes in attitude towards Germany in 
Britain, and the internal politics resulting from those changes which were the context 
for the establishment of the PWE. In order to consider the political atmosphere in 
which the intelligence officers operated, which is important for assessing their 
interpretation of events, the chapter will give biographical details on the key people 
working for the PWE, their background and their role in the Executive. Finally, 
the chapter looks at the intelligence officers and their contribution to the work of the 
PWE, and considers some of the important questions about the circumstances which 
determined the success or failure of the intelligence reports such as the availability of 
sufficient raw data, accuracy, problems of individuals perceptions of their role and the 
important problem of political interference in the intelligence process. 
CHAPTER FOUR is the first of three chapters, focusing on the assessment of the 
Weekly Reports, and looks at the question of German `resistance' to the Nazi regime 
and public opinion in Germany. There is a formidable amount of research and 
literature into this area of German history, as there is with the related studies on 
`resistance' in Germany to the Nazi regime. " The announcement of the 
"Detlev J. K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and Racism 
in Everyday Life. - (Penguin, Harmondworth : 1989). Timothy Mason, Social Policy 
in the Third Reich. The Working Class and the 'National Community, 1918-1939. 
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`Unconditional Surrender' policy in 1943 in effect defined the policy in Britain that 
all Germans were to be treated as Nazis. By definition this policy denied the 
existence of the `other Germany' , of `resistance' in Germany, which supported the 
Allied military strategy and policy towards Germany. However, it is not 
contradictory to examine the intelligence reports for information about `resistance' in 
Germany during this period. The Weekly Reports contain a wealth of material about 
the social and political conditions in Germany and the reaction of the German people 
to the Nazi regime, and they are examined to find out how much information was 
available in Whitehall about `resistance' in the Third Reich at a time when British 
policy was based upon the premise that there was no resistance. This chapter asks 
some particular questions. What do the intelligence reports tell us about the 
conditions in Germany at this time, and in the context of the research and literature 
now available on this, how accurate were they ? What do the reports tell us about the 
reaction and response of the German people to the increasing coercion and terror of 
the regime after 1943? Is it possible to define a criterion which was used by the 
German Section to identify and define behaviour as `resistance' as opposed to 
(Oxford: Berg, 1993). Ian Kershaw. Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the 
Third Reich. Bavaria 1933 - 1945. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Ian Kershaw. 
The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. Third Edition 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1993). David F. Crew (Ed. ), Nazism and German Society, 
1933-1945. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). David Clay Large (Ed. ), 
Contending With Hitler: Varieties of Resistance in the Third Reich. (Washington, 
D. C. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). P. Hoffmann, German 
Resistance to Hitler. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). Klemens 
von Klemperer, German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 
1938 - 1945. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Anton Gill. An 
Honourable Defeat: A History of the German Resistance to Hitler. (London: 
Heinemann, 1994). Michael Balfour, Withstanding Hitler in Germany, 1933-1945. 
(London: Routledge, 1988). Fabian von Schlabrendorff. Trans. Hilda Simon. The 
. 
Secret War Against Hitler. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Eberhard 
Zeller, Trans. R. P. Heller and D. R. Masters. The Flame of Freedom: The German 
Struggle Against Hitler. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Ulrich von 
Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries. The Story of the Forces Against Hitler Inside 
Germany, 1938 - 1944. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Annedore 
Leber. Trans. Rosemary O'Neill. Conscience in Revolt: Sixty-Four Stories of 
Resistance in Germany, 1933-45. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). 
Patricia Meehan. The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to 
Hitler. (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992). 
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`dissent' or `non-conformity' ? What intelligence was available to the foreign policy 
decision makers of the day engaged in the process of formulating policy towards the 
German people? Why was this information apparently ignored ? Finally, what 
`images' of the German people were created by the intelligence officers in the Weekly 
Reports, and did these affect British attitudes towards Germany in planning for the 
post-war treatment of Germany and the German people ? 
CHAPTER FIVE brings into focus the way in which the activities of the PWE were 
expanded after 1943 to include the major issue of the occupation of Germany after he 
military defeat. " The Executive was no longer only engaged in political warfare to 
bring about the defeat of Germany, but was involved in planning for the post-war 
treatment of Germany. The problems of occupying Germany were immense, requiring 
the maximum amount of information about the economic, social and political 
conditions existing during the war, and the likely conditions and problems which 
might arise after the defeat. The intelligence concerning the political `resistance' and 
public opinion was vital in this respect and was used for the categorisation of the 
`political reliability' of individual Germans after defeat, and the morale and likely 
attitude of the majority of the people during the immediate occupational period. How 
useful was the work of the German Section in this respect ? How accurate were their 
predictions of the conditions as the `enemy' became the `occupied' ? 
The unprecedented and controversial decision by Britain to occupy an industrially 
"See N. Pronay and K. Wilson (Eds. ), The Political Re-education of Germany 
and Her Allies After World War Two. (London: Croom Helm, 1985). Ian Turner, 
. 
(Ed. ), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany. British Occupational Policy and The 
Western Zones, 1945-1955. (Oxford: Berg, 1989). Alan Milward, The Reconstruction 
of Western Europe, 1945-51. (London: Methuen, 1984). Michael Balfour, The Tides 
of Power, (London: Routledge, 1991). Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace. 
Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1993). Victor Rothwell, Britain and The Cold War, 1941-47. (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1982). T. D. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War. (London: 
Andre Deutsch, 1976). Peter Weiler, British Labour and The Cold War. (California: 
Stanford, 1988). 
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advanced European country was accompanied by the astonishing and `breathtaking"' 
aim of re-educating the German people by `changing their mind'. 76 What role did 
the PWE play in this process, particularly since they were recognised as being the 
department which held the most comprehensive intelligence about Germany and all 
things German ? In considering this question the chapter will also include details of 
the PWE's involvement in producing information about the enemy and enemy- 
occupied countries for the use of Commanders in the Field in Europe. The 
Handbook for Germany, the `bible' used by the occupying forces, will also be 
examined. 
CHAPTER SIX assesses the final area of activity in which the PWE become 
involved. This was the monitoring of Russian propaganda to Germany and the 
movements of the Red Army in occupied Europe. The beginning of the perception 
in Whitehall of the Russian `threat' to British interests, has been identified as having 
its roots in the Foreign Office. The origins of the perception of the Russian `threat' 
which signalled the beginning of the early Cold War period is an important debate. " 
This chapter considers the importance of the changing `images' of Russia and the 
information produced by the PWE, their interpretations of the motivations and reasons 
for Russian behaviour and the analysis of Russian propaganda in order to anticipate 
the future intentions of Stalin in the closing stages of the war. The chapter illustrates 
the way in which the `image' of Russia in the PWE was never as positive as the 
's N. Pronay, in N. Pronay and K. Wilson. The Political Re-education of Germany 
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`image' portrayed by the public rhetoric of the leadership in Whitehall. Finally this 
chapter will identify the continuation of the work of the PWE into the post-war years 
and the acknowledgement in Whitehall of the importance of the intelligence work of 
the PWE in relation to Russia. It will identify the way in which the government 
quickly responded to the perception of the Russian `threat' and revived the 
organisation for political warfare, relocating the people with the expertise and 
techniques inherited from their work in the PWE. 
CHAPTER SEVEN brings together the results of the assessment of the intelligence 
work of the German Section of the PWE, and incorporates this into the re-evaluation 
of the history of the Executive. Finally, this chapter offers some comments and 
general conclusions concerning the continuation of government involvement and 
organisation for the use of propaganda and political warfare as an instrument of 
foreign policy from the beginning of the century to 1947. 
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The Organisation of Propaganda and Intelligence: 
The growing belief in Britain during the inter-war years that propaganda could and 
should be used to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad was also 
accompanied by the paradoxical attitude of ministers in government who displayed a 
distinct reluctance to be seen to be involved in what was seen as a `shady' or 
`ungentlemanly' business. Whilst this was largely as a result of the experiences of 
World War One, the ambiguity surrounding the use of propaganda as a manipulative 
instrument of politics in modern society can be traced back to classical times when the 
dangers of the use of rhetoric in public life were first recognised. 
Indeed, the origins of the modern term propaganda are to be found in classical times 
when rhetoricians appeared to make two opposing claims for their skills. One was 
propounded by those who taught their pupils the art of speaking well and who 
identified this skill with the attainment of the aesthetic principles. of eloquent speech. 
The other was based on a pragmatic understanding of the use of public speech which 
led some rhetoricians to claim that the aim of their skill was to bring success in public 
life. ' The former was based on the idea that language should be used as a social skill 
to enhance public debate, whilst the latter argued that the principal aim was not 
merely to enhance the debate but to win it. The critics of the pragmatic practitioners 
recognised the dangers of this new weapon . Plato accused these orators of placing 
victory in the debate which could lead to the decline of ethical and moral values in 
public life. He proclaimed that `persuasion was an ignoble aim in itself and could 
only be justified if the orator was seeking to convince others of the truth', 2 whilst 
'Michael Billig, Arguing and thinking. A rhetorical approach to social psychology. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Chapter Four: `The science of 
persuasion'. 
Ibid. p. 54. 
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Philo accused the `smooth-tongued orators' as being the descendants of the evil Cain. ' 
If a `science' of rhetoric based upon rules and forms of rhetoric which guaranteed 
principles of certainty could be discovered, then in the hands of the wrong people it 
could have disastrous consequences. It was feared that the discovery of the `secrets' 
of rhetoric would provide a guarantee of success to the practitioners regardless of the 
moral or ethical motivations of the speaker. It was believed that one of the `secrets' 
which would lead to principles of certainty would be the ability to ascertain the 
thoughts and feelings of the audience in order to be in the most advantageous position 
to use that knowledge in order to `win' victory in a debate. This recognition of the 
importance of understanding the human mind in order to manipulate behaviour can 
be seen as one of the earliest connections between the need for accurate `information' 
about the human mind in order to influence public opinion and attitudes. It has also 
resulted in the idea that the use of language to persuade an audience has always been 
connected to psychological issues. Although it can be argued, as Grant does, that the 
pejorative definition of propaganda emerged after the events of World War One, ` the 
origins of the modem day popular image of propaganda as not being about `truth' 
can also be traced back to the fears aroused in classical times about the use of 
language to persuade an audience. 
In 1481 Caxton illustrated his belief in the power of language when he defined 
rhetoric as `a science to cause another man by speech or by writing to believe or to 
do that thing that thou wouldst have him for to do'. ' The first use of the term 
`propaganda' can be dated to 1622 when the Roman Catholic Church under Pope 
Gregory XV established a College for the Propagation of Faith to support overseas 
missions, and demonstrates the political use of propaganda in the context of 
Ibid. p. 59. 
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Church/State relations at the time. ' During the course of the nineteenth century the 
use of pamphlets, speeches and personal appeals to persuade or manipulate public 
opinion became widespread. At the turn of the century this was given further impetus 
by ' development of mass-circulation newspapers, an instrumental factor in the 
emergence of a `mass' audience who were increasingly interested in social, economic 
and political issues. 
1903-1919 
The Communications `revolution' and War. 
Before World War One the informal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the 
press had been based on the need to control information. In the aftermath of the 
disasters of the Boer War when the lack of control over the press had resulted in 
questions being asked about the loyalty of the press and the perceived failure to 
control the dissemination of information during the war had led to pre-World War 
One discussions on press censorship. The growing tension and dangers in Europe 
focused attention in government about the need for co-operation over press censorship 
and intelligence operations between the Admiralty, the War Office, the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Office and the India Office. In particular, the need for securing 
joint action in any future war was addressed in November 1903 by a committee 
chaired by Lord Esher to look into the situation and to propose changes in the way 
the War Office operated. In June 1904 Lord Esher's War Office (Reconstitution) 
Committee set out the problems in its first report. The result was the creation of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) which would be responsible for the essential 
task of bringing together the hitherto separate departments responsible for the defence 
of the realm. The aim of this pre-war Committee was `precise and definite .. to 
provide the plans necessary to defend the country and the Empire'. ' According to 
Christopher Andrew the Enquiry led by Lord Esher resulted in a radical reform of the 
'Jackall, Propaganda. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State. Grant, 
Propaganda and the role of the State. 
'Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government. Third Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1959). p. 292. 
32 
War Office, and marked the beginnings of the emergence of a modern secret service 
intelligence community in Britain. ' The Committee set up the institutional 
infrastructure which would provide a co-ordinated response from the Admiralty, the 
Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air (from 1917) and Heads of 
Naval and Military Intelligence. They would report to the CID who in turn reported 
to the Cabinet. One essential task of the CID in the inter-war period was the co- 
ordination of supplies for the services. The system of co-ordinating the Cabinet 
Committees which arose out of the CID was then developed further by the War 
Cabinet in 1940-1945. 
The importance of military cable censorship, and the need to guard and change secret 
codes to prevent sabotage and espionage, had been recognised during the Boer War 
by Sir George Cockerill. In 1905, reflecting the concern in Whitehall about 
censorship in government, Cockerill was recalled from South Africa to administer a 
Special Intelligence sub-division of the War Office. He began by imposing imperial 
cable censorship and making plans for censorship in the event of another war and in 
1906 he was made head of the Special Intelligence Section where he stayed until 
1908. By 1909 government interest and involvement in wireless and communications 
technology was already in progress, and the Colonial Defence Committee (renamed 
Commonwealth Communications Council after 1933) was already working on building 
and maintaining the `Red Network', the undersea strategic cable communications 
system of the Empire expanded in 1909 to include a network of wireless stations! 
When Britain entered the First World War on 3-4th August, 1914 many people in 
Whitehall had also recognised the need for governmental action to address public 
opinion both at home and abroad. It was felt necessary to monitor and control the 
`Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
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information the British public were receiving and also to make preparations for the 
use of propaganda to support British interests abroad. On 5th August the British 
government cut the transatlantic cable between Germany and America, thereby 
ensuring complete control of information going directly to America for some months. 
On August 7th, 1914 an official Press Bureau was set up with extensive censorship 
powers and whilst it was headed by a civilian it was staffed largely by military and 
naval personnel. The War Cabinet and Admiralty became increasingly involved in 
postal, cable and wireless censorship which was seen as much more important in 
terms of military efficiency. Cockerill was reassigned to head the SIS (which later 
became known as M05 or MI5) and the benefits of the pre-war planning ensured that 
Britain had complete control of the imperial channel of communication - the `Red 
Network'. 
At the beginning of the war, the appearance of German propaganda was brought to 
the attention of the Cabinet by Lloyd George. The British Ambassador in Rome had 
informed the Foreign Office that the German government had been `flooding' offices 
in Italy with propaganda, which was assumed to have been in preparation for the onset 
of hostilities. " At the end of September the appearance of German propaganda in 
many countries in Europe was discussed and Lloyd George urged the Cabinet to set 
up an organisation to `inform and influence public opinion abroad and to confute 
German mis-statements and sophistries'. " Charles Masterman was asked to head this 
organisation which was known as the War Propaganda Bureau and was located in 
Wellington House, Buckingham Gate. ' According to Messinger, Masterman was 
the `single person who, more than any other, caused the British state to become a 
major actor in the propaganda arena'. " His brief was not to engage in propaganda 
"Messinger, British Propaganda and the State. p. 33. 
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directed against the enemy or the home-front in Germany, but to concentrate on 
making the British case in Allied and neutral nations. The key principle adopted by 
Masterman, and which identified him as a propagandist, was secrecy. At this stage 
propaganda was only to use `neutral' facts and information and not fabrication, and 
close attention to the mentality of the audience and public opinion was seen as the 
most important factor necessary for effective propaganda. Masterman divided the 
work of the department into different countries, and the staff worked closely with 
military and naval intelligence, as well as reading German newspapers and periodicals 
to glean information which could be used by the propagandists against the enemy. 
In the Spring of 1915 the Directors of Intelligence at the War Office were becoming 
increasingly interested in propaganda. Cockerill's department had expanded rapidly 
and by 1915 included ninety five officers and twelve-hundred staff. During his stay 
at the War Office he began using the information collected by the censors to try to 
predict future conditions and particularly, from the analysis of business 
communications, the future needs of the wartime economy. The information collected 
by the censors also provided for the development of propaganda aimed at the enemy 
in uniform, to the soldiers in the trenches, which he described as `army propaganda' 
as distinct from propaganda to civilians. This was followed in 1916 when a 
department known as M 17(b) was established as a propaganda production department 
of the War Office under the Director of Military Intelligence. Housed in Adastral 
house adjacent to Wireless and Cable, the department was responsible for the 
`compilation and distribution of propaganda by cables and by wireless'. " 
By 1916 the War Propaganda Bureau was distributing six fortnightly illustrated 
newspapers, and had published three hundred books and pamphlets They had three 
hundred centres of distribution and circulated four thousand photographs a week to 
press all around the world. But the signs of the problems of overlap between the 
official groups, institutional sources and private sector propaganda were quickly 
recognised. The Bureau was working in parallel with the Press Bureau which had 
14 Pronay and Taylor, `An Improper Use of Broadcasting.. ' p. 371. 
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been set up to censor newspapers, and also the War Office and Admiralty who were 
responsible for censorship of postal, cable and wireless. In addition to this the 
Foreign Office News Department also disseminated individual news stories. A rift 
developed over the control of propaganda and censorship with the Foreign Office and 
Home Office suggesting that control should be in the Foreign Office, whilst the War 
Office and Admiralty argued that a new department staffed with experts should be 
established. 
During this period Lloyd George had replaced Asquith as Prime Minister and the 
administrative organisation for propaganda received serious attention. One of the 
reasons that Lloyd George became involved was that he understood the connections 
between political power in the twentieth century and the importance of access to the 
means of control of mass opinion. At his first meeting of the War Cabinet on 9th 
December, 1916 the matter of organisation and political control or propaganda was 
discussed, and it was agreed that a separate department was needed. In February 
1917 the Department of Information was established, with its headquarters in the 
Foreign Office. John Buchan was made head of the Department and the War 
Propaganda Bureau was incorporated into the new structure where Masterman 
continued as head until 1918, overseeing literary propaganda, recruiting war artists, 
and supporting film making. 
Under Buchan's leadership the size of the staff increased, as did the quantity of 
materials produced, with more films being made and overseas activity increased. One 
of the most important changes that Buchan brought about was in the increased use of 
propaganda against the `enemy', re-directing the strategy which had focused on 
neutral and Allied countries to which Masterman had been limited previously by the 
Cabinet. Other important changes took place in the Department under Buchan's 
leadership. The recognition of the need for accurate and specific information led 
Buchan to set up an Intelligence Bureau and he employed R. W. Seton-Watson to work 
in this department. The Intelligence Bureau used its analysis of the daily newspapers 
of enemy countries to produce reports on the internal conditions from which the 
propagandists could work. 
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Another important change in British propaganda was the increasing resort to deception 
as a partner in propaganda, the increased contacts with other Intelligence departments 
and the use of counter-espionage techniques. One favoured method was that of 
`leaking' intelligence information through the press via friends on American 
newspapers, the most famous being the Zimmermann telegram. u The Bureau also 
used, probably for the first time, vicious propaganda directed at children in the form 
of a subsidised book by Henry Newbolt entitled Tales of The Great War. This 
identified the Germans as `Huns - the enemies of humane and civilized life' and 
accused them of the calculated mutilation of women and children through air attacks 
on England. " This can be seen as one of the very early examples of `black' 
propaganda, reflecting the fears produced by the escalation of the war which now 
involved entire populations and also demonstrated the willingness to use any strategy 
against the enemy. But in 1918, whilst the propagandists were expanding their 
departments and techniques there was a growing concern in Whitehall over the 
increase in the size of these organisations. One of the main problems was the 
recognition that control should be in the `right' hands, and that there should be 
ministerial responsibility for such a large organisation working within the government 
which was dedicated to the manipulation of public opinion. 
As a result of these growing concerns in Whitehall Lloyd George upgraded the status 
of the Department of Information by establishing it as a Ministry of Information, 
which took over responsibility for most of the functions of the Department of 
Information. Lord Beaverbrook was appointed Minister whilst Buchan became his 
Director of Intelligence. At the suggestion of Beaverbook, the job of developing 
propaganda to the `enemy' went to Lord Northcliffe, who accepted the position on 
condition that Beaverbrook was not involved and that he only reported to the Prime 
Minister. In February 1918 Northcliffe took up his responsibilities as Head of the 
Enemy Propaganda Department. In the Autumn of 1917 he had returned from a 
"The `leaked' telegram from Berlin to Mexico, which Britain used in an attempt 
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mission in the USA and during this time had met Campbell Stuart, whom he 
appointed Deputy Director of the Enemy Propaganda Department. Stuart was helped 
in his work by the appointment of Henry Wickham Steed as policy adviser, whom 
Northcliffe had already made Foreign editor of The Times. The Department was 
housed in Lord Crewe's mansion in Curzon Street. This arrangement, however, also 
brought problems, and Balfour at the Foreign Office argued that the propagandists 
should not be privy to military and Foreign Office despatches. After considerable 
internal debate and conflict the Intelligence Bureau moved into the Foreign Office in 
March, 1918. Seton-Watson was re-located to the Political Intelligence Division of 
the Foreign Office but also continued to work closely with Campbell Stuart in the 
Enemy Propaganda Department. 
At this stage in the war the government was unable or unwilling to define precisely 
their propaganda policy towards Germany, nor the functions of the new department. 
Stuart believed that `propaganda should depend on policy', and he enlisted the help 
of H. G. Wells, a friend of Northcliffe, as Director of the German Section and asked 
him to produce a document for Ministerial approval which would provide them with 
a focus for operations. This document, submitted to the Department Steering 
Committee on the last day of May, 1918 set out the main aims of propaganda which 
should be based on the recognition of the need to draw a distinction between the 
German people and the German government. Propaganda to Germany was to include 
the message that, as soon as the German Government was changed, the people would 
not be held responsible for its behaviour. The other point made by Wells in 1918 was 
the need for a League of Nations, and he suggested that Germany should be informed 
that they would be allowed to join as soon as they had made a complete break with 
the Imperial system of government. The Foreign Secretary of the day, Balfour, 
. 
broadly accepted this outline of the role of the Enemy Propaganda Department and 
the policy to be adopted towards Germany and the German people. Northcliffe's 
department based their propaganda around the speeches made by Woodrow Wilson 
which invariably distinguished between the German people and German policy, and 
emphasised that Allied policy was to liberate all people, including the Germans, from 
militarism. The aim of severing the ties between the people and the government, the 
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encouragement of the German people to throw off the shackles of their government 
was also to become the principal strategy adopted for British propaganda towards 
Germany in 1938. 
According to Basil Liddell Hart, the beginning of 1918 and the establishment of 
Northcliffe's organisation witnessed the `development and thorough organization' of 
government propaganda, when for the first time the full scope of such warfare was 
understood and exploited. " Liddell Hart also identified a strategy which was to be 
so controversially adopted in World War Two : the air bombardment of civilians to 
lower morale as an important psychological weapon of war. However, according to 
Michael Balfour, the `myth' suggesting that Northcliffe's Department had been 
responsible for creating the low morale in Germany on the home front and thus also 
the `stab-in-the-back' myth of the German propagandists is not supported by the 
evidence. " For Balfour, the Department did not produce `any appreciable volume 
of political propaganda of their own wording', and even if they had the logistical 
problems of delivering it to the home-front meant that very few Germans would have 
received any of the leaflets despatched". For Balfour, `the `propaganda' which 
weakened their will to go on fighting consisted of the responsible public utterances of 
the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom rather than 
of clever messages conveyed to them through newly-discovered channels by 
Northcliffe's organisation'. " 
Almost before the Department had time to make any impact with propaganda to 
Germany the war ended, and the day after the Armistice was signed Northcliffe 
resigned and the Department was rapidly closed down. According to Philip Taylor, 
at the end of World War One Britain `disarmed in the weapon of words as she did in 
17Basil Liddell Hart. History of the First World War. (London: Cassell and 
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other conventional forms of armaments'. " However, this was not before the Foreign 
Office had made the necessary arrangements for a post-war propaganda campaign 
against the German people. It was believed that Northcliffe's propaganda now 
offered an opportunity for the British Government to drive home the message to 
Germany of her absolute defeat. According to Wickham Steed, this was to be used 
to enable `the German people gradually to see why Germany lost the war, and to 
understand the force of the moral ideals which had ranged practically the whole world 
against her'. ' In order to do this Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, reconstructed a 
smaller version of the Foreign Office News Department to carry on the work of the 
Ministry of Information, and to preserve the instruments of propaganda and publicity 
which could be put back into operation speedily if the situation required. ' 
At the end of the First World War the use of propaganda as an instrument of war 
against the battle and home front had been recognised as an important element of 
government. The conditions of `total war' had led to the understanding that 
`Propaganda is the task of creating and directing public opinion.. since strength for the 
purposes of war was the total strength of each belligerent nation, public opinion was 
as significant as fleets and armies'. ' The victory over Germany seemed to verify 
and legitimise the belief in the use of propaganda in the `national ' interest, 
influencing the mind and it was hoped, the behaviour of the enemy. 
However, post-war revelations that a large amount of the information disseminated 
had been based on falsehoods and fabrication were confirmed in memoirs, giving the 
impression that citizens of all the nations involved had been misled and manipulated 
by propaganda. In the early years following the end of World War One, `propaganda 
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was not a word which most educated English men chose to discuss freely'. It was `a 
good word gone wrong, debauched by the late Lord Northcliffe'. $ The records of 
Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons record the `unanimous hostility in 
the House of Commons to Beaverbrook's Ministry of Information', ' illustrating the 
widespread feelings of unease and distrust. 
But the success of advertising and propaganda added to the growing body' of literature 
being produced by social scientists which suggested that humans were capable of being 
manipulated by language, and social psychology verified these theories, giving them 
an alleged `scientific' basis. At the end of the First World War propaganda had 
achieved scientific status : `the public mind to the trained propagandist is a pool into 
which phrases and thoughts are dropped like acids, with a foreknowledge of the 
reactions that will take place'' Although some questioned the validity of such 
theories, steadily throughout the inter-war years the belief in the power of propaganda 
increased dramatically alongside Government concerns about the need to control such 
an instrument. 
1919 - 1935 
Retrenchment and Discontinuities. 
Within the first year of the end of World War One the arguments which had initially 
led to a reduction in Britain's capacity for, propaganda were soon exposed as 
illusionary. As early as 1919 there was a growing body of opinion, not confined 
solely to the Foreign Office, which recognised that propaganda and publicity was a 
necessary, if unwelcome, addition to twentieth century diplomacy. The determination 
to retain an organisation for propaganda was confirmed in a memo written by S. A. 
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Guest in the Foreign Office, setting out the rationale that the new methods and 
channels being used in post-war international relations meant that a permanent 
organisation for Political Intelligence and Propaganda was needed. 2' 
Pronay identifies the inter-war years as the beginning of the most important period in 
the evolution of propaganda and publicity, when decisions were taken about the use 
of propaganda in an era when political developments in Britain were causing as much 
anxiety in Whitehall as the tensions in Europe. Despite the defeat of Germany, and 
the popular perceptions about the use of propaganda in the conflict, attitudes changed 
drastically towards continued Government practice of censorship and propaganda in 
peacetime. Now, government had to consider the use of propaganda and publicity to 
defend themselves at home as well as abroad. Gaining control of public opinion was 
seen as vital to the interests of the Government of the day. 29 
Whilst the belief in the potential power of propaganda was tempered by the anxieties 
in Whitehall about the desirability of adopting such an instrument of warfare, events 
outside the control of the Government heralded in a new era of censorship and 
control in Britain. The creation of a mass electorate in 1918, the lessons of World 
War One and the need for conscription, the growth of the Labour movement and 
strikes, including police strikes in 1919 , and the General Strike of 1926 all took place 
in a society where the monopoly of information which had hitherto been held by 
Government was now being challenged. Whitehall became acutely aware that the 
opinions and perceptions of working people in Britain would from now on be 
important elements which would have to be taken into account ' by any future 
government. During these volatile years of the Depression, Government reaction to 
the situation was one of extreme caution. Broadcasting in Britain, apart from the 
`hallowed traditions of Speakers' Comer, Wilkes and Liberty or the Freedom of the 
Press' was not to be allowed by any individual lest it should become an `engine of 
2Taylor in Pronay and Spring, Propaganda, Politics and Film. p. 29. 
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propaganda'. 30 
Additionally, during this period the recognition of the need for intelligence of 
potential enemies in Europe led to a re-evaluation by the CID of the intelligence 
services in Britain. In this the CID was at the forefront of setting up intelligence 
agencies for specifically identified areas of importance vital toBritish interest. One 
of the areas of interest, identified by the experience and problems of the First World 
War blockade of Germany, was the importance of economic warfare. The importance 
attached to such information was illustrated clearly in the decision not to publish the 
volume of the official history of the war which dealt with the blockade. The reasons 
given for not publishing, the only volume suppressed by the Government, was that 
is would be a valuable source of information to an enemy. As a result , the CID 
set up an Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, which by 1925 
had expanded its interests into looking at methods of economic warfare. " When the 
Allied Control Commission ended in 1928 it was recognised that Britain had lost a 
major source of information on the German economy and in 1929 the CID established 
the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee (FCI) 1929 to provide 
a substitute information service. This committee recommended the establishment in 
1931 of the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) which was to gather information and 
report back to CID on armament and war stores abroad. Until 1935 the IIC was 
funded by the Foreign Office secret vote. In 1934 it shared the headquarters of SIS 
and by 1936 was attached to the Department of Overseas Trade. 32 
Whilst the government established organisations to gather intelligence about political 
conditions in Europe during this time, the rise of National Socialism in Germany and 
the increased tensions in Europe brought the attention of Whitehall to the need to 
expand the existing facilities for the projection of Britain abroad. This change in 
thinking in Whitehall was illustrated in practical terms when Major Joseph Ball, who 
30 Ibid. p. 13. 
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had worked for the Intelligence Services (M16) in World War One, was given the task 
of building up a `new kind of propaganda organisation which it was believed the age 
required'. " A pioneer in the analysis of the new role of propaganda in international 
affairs was E. H. Carr, who warned of the dangers of propaganda used by the 
Bolsheviks and the Third International which he felt was being met with a reluctance 
by the liberal democracies to take it up in their own defence. " The result was the 
establishment of the National Publicity Bureau in 1934 which was created to inform 
and manipulate public opinion. " The importance attached to the role of this bureau 
can be seen from the budget it was given, which was nine times that of Northcliffe's 
organisation in 1918. 
Alongside the NPB the Government also established a department for the production 
of external propaganda and publicity, the British Council. In 1932, Sir Stephen 
Tallents, an important figure in government publicity during the inter-war years, had 
published a thirty-seven-page booklet entitled `The Projection of England' in which 
he advocated the use of propaganda abroad and which, according to Balfour was a 
pioneering work which did much to prompt the foundation of the British Council. ' 
After distinguished service in the First World War, Tallents had become secretary to 
the Cabinet committee dealing with the General Strike of 1926 and supervised 
publicity at the Empire Marketing Board from 1926 to 1933. In 1933 he became the 
first public relations officer of the Post Office whilst also acting as chief publicity 
assistant to the Supply and Transport Committee of the Cabinet, a secret organisation 
responsible for handling domestic crises. " 
In 1934 the British Council was formed, under the auspices of the Foreign Office, to 
"Pronay in Pronay and Spring, Propaganda, Politics and Film. p. 17. 
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use propaganda powerfully and deliberately to put Britain's case in reply to criticism 
abroad. According to Ellwood, the Foreign Office expected dramatic results from the 
work of the Council and believed it could use British `influence' and `cultural 
propaganda' to avoid another European war. The strategy and policy of the cultural 
component of British foreign policy at this point was to use `all means to fight the 
political debates in people's minds rather than on the streets'. " It has to be seen as 
an alternative to physical warfare - what Cruickshank describes as a `genteel 
propaganda machine'", and an important vehicle for the `appeasers' to use in their 
strategy to avoid another World War. 
But attempts to manage the political situation in Europe by the use of `persuasion', 
were still viewed with regret and distaste in some quarters. In 1935 Kennard, the 
Ambassador to Poland argued, `I feel that if we are going to follow the nauseating 
example of all others of conducting propaganda, we should do it well'. '0 This 
offers a perfect example of the `private' belief in the potential to manipulate public 
opinion and the `public' abhorrence of such a method. It is also indicative of the 
resentment felt that Britain had been forced to come to the `defence on foreign shores 
of her predominant ideas, traditions and ways. of life, things -the British were as 
unused to defending or spelling out as they were their Constitution'. " Nevertheless, 
external pressures left the Government with no alternative but to involve itself in the 
propaganda war in Europe. 
Nicholas Pronay argues that between 1918 and 1945 the new media and new 
techniques of `communications' were perceived as having a fundamentally important 
political role. And, because this belief was acted upon by governments and 
"Pronay in Pronay and Spring, Propaganda, Politics and Film. p. 17. 
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communicators alike, `politics and communications' came to be inextricably linked. "' 
In Britain the use of communications to disseminate information or propaganda was 
adopted in the inter-war years in an attempt to manage the serious political difficulties 
faced by the government both at home and abroad. 
In Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-war Britain , Mariel Grant has 
provided an excellent survey of the growth of government publicity in Britain during 
the inter-war period. " Grant argues that at the outbreak of World War Two the 
British government was far from assuming total responsibility for the dissemination 
of public information and lists three reasons for this. The first was that publicity and 
advertising was considered an `inappropriate' function of government, identified with 
the sale of goods not the sale of ideas in which the government wished to be engaged. 
Secondly, the State was still wary of engaging in propaganda due to the negative 
connotations of post-World War One experience which resulted in an `abhorrence of 
propaganda' in Whitehall. And thirdly, a reluctance in government to engage in 
publicity campaigns. " Her conclusions about government attitudes to the use of 
propaganda at home during the inter-war period mirror the reluctance of Whitehall to 
involve itself, publicly and privately, in the organisation for `enemy' propaganda in 
war : `the manner in which domestic publicity arrangements developed in Britain in 
the first half of the twentieth century owe more to the influence and attitude of the 
Treasury and of officials within Whitehall active in addressing the issue rather than 
any particular party in power'. `' 
In the first fifteen years following the end of World War One the gradual return to 
the use of propaganda to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad was also 
matched by the establishment of intelligence departments for the observation and 
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monitoring of political and economic conditions in Britain and Europe. It can be seen 
as the response of government officials, concerned about events at home and abroad, 
and their attempt to manage European affairs in the hope of avoiding another war in 
Europe. But, by 1935 ministers in Whitehall recognised the need to take further 
measures to make plans for the defence of Britain in the event of a future war. 
From Propaganda to Political Warfare. 
In July 1935 a Sub-Committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence was formed to 
look into the capabilities of, and arrangements for censorship, and the use of news 
reports in wartime. At the initial meeting it was also recognised that a system would 
be needed for the issuing of news in wartime and another Sub-Committee, chaired by 
John Colville, was given the task of considering this issue. A year later, a sub- 
committee of this Committee, under the leadership of Rex Leeper who was then 
working in the Foreign Office News Department set up by Balfour in 1919, reported. 
The report suggested that a Ministry of Information should be created, consisting of 
five departments : Administration, News, Control (Censorship), Publicity and 
Collecting (originally called `Intelligence'). It was to be the centre for the distribution 
of all information concerning the war, and its main function was to present the 
national case at home and abroad. ` The main strength of the Foreign Office News 
department would be transferred to the News Division, which would be responsible 
for the rapid dissemination of information as opposed to `propaganda'. The Publicity 
Division would be set up if war broke out, to ensure that the national cause was 
properly presented to the public at home and abroad. Within the Publicity Division 
a planning unit would be responsible for working out the policy of propaganda. The 
Collecting Division would gather all of the information the Ministry needed to fulfil 
the tasks allotted to each Division. The importance of these initial plans lay in the 
centralisation into one single department of the functions of gathering, assessing and 
, "Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 53. 
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issuing of all information relating to war-time governmental activities and the 
separating of this department away from the government departments. 
In July 1936 Sir Stephen Tallents was appointed shadow Director-General designate, 
after Reith's refusal to take up the position, and spent the next two years trying to 
extract from government specific guidelines or functions and responsibilities of the 
Ministry. But whilst Tallents struggled, as Stuart had done in 1918, to ascertain 
specific guidelines on policy and to organise the Ministry into an efficient operation, 
events in Europe overtook the bureaucratic delays in Whitehall. 
By 1938 public opinion in Britain about the use of propaganda was changing. 
Faced, as it was, by the irrefutable proof of the use of propaganda by her European 
neighbours, the `unanimous hostility' which existed in the House of Commons in 
1918 was transformed by February 1938 into unanimous support for the establishment 
of organisations to provide propaganda in the defence of Britain. " 
Attitudes towards Germany during this period were also changing. During 
Chamberlain's period of Office as Prime Minister his policy of Appeasement came 
under increasing pressure with a polarisation of opinions at all levels. The anti- 
appeasement lobby had at its helm an influential and vociferous opponent of the 
policy, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart. 
He had spent time as a student in Germany in the 1890s, and had come to believe that 
Germany wanted Britain's destruction. ` His mistrust of the Germans continued 
throughout the Weimar period and led him to conclude that `the Germans never 
wanted or cared for democracy and only accepted it because they had no alternative 
when the First World War was over'. ' Essentially he believed that German 
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psychology was centred on cruelty, envy and self-pity'. " Vansittart organised and 
led the opposition to Chamberlain's lenient approach to Germany and followers 
included Harold Nicholson, Duff Cooper, Churchill, Brendan Bracken, Hugh Dalton 
and Clement Attlee. So pervasive was this line of thought in Whitehall that the word 
`vansittart' became a general term for anti-German, and had a meaning at international 
levels to the extent that when Churchill met Stalin in October 1944 and told him of 
the American Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's hatred of the Germans, Stalin 
replied `He must be a second Vansittart'. " The anti-Vansittart lobby who supported 
Chamberlain consisted of mainly left-wing or at least liberal people, clergymen, 
Labour MPs , German refugees and exiles, 
German political exiles, and included 
some who had been anti-Nazi throughout the 1930s such as Harold Laski, Victor 
Gollancz, Michael Foot, Stephen King-Hall and Eleanor Rathbone. 
Vansittart's views became increasingly `unwelcome' in Whitehall, creating divisions 
and conflict in government, and at the beginning of 1938 Chamberlain replaced him 
with Sir Alexander Cadogan. Vansittart was given the title of Chief Diplomatic 
Adviser and the Foreign Secretary (Eden), finding it difficult to find anything for him 
to advise on, suggested he should co-ordinate overseas British publicity. Given 
Vansittart's political views and the reasons for his removal from office it seems to 
have been a paradoxical decision for Eden to take . Nevertheless, Vansittart formed 
a committee and on 28th May, 1938 he sent a report directly to the Prime Minister, 
advocating the extension of the existing publicity departments, the creation of a new 
Film Council and the appointment of press attaches in key embassies. He also 
suggested the upgrading of Rex Leeper who had been the controversial head of the 
Foreign Office News Department with him in 1935.52 Chamberlain acknowledged 
the report but said that Vansittart must wait for the Foreign Secretary, now Lord 
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Halifax, to deal with it. Eden had resigned on February 20th over the policy of 
appeasement. Halifax did not deal with it immediately, no doubt because of more 
important issues of the day, but Leeper , who had a vested interest because it would' 
strengthen his own position in the Foreign Office, reported that his Department 
accepted the proposals put forward. The Treasury dragged its feet on the funding of 
these ambitious and costly proposals until the Munich crisis of September focused 
attention once more on the potential use of propaganda and `persuasion' to avert war. 
At the same time King-Hall supported the arguments being made that Britain was 
faced with a war of ideas, a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, between 
free and controlled thought. Britain's first weapon must be propaganda, regardless 
of the cost. " Tallents believed that the German people were divided and that 
propaganda could and should be used to exacerbate that division in an effort to bring 
about the downfall of National Socialism in Germany. He also made two suggestions 
which were fundamentally important for the evolution of the Organisation for 
propaganda in war. The first was that there must be an organisation for the study of 
public opinion in potential enemy countries and the second was that material must be 
prepared in case of war. ' The Defence Department endorsed this proposal. " 
In February 1938 Tallents submitted a progress report to the CID sub-committee and 
again requested clarification of the exact role of the Ministry. Although he was aware 
of the role of the MOI as responsible for the distribution of all wartime `information', 
he was not clear on the position regarding the preparation or distribution of other 
publicity material required by other Government departments.. However, his attempt 
to define the parameters of his responsibility failed and he was told that the 
departments concerned were the best qualified to handle their own publicity and no 
transfer of existing organisation would be made. The sub-committee noted that 
although the work of the MOI and other Government departments would probably 
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overlap, nevertheless the transferral of responsibility and other departments should 
only come in the light of experience and desirability. For the next twelve months 
Tallents continued to try to gain ministerial guidelines upon which to organise the 
embryonic Ministry of Information, but with a minimum of success. 
In September 1938, following the Munich crisis and in the light of the problems at 
the Ministry of Information, Chamberlain asked Campbell Stuart to set up a `secret' 
organisation responsible for enemy propaganda. This was to become the Department 
of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, which was to be funded on the `secret vote' and 
responsible to the Ministry of Information. The headquarters of this new organisation 
was the same as that of Cable and Wireless, Electra House in London, and it became 
known as `EH' , after 
Electra House or CS after its first Head, Campbell Stuart. The 
selection of Campbell Stuart and his experience in enemy propaganda World War 
One, and the use of Cable and Wireless offices as the `secret' location for their work 
in maintaining the Red Network were an obvious combination. Whilst the 
headquarters were in Electra House, the operations were located at Woburn Abbey. 
Stuart carried on where he had left off in 1918, now with crucial the addition of the 
new medium of radio. Initially he reported to the Minister of Information, Law Lord 
Macmillan until `EH' was transferred briefly to the Foreign Office in October 1939. 
It was moved back to the Minister of Information, Duff Cooper in June , 1940. The 
three other people, working alongside Stuart and involved in the running of `EH' 
were Rex Leeper (PID and Foreign Office), Major Dallas Brooks and Robert Bruce 
Lockhart. 
Sir Reginald (Rex) Leeper was born in 1888 and educated in Australia, initially, and 
then at New College, Oxford. " Between 1917 and 1919 he worked in the 
Intelligence bureau at the Department of Information and in the Political Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Office. His elder brother, Allan, was a close friend of 
Vansittart and Rex was also seen as a `vansittart', strongly antagonistic towards 
-'See also Select Biography. 
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Germany and appeasement. In 1939 Leeper moved to Woburn as Head of the 
revived PID of the Foreign Office. Bruce Lockhart, born in Anstruther, Fife in 1887 
and educated in Edinburgh had been Acting Consul-general in Moscow between 1915- 
1917 and had also worked in the Political Intelligence Department. " Major-General 
Dallas Brooks, an ex marine Officer, according to Baker-White spent the whole of 
the wartime in propaganda at `EH' and then the PWE, `fighting its battles at the 
highest level with the departments, Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet and a 
Prime Minister who to the last remained sceptical as to the value of political 
warfare"`. Also working in'EH' propaganda was Ivone Kirkpatrick, born in India 
in 1887, educated at Downside; he had also worked in Intelligence from 1916- 
1918.39 Subsequently he was appointed First Secretary in Berlin 1933-1938, and had 
interpreted for Chamberlain at Bad Godesburg and was present at Munich in 1938. 
The role of `EH' was to produce all forms of propaganda to enemy countries. As 
soon as territory was occupied by the enemy the responsibility passed from the 
Ministry of Information to `EH'. The department also began to liaise with the 
Communication Section of the Intelligence Service and for a while operated a short- 
wave transmitter which was used to broadcast propaganda to the German people 
purporting to come from a Conservative anti-Nazi group inside Germany. During the 
`phoney-war' period three or four leaflets a month were produced and scattered over 
Germany `instead of bombs'. 60 
During the same period and working alongside `EH' the intelligence community in 
Whitehall was also expanding and two organisations emerged in 1938 which were 
later to be fused in the Special Operations Executive under Hugh Dalton61. Initially 
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they were under the control of the Special Intelligence Services. These two 
organisations marked the beginning of a major innovation in the war, the use of 
sabotage and subversion. In March 1938 Section `D' (for Destruction) was 
established and headed by Major-General Laurence Grand, an Officer of the Royal 
Engineers whose Admiral was Hugh Sinclair then `C' , 
Chief of SIS. Section `D' 
was involved in undercover operations to counter Nazi predominance in small 
countries that Germany had just conquered, or was plainly threatening. Kim Philby 
found his way into SIS through his appointment to Section D in July 1940, and was 
instructed to report to Guy Burgess at an address in Caxton Street, London. ' The 
second organisation, GS(R) was a small, War Office funded, research section 
concentrating on tactics of guerilla warfare and whose Head was Major J. C. F. 
Holland' In March 1939, after the German occupation of Prague, GS(R) was 
incorporated into the Military Intelligence Department, given the new title MI(R) and 
moved offices next to Section V. Section `D' expanded rapidly after the outbreak 
of war, eventually employing 140 officers by July 1940 - more than the main body 
of SIS. " Ian Walmsley, who went on to work for the German Section producing the 
Weekly reports, was recruited by Grand and initially worked for Section `D', although 
he did not know the name of the organisation; he then moved over to `EH'in 1939 
and then PID/PWE in 1940. Christopher Andrew believes that `if Grand achieved 
little else, he at least accustomed some senior civil servants and Ministers to the 
unheard-of idea that a secret department specialising in sabotage and subversion could 
contribute to the war effort'. 
The relationship of `EH' and the wider intelligence community is clear. The JIC were 
aware of the need to have accurate information about the internal social and political 
conditions in enemy countries, and arranged to receive intelligence reports of the 
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,. 
Analysis of German Propaganda from `EH' at the beginning of the war. Within 
months, the JIC had requested a named representative from `EH' to attend meetings 
in which they had an interest. 61 
This early evolution of the organisations for propaganda, sabotage and subversion 
occurred within a political climate in Britain profoundly shaped by Chamberlain's 
appeasement policy. The principles during this time were, as already mentioned 
above, those put forward and followed by the Enemy Propaganda Department in 
1918. That is the distinction between the German people and the Nazis and the need 
to appeal to the German people to `throw off' Hitler's dictatorial regime in favour of 
a western liberal democratic style of government. It was acknowledged that there 
existed a separation between the Nazi regime and the German people, and at this stage 
the `enemy' was clearly the Nazi regime, all it stodd for and all who supported it. 
In clear contrast the German people were identified as the `other' Germany consisting 
of all the `ordinary' German people who were anti-Nazi and recognised as being 
oppressed by the terror and coercion of the regime. British propaganda policy 
during the `phoney-war' period was based on the question : `How can Germany free 
itself from the yoke of Fascism? '. ' 
But the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23rd August, 1939 followed by the invasion of Poland 
and the declaration of war began a process of change in public opinion in Britain at 
all levels. British propaganda initially supported the principles of the government 
propaganda departments of 1918 and 1938 and continued to attempt to drive a wedge 
between the German people and the Nazi regime. Chamberlain confirmed the 
government's policy in 1939 towards Germany in a speech on 4th September, when 
he said that Britain was not fighting the German people but a tyrannical regime which 
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had betrayed them. " The years 1939 and 1940, however, were to witness a change 
in attitudes, strategy and politics in Britain towards Germany and the German people 
which was reflected in a drastic re-appraisal and re-organisation of the existing 
departments of propaganda, subversion and sabotage. 
At the outbreak of war Law Lord Macmillan was the Minister of Information, but 
almost as soon as the announcement of the war with Germany was made the scheme 
put forward by the CID immediately began to break down. The system for control of 
information and censorship did not work, and created embarrassing and potentially 
dangerous blunders at the beginning of the war. The Press were suspicious of the 
Ministry, fearing it would restrict their freedom and resented tight governmental 
centralised control. The failure of government to address and resolve the issues raised 
during the previous two years had resulted in the creation of a large organisation, 
which by 1939 employed nearly 1,000 people, without the policy decisions being 
made which were vital to the work it had to do. The work of the Ministry was also 
seriously jeopardised by the rapid succession of Directors and Ministers during the 
first year of the war. Tallents, having been thanked for his work during the Munich 
Crisis was, according to Balfour, asked to resign his post in January, 1939. ' 
According to Grant, however, he was dismissed when he pushed for greater 
centralisation in the aftermath of Munich. " It was, however, probably a combination 
of these two events and the `final straw' of the confrontation with Campbell Stuart 
who had been asked by the Prime Minister to set up an organisation ('EH') for enemy 
propaganda in the event of war. This was a department which would be responsible 
to the Minister of Information and yet Tallents had been kept in ignorance of its 
existence. Lord Perth, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, was appointed the 
first Director-General of the Ministry of Information, but within months was replaced 
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by Findlater Stewart. But within weeks, Stewart was recalled to deal with an India 
crisis and in December 1939 he was replaced by a third Director-General, Kenneth 
Lee who was at that time the Chairman of Tootals. Lee stayed in post until August, 
1940 when the work of `EH' was absorbed into SOE. 
In September, 1939 in response to these problems, Hore Belisha, the War Secretary, 
suggested that responsibility be put back to the individual departments and the Press 
left to deal with them direct. The Cabinet accepted this proposal and effectively 
reversed the basis on which the Ministry of Information had been founded, leaving 
it responsible only for publicity. The News and Censorship Division was made into 
a Bureau, responsible to the Home Office. 
Macmillan resigned from the Ministry in December, 1939 and John Reith, who had 
refused the position in peace-time, was appointed Minister of Information in January 
1940. But his stay was equally as short as Macmillan's and, as already indicated, he 
handed over responsibility to Duff Cooper in May of that year. This constant 
replacement of people at the top in the Ministry, which was badly in need of 
experience and consistency in organisation, resulted in a lack of organisation and 
misunderstandings about the role of the Ministry of Information and who should be 
in control of propaganda to the enemy. 
As the German Army swept across Europe defeating Poland, invading Finland and 
Scandinavia attitudes in Britain towards the German people hardened. On 10th May, 
the German 4th Panzer Division crossed the River Meuse in Belgium on their way 
to France. At 4.30pm Chamberlain announced his resignation. A new government 
was formed, including members from all political parties and Winston Churchill 
became Prime Minister. He also took on the role of Minister of Defence, with 
additional authority as head of a special Defence Committee consisting of himself and 
the Chiefs of Staff. Duff Cooper replaced Reith at the Ministry of Information. 
Within two weeks the failure of the British bomber offensive to halt the German 
advance was matched by the failure of French troops on the ground, and towards the 
56 
end of May the decision had been taken to withdraw all British troops from the 
European continent at Dunkirk. The fall of France in the last weeks of June, 1940 
brought home to Churchill and the War Cabinet the utter failure of regular warfare. 
After long and detailed technical and military briefings the conclusion was that for the 
foreseeable future if Hitler retained control of Europe, Britain could not launch a land 
attack. 
The failure of regular warfare and the failure of the propagandists' attempts to 
`persuade' the German people to reject the Nazi regime combined to suggest that both 
British strategy and policy needed to change. The previous conflicts and change of 
leadership at the Ministry of Information were recognised to have seriously weakened 
the ability to provide a fast, co-ordinated and effective propaganda campaign. 
Campbell Stuart had taken advantage of the problems within the Ministry to retain and 
increase his responsibilities at `EH' and had been personally successful in that 
operation. But his department had made no significant contribution to the war effort 
and Churchill became immediately involved in propaganda and subversion activities. 
The situation in 1940 did not allow Churchill to enter the political debate concerning 
the moral problems of the use of propaganda or the desirability of using this 
`ungentlemanly' technique. 'Importantly, Churchill's opinion of the War Cabinet as 
being `hidebound, devoid of imagination, extravagant of manpower and slow"' was 
a forceful element in the decision to take control of the situation himself. 
It was also a decision based upon Churchill's perception of his role and responsibility 
as Prime Minister at such a dangerous moment in the nation's history. Whilst it has 
been argued that Churchill remained unconvinced about the effectiveness of political 
warfare, ' the decision nevertheless reflects Churchill's perception of his role as a 
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politician who realised that `the business of the politician is to consider not merely 
what is morally and theoretically desirable, but also the forces which exist in the 
world, and how they can be directed or manipulated to probable partial realisation of 
the ends in view. " Propaganda and subversion were existing forces which, despite 
the problems of ethics and organisational difficulties, in 1940 were still available 
forces for the defence of Britain. Typically Churchill ignored the traditional route of 
diplomatic discussion and debate and, within days of the fall of France, he summoned 
Dalton, an anti-appeaser and Minister of Economic Warfare, to Downing Street 
where he gave him the `secret' job of pulling together the existing but disparate 
strands of propaganda and subversion operations. Dalton's outlook on European 
affairs which was directed by his distrust and fear of Germany made him the ideal 
candidate to take over the `black' propaganda and subversion operations against 
Germany. " Dalton's view of Germany was summed up in a private note to Eden, 
written in 1942 when he was Labour spokesman for Foreign Affairs, in which he put 
forward his ideas about the future for Germany and in which he stressed that 
`Germany is, and will remain, even though defeated, the greatest potential danger to 
the world's peace and the lives of our children'. " 
In assigning Dalton to Special Operations with the task of `setting Europe ablaze' 
Churchill had already made the decision that Campbell Stuart's long career in 
propaganda was effectively over. Stuart was too closely associated with 
Chamberlain's policy and, identified as an appeaser, he had little chance of survival 
under Churchill's premiership. Stuart left Britain for a trip to Canada in June 1940 
and returned to find he was very quickly marginalised and then disregarded in `EH', 
his work and people being absorbed into Dalton's new organisation. Stuart's position 
in `EH' was taken over by Rex Leeper whose political opinion and attitudes towards 
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Germany, like Dalton's, were opposed to Stuart's. He was anti-German and an anti- 
appeaser and his friendship with Vansittart and background in intelligence in WWI all 
combined to put him in the front running for Stuart's job. 
Thus, within weeks of taking over as Prime Minister Churchill had given the work 
of `black' propaganda and subversion operations to Dalton, moving it away from the 
Ministry of Information to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and had replaced Stuart 
at `EH' with Rex Leeper. Both appointments signalled the change in the future 
direction of propaganda and subversion activities in the war. There is still some debate 
concerning Churchill's views regarding the value of propaganda. According to 
Michael Balfour Churchill `was not interested in the subject ... propaganda was not 
going to win the war'. 76 However, Churchill's decisive engagement with these 
issues indicates that he felt propaganda and political warfare to be potentially 
important factors in the war effort at this time. 
Two other issues had also been instrumental in the changing policy adopted by 
Churchill in June, 1940. The first was the lack of conviction in Britain of the ability 
to win the war after the fall of France in May, 1940. The second was the growing 
polarisation of public opinion in Britain about the German people, with the 
`Vansittart' view supported by Churchill, Eden, Ernest Bevin and certain members of 
the Labour Party becoming more popular. Added to this, the principles, strategy 
and policy of `EH' had now been proved to be a failure. The role of propaganda pre- 
1940 was now called into question as the nature of the Nazi regime and the German 
people was once again debated. With the German Army now only a few miles across 
the British Channel the `soft-line' approach of the Chamberlain Government in 
propaganda to the German people also appeared to have been a serious error of 
judgement, and the previous distinction between the two Germanys was increasingly 
questioned. 
At the beginning of 1940 `EH' had already started to shift propaganda from anti-Nazi 
76 Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 65. 
59 
to a generally anti-German line. In the Spring of 1940 the BBC felt it was no longer 
possible to make the distinction between the Party and the people and it was decided 
that the term `Nazi' should be excluded from news bulletins and `opposition was now 
crystallizing into. a distinctive doctrine similar to Vansittart's'. " Throughout the 
period Vansittart had continued his criticism of the British propaganda line towards 
Germany, producing pamphlets and making the `Black Record' radio broadcasts. This 
`hard-line', making less of a distinction between the `good' and `bad' in Germany, 
now began to win support in both the British Cabinet and the Press. In March, 1940 
he proclaimed that `Eighty per cent of the German race are the moral and political 
scum of the earth .. they have got to be hamstrung and broken .. they are a race of 
bone-headed aggressors'. " 
The Battle of Britain in July 1940 had the effect of reinforcing this attitude . Sefton 
Delmer noted that `the promises of an independent and self-determined future for 
Germany .. were no longer 
desired to be heard'. " Eden outlined this change in 
feelings and mood `I have no confidence in our ability to make decent Europeans of 
the Germans and I believe that the Nazi system represents the mentality of the great 
majority of the German people'. ' The fundamental principle that a distinction had 
to be made between Germans and Nazis was now challenged by events abroad and the 
`image' of the German people suffering under the `yoke of fascism' was incrementally 
replaced by an `image' of an aggressive, militaristic and expansionist nation led by 
the Nazi regime which had the full support of the German people. It was in this 
climate that Churchill took the decision to increase propaganda and subversion 
activities, based on the principle that the enemy was one Germany. The distinction 
between the `two' Germanys had in effect disappeared. 
'Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The Controversy Over `Vansittartism' in Britain'. 
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"Cited by Anthony Glees in G. Hirschfeld (Ed), Exile in Great Britain. (Oxford 
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One of the most important results of this changed attitude was the impact it was to 
have on the attempt by various individuals over the previous two years to open up 
negotiations with the British Government which would bring a negotiated peace 
settlement. Churchill's directive issued on 20th January 1941, in response to a peace 
feeler coming from a Swedish Baron named Knud Bonde began what was to become 
the `establishment' position on policy towards Germany . He had approached Lord 
Halifax in December 1939 in the name of Goring with a peace feeler. Halifax 
responded and when Bonde appeared in January 1941 with a similar message 
Churchill sent a note to Anthony Eden saying that Halifax had been entirely misled 
in December and that `Our attitude towards all such enquiries should be absolute 
silence'. " From now on peace feelers and attempts by the German resistance to 
open up discussions with the British Government were dismissed out of hand. As 
Klemperer points outs, although Churchill had never subscribed to the Vansittart 
arguments `one by one all distinctions between Germans and Nazis faded'. d2 
Klemperer argues that this decision reflects Churchill's resolve to end the war 
militarily through forging a Grand Coalition against Hitler and that it actually pre- 
empted Roosevelt's demand for Unconditional Surrender in 1943. It also pre-empted 
the conditions attached to the Atlantic Charter of August 9th . 1941 made between 
Roosevelt and Churchill which in effect denied Britain any possibility of taking 
unilateral action in attempting to negotiate with Germany a compromise . peace. In 
August Churchill gained support from Roosevelt on the basis of a promise not to 
make any secret `deals' with Germany, a decision he had already taken seven months 
earlier. 
In his new role as head of Special Operations, Dalton acted quickly and established 
two separate but associated departments to bring together the previously dispersed and 
uncoordinated departments of `EH', MI(R) and Section `D'. SO1 took over the 
`black' operations of `EH' and MI(R) (propaganda and intelligence), and Section `D' 
(subversion and deception) became S02. At the same time the intelligence operations 
"Klemperer, German Resistance Against Hitler. p. 218. 
82 Ibid. 
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of SOE were increased when John Baker-White was summoned by the Director of 
Military Intelligence who instructed him that he was to become involved in political 
warfare activities which had now been extended to cover the German armed forces. 
His job was to start a daily special broadcast programme, liaising with the BBC and 
Ministry of Information, and also to become involved in leaflet and rumour 
campaigns. In The Big Lie Baker-White stated that the job was `right up my street 
.. I 
have been in the game since 1923 fighting communism'. ' Baker-White had an 
extensive knowledge of the German past and in common with those now being 
appointed by Churchill's government had an equally negative view of Germany and 
the German people. He strongly condemned all those who had been `hoodwinked' 
by Goebbels and Hitler, in particular Sir Neville Henderson. Baker-White had 
intimate contacts with the Nazi underground, and especially with Ribbentrop's 
personal espionage service, and had information of everyone in France working for 
Germany. The initial staff allocated to Baker-White consisted of three young officers 
recruited from the German Section, namely Euan Butler, Paul Bretherton and Ian 
Colvin. On their first visit to the BBC they were met `with a cold suspicion just short 
of hostility'. " According to Baker-White, Butler specialised in the Nazi hierarchy 
and knew many of them intimately; Bretherton had lived in Germany `knew how their 
minds worked and talked their language'. " Colvin had been the News Chronicle 
correspondent in Berlin in the early 1930s where he had established secret contacts 
with some of the important German generals and also with individuals who saw in the 
`Hitler Movement' the `approaching ruin of their native land'. " Baker-White later 
bemoaned the loss of all three to PID/PWE in 1941. 
The open propaganda work of `EH' was left temporarily with Duff Cooper in the 
Ministry of Information. Menzies at SIS had hoped that `D' and MI(R) would stay 
'John Baker-White, The Big Lie. (London: Evans Bros. 1955. ) p. 11. 
" Ibid. pp. 55-56. 
0 Ibid. P. 55. 
'Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. Volume I. The Gathering Storm. 
(London: Cassell and Co. 1948) p. 64. 
62 
under his control and expand SIS, but in fact Churchill's decision took sabotage and 
subversion away from SIS and `black' propaganda away from the Ministry of 
Information. Whilst Menzies was unhappy with this situation but took no action Duff 
Cooper, as Minister of Information, vehemently resented the loss of the `black' 
activities of `EH' and began a battle with Dalton to keep all propaganda activities 
under the single control of the Ministry of Information. Dalton argued that all forms 
of verbal approach to the populations of enemy and enemy-occupied countries should 
be co-ordinated and under the control of one Minister. In November, 1940 Dalton 
attempted to gain control of the remaining `white' propaganda operations of `EH', 
but Cooper reacted forcefully and demanded SO1 back. Cooper's argument was 
based on his conviction that `open' and `secret' propaganda should be handled 
separately but within one Ministry, namely the Ministry of Information. This, of 
course, was in direct contrast to the idea of bringing propaganda, sabotage and 
subversion activities all together within the SOE. 
According to John Charmley, Cooper found himself in an impossible position at the 
Ministry of Information with a department lacking in the necessary support from 
Churchill in his efforts to find a role for the Ministry. In September of 1940 he was, 
according to his wife, bored and worried about his own position and believed that 
Churchill now hated him. One of the reasons for this was that as well as battling with 
Dalton and having little support from Churchill, he was convinced that Beaverbrook, 
a friend of Churchill, wanted control of the Ministry of Information for himself. ' 
Cooper's health deteriorated as Dalton continued to fight for the control of all enemy 
propaganda within SOE. In December 1940 Dalton again tried to gain the upper hand 
in the row and failed, and Churchill appointed Sir John Anderson to act as mediator 
between the two warring departments. 
In the Spring of 1941 Cooper made plans to appoint his own staff for propaganda and 
tried to get some of his own people back into the Ministry of Information, but was 
thwarted when Dalton learned of these plans and refused to part with any of his 
17 Ibid. p. 145. 
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people. Cooper's reaction was to demand that the people, expertise and activities of 
`EH' which he felt had been too quickly absorbed into Dalton's. `empire' should be 
returned to the Ministry of Information. The row which had been simmering just 
under the surface between Dalton and Cooper now exploded into the open, and Sir 
John Anderson was once more summoned to try to resolve the differences between 
the two Ministers. The result was that on 16th May a triumvirate was formed with 
Eden, Duff Cooper and Dalton who would control their own staffs but co-operate with 
each other, but essentially the conclusion was that the responsibilities for propaganda 
and subversion operations should stay as they were; Dalton would be responsible for 
secret propaganda and subversion operations and Duff Cooper for open propaganda. 
Despite acceptance by all three Ministers this did not solve the problems, and 
Churchill brought in his trusted advisor , Lord Beaverbrook in a final attempt to sort 
out the differences between Dalton and Cooper. " On May 30th Beaverbrook sent 
for Bruce Lockhart and advised him that Eden wanted to make him an Under- 
Secretary and to co-ordinate policy and `black' propaganda. Obviously Eden was also 
unhappy with the failure of the triumvirate of Ministers and had decided to try to 
solve it by appointing Lockhart, an experienced diplomat and at the time working for 
`EH' and the Political Intelligence Department. Lockhart's career had begun in 1912 
when he was sent to Moscow as vice-consul where he stayed until being recalled in 
1917. At the outbreak of World War Two he rejoined the Foreign Office and worked 
for the Political Intelligence Department before moving on to become Director- 
General of the PWE. " Lockhart was advised to accept the post , but informed 
Beaverbrook that unless the friction between the Minister of Information and the 
Propaganda Department was resolved his task would be 'useless. " The outcome 
of further negotiations was what Lockhart called `a thoroughly bad compromise' with 
propaganda being placed under the control of a ministerial Committee composed of 
"According to Eden, Churchill's `affection for Beaverbrook was a blend of 
sincere admiration and of a generation of political experiences shared together'. 
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Eden, as Chairman, Cooper and Dalton. " Again Lockhart was asked to accept the 
job as Deputy-Under Secretary of State, and he replied that he would need time to 
think about it, feeling that he was being used to provide an easy and temporary 
solution to a `silly ministerial squabble'. ' 
However, the weekend of June 22nd 1941 was to prove decisive in Lockhart's 
imminent entry into the propaganda field. He had accepted an invitation to spend the 
weekend with Lord Beaverbrook. During his stay Beaverbrook was hastily summoned 
by Churchill to help prepare a speech, and at 9pm Lockhart listened to Churchill's 
broadcast speech, which was an announcement of the German attack on Russia, and 
which Lockhart believed to have been `perhaps his most important speech of the 
war'. " When Beaverbrook returned at 10pm on the night of the speech he had 
details for Lockhart of plans for the re-construction of propaganda activities and again 
asked Lockhart to accept the position he had been offered. Feeling that it was now 
a duty to accept he did so and his appointment was announced in Parliament on July 
3rd. 
On the 15th July Lockhart made his first report to Eden `During the past fortnight I 
have made a much closer inspection of a situation which has been vaguely familiar to 
me since the beginning of the war. I found the confusion, overlapping and lack of 
organisation even greater than I had believed possible'. " At the same time the war 
between Dalton and Cooper over propaganda policy was being conducted at the 
highest level in Whitehall. Cooper wrote to Churchill suggesting the time had come 
to make some decision about the role of the Ministry of Information and a few days 
later made it plain that he would resign unless the serious problems within the 
" Ibid. 
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Ministry of Information and the conflict over `EH' were resolved to his advantage. " 
Again he received the minimum of support in the Cabinet, and celebrated his last day. 
at the Ministry of Information by dining at the Dorchester with Sir Robert Bruce 
Lockhart. The vacant post of Minister of Information was given to Brendan Bracken, 
Churchill's Parliamentary Private Secretary, who in fact continued the battle with 
Dalton over the future of SOE. 
During this period Dalton put forward plans to the Joint Planning Staff for a 
subversion operation in Europe with the aim of producing a single, sudden and 
complete revolt in the enemy-occupied countries of Europe. " In essence the 
proposals involved using the manpower of occupied Europe to support the Allies. 
This was not a plan to encourage or foster guerilla warfare in the occupied territories, 
but a plan to train and arm patriots in preparation for `single, sudden and complete' 
uprisings in carefully chosen occupied territories. The role of the British armed forces 
would be to isolate the area from German military intervention, to assist the patriots 
in capturing key areas and to destroy the enemy within the theatre of operations. The 
plans also incorporated the use of the air force to interrupt German communications 
and the navy, where possible, to land more troops who would assist the patriots and 
also protect the bases and harbours on which these forces depended. The overall 
strategy was to move from one chosen area to another and eventually to bring about 
a `general political insurrection throughout Europe ... which would reproduce the 
condition of Ireland in 1920 or Palestine in 1936'. However, after consideration these 
plans were rejected because of the serious logistical and political problems involved. 
The rejection of these plans signalled the death of the `Fourth Arm' concept of 
subversion as a separate and equally important weapon of war alongside the other 
`traditional' weapons. More importantly for Dalton was that the rejection also 
, 
relegated the importance of subversion from an independent to a subsidiary weapon, 
and undeniably weakened the strength of his arguments for keeping SOE intact. . 
95Charmley, Duff Cooper. p. 150. 
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Within weeks, on 8th August, 1941 the Ministerial Committee appointed by Anderson 
on 16th May (now with Bracken replacing Cooper) put forward an outline for the 
separation of `black' propaganda activities from SOE which was subsequently 
approved by the Prime Minister. " Bracken, Dalton and Eden would act as the 
Standing Ministerial Committee to deal with major problems of propaganda policy and 
would be supported by an `official' Committee of three: Robert Bruce Lockhart, Rex 
Leeper and Brigadier Dallas Brooks. 
What is interesting is the choice of people for the `official' committee. Aware of the 
problems of the past between Cooper and Dalton which had resulted in inefficient 
and unsatisfactory organisation and running of the propaganda war, it appears that 
Bracken and Eden worked together to ensure that Dalton did not win the next battle, 
which they assumed he would instigate in his `war' to retain SOE. At first glance it 
would appear that the three `officials' would represent their respective departments on 
an equal basis. But Lockhart's appointment as Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office, Leeper, like Lockhart a Foreign Office `man', and Brooks who had 
worked for both at `EH' ensured that the Foreign Office would have control. Dalton, 
obviously aware of this, suggested that the three `officials' should not head the 
department but co-ordinate and direct the policy of government. Bracken and Eden 
accepted, and the three worked to produce a solution to the problems they faced. On 
14th August Lockhart, Leeper and Brooks produced outline proposals for the make-up 
of the new organisation . Basically that certain sections of the Ministry of 
Information, BBC and SO1 should be brought together into one department to be 
known as the Political Warfare Executive. 
Dalton rejected these proposals immediately, confirming the view that he was still 
determined to keep SOE together. He claimed that if `black' propaganda were to be 
returned to the Ministry of Information he would lose half of his organisation which 
would be to act against the charter given to him by Churchill in July 1940. The 
conflict between Dalton and Bracken was far more vicious and personal than the one 
Dalton had conducted against Cooper, resulting in what Ben Pimlott has described as 
the deplorable situation that `Instead of body-line bowling at the Hun, there was the 
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degradation of the Whitehall War' - Dalton and Bracken's war. ' Lockhart told Eden 
on 11th August that Dalton was again halting any progress and that SOE's charter 
might have to be amended to allow their plans for the organisation of the PWE to go 
ahead. Eden, however, did not comply with Lockhart's request and instead told him 
that the Executive Committee did not think it appropriate at this time to alter the 
charter in any way. " On 22nd August, 1941 Lockhart once more wrote to Eden 
referring to the Standing Ministerial Committee of the day before, and bringing to 
Eden's attention the `deplorable situation in which our propaganda machinery has been 
for a long time and still is', with `most of the energy which should have been directed 
against the enemy has been dissipated in inter-departmental strife and jealousies'. 
Furthermore, he added, `If our war effort is not to suffer, it is of paramount 
importance that our propaganda machine should be put in order at the earliest possible 
moment'. " Eden, marked the last passage in red and noted to Alexander Cadogan 
`If this is still the position I shall have to take the whole business to the Cabinet. I 
have done all I can do to bring the warring departments together'. 10° 
Eden's reply to Lockhart that SOE's charter could not be altered brought a swift and 
angry reply from the `official' committee. On September Ist Lockhart, Leeper and 
Dallas Brooks penned an angry and joint reply to the Ministers stating that they 
believed their plan had been rejected as a result of the internal problems between the 
Ministers. On the 27th August D. Stephens (secretary) had received a memo signed 
by Dalton and Bracken, and in agreement with the Foreign Secretary they wanted the 
committee to `submit as soon as possible proposed arrangements for providing the 
staff required for the complete fusion of personnel of the Ministry of Information, the 
"Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton. (London: Jonathan Cape 1985). p. 340. 
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BBC and SO1 and include appointments in each area of a Regional Head'. ` Their 
plan was the only basis for the efficient organisation of propaganda. Dalton tried 
once more to hold on to SO1, arguing that the PWE's activities outside Britain must 
be conducted through SOE, thus making him controller of all propaganda operations. 
Brendan Bracken was no more willing to accept this proposal than Cooper had been 
in 1940, and in the knowledge of his friendship with Churchill which Dalton did not 
have he refused Dalton's suggestion. Dalton, unpopular with civil servants in 
Downing Street and also vindictive in his remarks about his fellow civil servants in 
Whitehall was unwise in his outspoken pronouncements. He thought Eden to be a 
`vain, feminine creature', and declared that he could not decide which was worse 
`Eden's green eyes or Bracken's brainless bad manners'. 1Q2 Bracken used Dalton's 
unpopularity in Whitehall and his own relationship with Churchill and Eden to weaken 
and undermine his position, and eventually in the Summer of 1941 the inter- 
Ministerial war was resolved in Bracken's favour. Dalton had now lost the war over 
propaganda, and the organisation for the PWE went ahead, splitting SO1 away from 
Dalton's `empire' and incorporating it with the BBC European sections, and the 
Foreign Publicity Division of the Ministry of Information. 
The battles between Cooper and Dalton, and then between Dalton and Bracken were 
in essence the problems of Ministers arguing about the `traditional' responsibilities of 
particular Ministries. Bracken believed that he should be in control of propaganda, 
and therefore fought to bring back the `black' operations of `EH' under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Information. Dalton's determination to keep SOE 
together produced a conflict in essence concerned with the Ministerial location of 
propaganda. 'Traditionally it had been within the remit of the Ministry of 
Information, and Churchill's decision to set up SOE had broken that tradition, A 
. year 
later Dalton was moved to the Board of Trade and his successor at the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare was made responsible for subversion operations only. This left 
101 `Memorandum from Dalton and Bracken to Stephens, 27th August 1941'. 
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Bracken at the Ministry of Information and Eden in control of the PWE, in effect 
returning propaganda and political warfare to its traditional location in Whitehall. 
The PWE emerged in August 1941 , fourteen months after Dalton had been given 
responsibility for propaganda and subversion and after a great deal of damage had 
been done to the war effort by the inability or unwillingness of the Ministers 
concerned to put responsibility to the country before their own careers. Only when 
the German army had taken France and were within striking distance of Britain did 
this situation change. During the battles within Whitehall, in June 1941 Hitler had 
launched Operation Barbarossa on Russia, and America and Britain were now 
committed to give Russia as much help as possible and had produced the Atlantic 
Charter which, as already discussed above, gave Churchill exactly what he wanted at 
no cost to British policy. America's entry into the war in December of 1941 sealed 
the fate of Germany, which would be a total military defeat, a message sent 
unremittingly to the German people. A Report at the end of 1942 assessing the 
impact on German morale of the latest Soviet offensive and Allied operations in North 
Africa illustrates the disappearance of the distinction of the `two' Germanys : `war 
weariness and general apathy are now established traits of German morale' and that 
although `propaganda as such is largely discredited ... none-the-less it has been 
effective in persuading the German nation that in defeat it will be annihilated, and 
therefore they must stand or fall with the Nazi regime'. 103 
In conclusion the situation in Europe in 1940 left Churchill with few options, and one 
of them was the use of propaganda, subversion and sabotage as an independent 
weapon alongside the `traditional' instruments of war. The fusing together of `EH' 
(propaganda) and MI(R) (intelligence)into SO1 and Section `D' (subversion and 
deception) into SOE was seen at the time to be an important step. For some months 
between May 1940 and June 1941 the potential for SOE to become an integral part 
of the war been taken very seriously in Whitehall. Whether Churchill was personally 
103 `Memorandum from the War Cabinet entitled "Morale in Germany" dated 24th 
December 1942'. PRO/ F0371/34425 File No. 55. 
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convinced of the potential power of propaganda or subversion is not important, the 
reality was that he had the organisations already existing which he believed he could 
bring together as a useful instrument of war. 
The decision to split up SOE and establish the PWE in 1941 was the result of a 
number of factors. The continued failure of the military forces to change the course 
of the war was compounded by the recognition of the limitations of the subversion and 
sabotage operations of SOE. Changing attitudes in Britain towards Germany had 
resulted in the gradual disappearance of the distinction between the `two' Germanys 
and the acknowledgement of the need for a harder line in propaganda to answer the 
propaganda campaigns of the Ministry of Propaganda. The technical advances that 
had been made during the inter-war period and the first two years of the war had also 
resulted in the use of intelligence to anticipate enemy intentions, which could have 
been incorporated into propaganda campaigns. It was also recognised that the 
intelligence collected by the propagandists could have other uses and establishing SO1 
as a separate entity would expand this potentially useful service. Finally, the 
organisational problems of SOE, resulting mainly from internal conflict and rivalry, 
had seriously jeopardised Britain's potential for an effective propaganda campaign 
against the enemy and promised to continue to do so. The rational and logical 
decision was taken, to separate the warring factions in the hope that SO1 and S02 
would function effectively as separate departments in a way that had proved 
impossible during the preceding twelve months. 
71 
The Political Warfare Executive. 
During the summer of 1941, the plans put forward by Lockhart, Leeper and Dallas 
Brooks were implemented and the PWE was set up with Eden, Bracken and Dalton 
taking joint ministerial responsibility. However, the records of the House of 
Commons for 11th September 1941 when Churchill announced the formation of the 
PWE, clearly indicate that specific responsibility had been transferred to Bracken. 
Although the Prime Minister announced that the joint ministerial responsibility was 
shared by the Ministers of Information and Economic Warfare and the Foreign 
Secretary, in reply to a question from King-Hall asking which Minister would answer 
Questions about the new executive Churchill replied that `There can be no Question 
on secret matters. On all other matters, to the Minister of Information'. ' 
The fact that ministerial control of the PWE was still jointly shared illustrated the 
continuing problems at that level over the control of propaganda and political warfare. 
The operational activities of `EH' which were absorbed into the PWE continued to be 
based at the Riding Stables, Woburn and the London base was 2, Fitzmaurice Place 
which was also the location for the Political Intelligence Department and which the 
PWE used as a `cover' until the end of the war. ' Lockhart, as Deputy Under- 
Secretary of the Foreign Office was appointed Chairman and responsible for the day- 
to-day running of the Executive and liaison with the Foreign Office. As we have 
seen, he was assisted by two Regional Directors, Rex Leeper who was responsible for 
the `Country' Headquarters, and Ivone Kirkpatrick who was responsible for liaison 
with the BBC. Major Dallas Brooks was appointed to the PWE from SO1 and his 
'Hansard 11th September, 1941. Column 294. 
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responsibilities included liaison with the Chiefs of Staff, JIC and the Services? 
On 9th October, 1941 Bracken instigated a re-organisation of the elements of the 
BBC which were fundamentally important to the work of the PWE. The BBC 
Overseas department became External Services with separate divisions for European 
and Overseas operations. Tallents left the BBC and the existing Director of European 
Services also moved elsewhere, making room for Kirkpatrick to become Controller 
(European) Service and Noel Newsome to be appointed Director of European 
Broadcasts responsible for putting PWE policy into broadcasting terms. The work of 
the Executive was divided into seven Regional Directorates which were identified as 
France, Italy, the Balkans, the Low Countries (Holland and Belgium), Scandinavia 
(Norway and Denmark), Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Austria. The 
latter Direcorate (Germany and Austria) was, for obvious reasons, the most important 
and had always had its own intelligence service, whilst the other six Directorates . 
initially relied on the Foreign Office and the BBC for their intelligence. A Central 
Planning Section was introduced to carry out forward planning and to analyze the 
quality of propaganda output each week, and Ritchie Calder was appointed Director 
of Planning. ` `Open' propaganda was handled by the BBC, using directives from the 
propaganda department as guidelines although it should be stressed that the PWE had 
no authority over the BBC in this field. The Regional Directors submitted their 
Weekly Directives each week to Kirkpatrick before they went to the Executive and 
then to the BBC Regional Heads who had freedom in choice of items and presentation 
whilst keeping within the general framework laid down by the PWE. The fact that 
the BBC Editor-in-Chief was also responsible to Kirkpatrick meant that the directives 
and programmes based on these were in fact supervised by the same individual and 
although there were some problems between the two organisations this system did 
operate relatively successfully. 
'See also Select Biography. 
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Almost as soon as the Executive was created a committee, chaired by Sir Leonard 
Browett, was commissioned to streamline the organisation and in particular to look 
at the problem of overlapping in intelligence work between the BBC and the PWE. 
At this time intelligence came from a variety of departments including the BBC 
Central News Room, BBC European Records Unit, BBC Overseas Research Unit, the 
PWE Propaganda Research Station and Press Cutting and Filing Library at Woburn, 
and the BBC News Information Bureau in Bush House. The PWE and PID also 
received information from the Foreign Research and Press Service ( which received 
information from The Royal Institute of International Affairs or `Chatham House', 
based at Baliol College Oxford during the War) which reported directly to the Foreign 
Office. ' The committee reported in November 1941 and recommended that the staff 
engaged in `black' propaganda and the production of `white' leaflets should remain 
at Woburn whilst all the other staff, particularly those who worked with the BBC, 
should be moved to London. ' Additionally it was suggested that a PWE Central 
Intelligence Unit should be set up in London, and a Director of Intelligence should 
be appointed. Lockhart was asked to implement the recommendations. Again this 
proved to be difficult, since the BBC was reluctant to have their own departments 
moved to the PWE, and also because Dalton supported the Woburn people who 
objected to the move. They were also upset because Lockhart began to implement the 
decisions before the BBC had considered the report in total, but eventually in the early 
part of 1942 they did concede defeat. Regionalisation was introduced and PWE 
policy-making and some intelligence staff were moved to London, staffed largely by 
BBC staff to cater for the needs of the BBC and located on the top three floors of 
Bush House. 
Acting on the recommendation of the Browett Report the Executive appointed Walter 
Adams' as Officer in Charge of Co-ordination of Propaganda Intelligence for the 
PWE, and Michael Balfour acted as Adams deputy until March, 1942. Balfour had 
"Letter from Toynbee, Royal Institute of International Affairs to Rex Leeper at 
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been working at Chatham House as part of a study group on `Nationalism', moving 
to work for the Ministry of Information in 1939 and then to the PWE. In 1942 he 
worked as Assistant Director of Intelligence under Sir Eric Sachs and in 1943 went 
with Richard Crossman as Director of Intelligence for the Psychological Warfare 
Division/SHAEF until the end of the war. In July 1945 he was sent to Berlin as 
Director of Information Services Control after Lockhart told Balfour that there was 
a `huge job' to be done in Germany which was a `mess'. ' 
The establishment of the PWE, and the change of name from Department of 
Propaganda in Enemy Countries to Political Warfare Executive, also reflected, as 
mentioned above, an important change in British strategy and policy towards 
Germany and the German people. The twin aims of the PWE which were attacking 
the enemy and supporting resistance in enemy-occupied countries explicitly rejected 
the acknowledgement of the existence of `two' Germanys which had been the guiding 
principles of `EH' . British propaganda policy was now focused on two issues, both 
based on the concept of the war now being a `total war' where every member of 
German society was now a legitimate target. The first was that propaganda and 
political warfare must be used to attack the entire enemy population, both civilians 
and troops, by every available means. Secondly, the whole of the German nation must 
be made to understand that they were now identified as having to take some of the 
blame for the war because of their support for the Nazi regime. 
The crucial problem for the PWE in 1941 was the divergence of opinion in Whitehall 
about the way in which propaganda could be used most effectively to pursue these 
two main objectives without producing a counter-productive effect. The more lenient 
view was that a tough, uncompromising line which reflected the most extreme 
`vansittart' attitude could actually work against the Allies by forcing German public 
opinion into support for the Nazi regime and thus prolong the war. Opponents of this 
view warned that there was a great danger that a `soft' or more liberal approach to 
the German people would go against the growing anti-German public opinion in 
'Interview with Michael Balfour. Birkbeck College, London. March 7th, 1991. 
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Britain, and in addition pointed out that such an approach had failed disastrously in 
World War One and with the inter-war policy of Appeasement. 
An additional problem for the propagandists was what they perceived to be the failure 
amongst some Ministers and others in SOE and PWE to understand the distinction 
between `preparatory' and `operational' propaganda. In June, 1941 attempts had been 
made to define `operational' which was `that type of propaganda in which we attempt 
to persuade our listeners to do something rather than feel something'. ` That is to- 
incite the listener to take active measures to sabotage or subvert the enemy. At this 
time Ritchie Calder had replied that `operational' propaganda had to be part of a 
wider strategy of economic disruption and military operations if it was to have any 
effect. This, of course, ties in exactly with the timing of the debate concerning the 
SOE plans for a campaign in Europe to support patriots in uprisings against the 
Germany forces. It was, as has already been discussed, rejected on logistical and 
political grounds. However, the question was raised once more in February 1942 
when Calder chaired a committee to re-consider the use of `operational' propaganda 
to Europe with special reference to the use of incitement to sabotage in open 
broadcasts. At this time SOE, not surprisingly given the events of July 1941, 
protested that this should be left to agents in the field. Nevertheless, it appears that 
SOE did eventually agree and Calder put forward plans to Lockhart for the use of 
open broadcasting to increase military action in the occupied countries by using the 
BBC to give instructions for subversive actions. But, on March 17th 1942, a 
`divergence on the view of policy emerged' when the Regional Directors of the PWE 
articulated reservations about the plans and requested that the policy should not be 
mandatory. ' The meeting to `rubber stamp' the proposals was cancelled, Dallas 
Brooks went to see General Ismay and Lockhart had an interview with the Foreign 
. 
Secretary. The outcome was that on March 24th Lockhart `effectively killed the 
proposals, speaking against them with all the vigour at his command'. " The plans 
'Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. p. 50. 
9Ibid. p. 51. 
'o Ibid. p. 52. 
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were abandoned, much to the astonishment of SOE and the PWE and Foreign Office 
who had agreed with them. There are three points that should be made here. The first 
is that the debate concerning the use of propaganda and subversion as an independent 
force for military insurrection in Europe had already been rejected at the highest level 
in Whitehall the year before. The second can be illustrated by looking, once more, 
at the Dalton and Bracken's relationship, but now during the early period of the PWE. 
This continuation of `discussions' between the departments about propaganda and 
subversion, which had only served to frustrate effective plans for action, had been 
repeated in the relationship between Bracken and Dalton. Whilst Lockhart worked 
to bring the PWE under control and working effectively, Bracken and Dalton's 
conflict continued unabated, characterised by the former's `continual aggression, 
rudeness, and insulting baiting of Dalton'. " Dalton's opinion of Bracken was 
equally animated, describing him as `rude, assertive, ignorant, inconsequential, stupid, 
angular and unreceptive' . 12 But Dalton either mis-read or misunderstood Bracken's 
position and dangerously over-estimated the relative strength of his own position. 
He was in fact in a much weaker position to quarrel with Bracken than he had been 
with Cooper. As Ben Pimlott pointed out, whilst Dalton thought Bracken was `a 
guttersnipe', he was nevertheless `a guttersnipe with influence. Influence of and in the 
Prime Minister'. " The conflict between Dalton and Bracken had been intensified by 
Bracken's decision to. move the PWE back to London, a decision that had not been 
welcomed by everyone. 
In the early months of 1942 the PWE had come under serious attack in the House of 
Commons, mainly on account of broadcasts to Germany which, according to 
Lockhart, many MPs thought were `too friendly'. " Lockhart was growing weary 
"Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985). p. 340. 
uBalfour Conference Paper, 1991. 
"Pimlott, Hugh Dalton. p. 344. 
"Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. p. 152. 
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of the many problems of the PWE, not least the current one of bringing the PWE to 
London whilst Dalton was supporting Woburn in their efforts to stay. He admitted 
that criticisms were justified, and that the PWE `was deservedly in bad shape' and that 
it had few supporters in Whitehall. " However, changes were made and in February 
1942 Dalton was finally moved from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Board 
of Trade. According to Howe and Cruickshank he was 'reluctant', " whilst Balfour 
maintains that he is sure that Bracken was determined to get Dalton out of propaganda 
`by hook or by crook'. " He also believes Bracken's relationship with the Prime 
Minister had been close enough for him to persuade Churchill to offer Dalton the 
post, which in effect meant that Dalton had been `kicked upstairs'. " According to 
Balfour, Dalton's greatest mistake was in thinking that the Labour Party would back 
him in the political arena for control of propaganda. Lockhart was also concerned 
about the support Dalton would get from the Labour Party. 
But the Labour Party did not come to Dalton's aid, mainly because neither Attlee nor 
Bevin had any great affection for him and furthermore were unwilling to make the 
Prime Minister's job any more difficult than it already was in 1942. Consequently 
they did very little to support Dalton against Bracken, and the Conservatives, afraid 
that a socialist like Dalton would use his position to further his own creed also 
supported Bracken. Dalton, by now aware of his hopeless position, reluctantly 
accepted the new post but not before he had made one last atttempt to influence the 
Labour Party. In a Minute sent to Eden on 6th March, he informed him that at the 
meeting of the Labour Party that day the future of the PWE would be considered, and 
that the Labour Party had a strong interest and a strong belief in political warfare and 
had a claim to be represented on the PWE. He added `They are determined that Mr. 
11 Ibid. 
"Howe, The Black Game. p. 51. and Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. p. 34. 
"Balfour, Propaganda in War. if. 171. pp. 92. 
11 Ibid. 
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Bracken, whom they describe as "the Tory thug", shall not have control'. " 
Lockhart continued that the Labour Party would be content if Eden would assume full 
responsibility with a Parliamentary Under-Secretary to run the PWE for him: They 
did not, it seemed, want a Committee of three and if Eden did not wish to accept 
responsibility the Labour Party preferred a separate Ministry and Minister. Lockhart 
concluded that `These views, I imagine, are sponsored by Dr. Dalton'. 20 
One of the most important outcomes of the discussions following Dalton's `reluctant' 
departure was that his successor at the Ministry of Economic Warfare did not take 
over any of his responsibility for the PWE. Lockhart, was appointed Director 
General of the PWE and reported directly to Bracken who assumed responsibility for 
administration and Eden who took all policy decisions. Dalton's departure had 
effectively broken the ties which had produced so much conflict and aggravation, and 
in the process retarded progress in the propaganda field. To accept the proposals put 
forward by Calder would have been to reverse and negate the decision to exclude the 
Minister of Economic Warfare from propaganda activities which had been taken in 
order to achieve a co-ordinated and efficient propaganda department: Lockhart 
rejected Calder's plans and working with Eden and Bracken now brought the PWE 
firmly under Foreign Office control. 
The third point about this whole episode is that it illustrates that, yet again, the inter- 
departmental politicking was still affecting the way in which Britain was failing to 
make the most of this potentially valuable weapon at a time when military successes 
still remained in Germany's favour. Thus, the first eight months of the PWE were 
characterised by the same well-worn conflicts and debates about who was doing what, 
why and how. However, with the departure of Dalton, Lockhart now had freedom 
to make more changes for the efficient functioning of the PWE. He immediately 
made Kirkpatrick a member of the Executive Committee and concentrated his efforts 
on moving the PWE to London. Also working with Kirkpatrick was Noel Newson 
19'Secret Minute from Lockhart to Eden', 6th March 1942. PRO/FO898/10. 
20 Ibid. 
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who, as Director of the BBC European Services, had the task of turning the PWE's 
policy into broadcasting items. Additional staff were appointed which included 
Ritchie Calder, Director of Plans and Operations, Hugh Carlton Greene who became 
Editor of the BBC German Service and his opposite number in the PWE, Richard 
Crossman who acted as Head of the German Section from 1941 to 1943. Working 
with Richard Crossman on specific projects was Ralph Murray (later Sir) who had 
initially worked with Walmsley in intelligence, and was then put in charge of the 
department's recording studios at Wavendon. Murray was closely involved in the 
plans and operations of Aspidistra. " He was assisted by Harold Robin, a technician 
funded by the SIS and attached to William Stephenson, a senior SIS member and 
Churchill's personal representative in the USA, and Director of British Security Co- 
ordination in the Western Hemisphere. Murray also worked with Crossman to produce 
plans for the Freedom Stations, where a small number of German political emigres 
were used as a result of the intimate knowledge of the particular countries to which 
they were broadcasting. The changing international situation and government policy 
and attitude towards the German people, however, resulted in the gradual exclusion 
and then dismissal of these political exiles from the PWE after 1942. 
In April 1942, Lockhart suggested that the `creakings that still occur in the PWE 
organisation has its roots in the absence of an effective planning system', and a 
Planning Section Committee was set up to resolve the problem. ' An essential part 
of the planning within the PWE included the organisation for intelligence, and this 
aspect of the organisation also underwent a radical re-organisation during the last 
months of 1942. 
The activities of the PWE relied on an efficient, accurate and timely intelligence 
service. As explained previously the German Section of `EH' had it's own 
"The powerful radio transmitter used to broadcast to enemy-occupied countries 
and located in Ashdown Forest, near Crowborough, Sussex. Howe, The Black Game. 
pp. 157-159. For details of Murray and Robin see Select Biography. 
`Most Secret and Personal Report "PWE Planning Organisation" from Lockhart, 
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intelligence service supplied by the PID of the Foreign Office. This department was 
headed by A. R. Walmsley and supported by Valentine Williams, Ralph Murray and 
Leo Russell. Walmsley had worked on the analysis of German newspapers for both 
Grand (Section `D') and Campbell Stuart for a short time before the two organisations 
were merged into SOE in 1940. On the day after Germany invaded Poland an 
intelligence department was set up comprising of Kirk, the Director of 
Communications at the Ministry of Information, Ian Colvin (ex S01) , Joffe, 
Walmsley (who had worked in `EH') and two secretaries' Liaison with the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare was through Walter Ingrams. Together they produced a `Daily 
Digest' of the content of Allied and German press and began setting up a Library. 
There was a weekly Saturday morning meeting attended by Rex Leeper, Dallas 
Brooks, Campbell Stuart and his assistants Gishford, Foss and Ryder. Foss had 
worked for the Daily Telegraph and also had experience in broadcasting, whilst 
Gishford had also worked as a journalist at Illustrated Newspapers and at the 
beginning of the war acted as Stuart's personal assistant at `EH'. They also produced 
a weekly leaflet called `Wokinger Beobachter', and a small four-page leaflet 
`Londoner Post' which was sent to German addresses in neutral countries for 
distribution. 
According to Walmsley, in the first twelve months of the war two major 
developments in intelligence work took place. In early November 1939 Walmsley, 
working at `EH', experimented with a tentative quantitative analysis of German 
propaganda - BBC monitoring information - under set themes and Stuart 
commissioned a fortnightly report of German propaganda using this technique. This 
dealt with German home propaganda, propaganda to Britain, France and neutral 
countries. According to Walmsley this was the first systematic analysis of propaganda 
in this country which relied on quantitative analysis. ` The second innovation, also 
in the field of propaganda analysis, was the deduction of enemy strategic intentions 
"A. R. Walmsley, `EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence. 




from the analysis of enemy propaganda. Initially requested by Dallas Brooks who 
requested all possible information about German intentions of invading Britain, once 
the threat of invasion had passed this study was extended to all possible theatres of 
German operations. 
The principles guiding this analysis were simple: to discover how German audiences 
had reacted to German propaganda, and how German propaganda responded to public 
opinion, to discover whether it was possible to identify patterns of behaviour. From 
the analysis of enemy propaganda Walmsley believed he could guess or anticipate the 
strategy of the Nazi regime, for instance by preparing the German people for 
particular military operations. This type of analysis was used in relation to German 
plans for the invasion of Britain, German expectations of defeating Russia, and from 
November 1943 onwards the possibility of the German retaliatory threats against 
Britain. 
In March 1941 Walmsley asked Leeper for permission to begin `morale research', 
feeling that the BBC were not providing enough information, or to be more specific 
the right `type' of intelligence that he thought was vital to the success of the PWE. 
Leeper agreed to this and Dr. ' Klibansky, a lecturer in medieval philosophy at Oriel 
was engaged to help. Walmsley and Klibansky worked together, the latter becoming 
the expert in affairs concerning Italy whilst Walmsley continued working for the 
German Section. In June 1941 the `Propaganda Man' was created as an instrument of 
analysis of German public opinion and can be seen as an early form of the 
contemporary qualitative research which today would be identified by specialist 
research in media theory which concentrates on audience reaction amongst other 
issues. ' In a weekly report entitled `German Propaganda and the German' the 
. 
information was presented in three sections. The first part of each report sought to 
anticipate the intentions of the Nazi regime from an analysis of the propaganda output 
of the Ministry of Propaganda. The second attempted included direct quotations from 
the Press and broadcasts concerning what the German people were been told by the 
23 eg Omgus Surveys after the war and today in the field of media studies. 
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regime. The third section, the most important, constituted the analysis and 
conclusions of the intelligence officers which incorporated the analysis of enemy 
propaganda and all the other information drawn from other sources which was 
available to the German Section. Additionally, occasional papers were produced on 
specific issues of particular interest and were circulated with the Weekly Report as a 
separate document. The important feature of these documents was the amalgamation 
of information of every grade of security up to and including `Top Secret' and as such 
represented an important systematic and co-ordinated intelligence report on social and 
political conditions in Germany which no other department in the intelligence services 
in Britain at the time had developed. The German Section included in each report the 
most important issues of the week and usually reported them in terms of the past 
experience or information regarding each issue. 
However, despite the apparent success of re-organisation which had resulted in the 
expansion of the output of the PWE, in the Autumn of 1942 it became clear that some 
further `fine-tuning' of the intelligence operations was required. During the year the 
Central Intelligence Unit had attracted enough criticism during 1942 to warrant 
another inquiry, and Brigadier Eric Sachs was brought in to report on the situation 
and at the end of 1942, he was'ordered to recruit and form the Directorate of Political 
Warfare Intelligence. He admits that at the time he `quite literally knew nothing 
about `Intelligence' and, if possible, less about Political Warfare'. ' His job was `to 
organise the gathering and analysis of necessary factual information ... to find out 
what was going on politically in all enemy and enemy occupied countries in Europe; 
to know how the war was affecting the ways of life and morale of the inhabitants; to 
provide reports as required by the JIC; and to transmit daily short bulletins to Winston 
Churchill on what was happening'. ' Sachs recommended the strengthening of 
intelligence staff attached to the Regional Directors, a strengthening of the Central 
Directorate and the relocation of the remaining intelligence staff at Woburn up to 
'ISir Eric Sachs. `Basic Handbooks Footnote', 1975. Middle Temple Library, 
Middle Temple Lane, London. 
27 Ibid. 
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London. These recommendations were approved and in 1943 the remaining members 
of the intelligence staff were transferred to London. The Political Intelligence 
Department was disbanded and most of the staff, apart from those working on the 
German Section who remained with PWE, were moved to the Foreign Office 
Research Department. According to Sachs recruiting high calibre staff for the 
Political Warfare Intelligence" department was `no easy task', not least because the 
reputation of the PWE had suffered because of the `ways' of Richard Crossman and 
`some of his colleagues'. Nevertheless he managed to recruit Lt. Col. Henry Hope 
who became senior Assistant Director, and Michael Balfour, Dr. T. K. Derry, Lt. Col. 
C. Battiscombe as other Assistant Directors and Stanley Hewitt Pitt, Major Sir 
Michael Malcolm, and Lt. Col. Stella A. M. Allen as his Personal Assistant. ' By 
1943 each Regional Directorate had its own intelligence officers working specifically 
on their own country or region and reporting to their own Regional Director and the 
Central Directorate. 
The intelligence work of the German Section of the PWE continued, producing the 
Weekly Reports. Walmsley's work at `EH' and then in the PWE had resulted in the 
establishment of a process which eventually resulted in the provision of an impressive 
amount of information. This' information was gathered, collated, indexed and filed 
for the day-to-day requirements of the propagandists and for possible future use. The 
main sources of this information were : the Daily Digest of German Broadcasts from 
the BBC Monitoring Service; Press Reading Bureaux in Stockholm, Berne and 
Istanbul; interrogation of prisoners-of-war; information from private individuals, 
political exiles, refugees; information from the French army and Secret Service; War 
Cabinet Secretariat; Ministry of Economic Warfare; Ministry of Information 
`network'; and a significant amount of information from the PID/Foreign Office 
through their diplomatic, military and other contacts. In addition the PWE had access 
to something like one hundred newspapers from sixteen countries which were supplied 
"Hereafter PWI 
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through enemy news agencies. " In addition to these sources the acquisition of three 
Hellschreiber teleprinter machines was important, since these machines allowed the 
PWE to `tap' into the German News Agency (DNB) system and to obtain information 
direct from German sources. The value of this source of information was that the 
propagandists had access to information immediately, if not before, the rest of the 
German public and could therefore use counter-propaganda in an extremely effective 
way. According to Michael Balfour the most valuable conclusions came from the 
systematic analysis of the `open' source material. All of this information was 
classified and ordered for maximum efficiency, into specific areas according to the 
country, issues covered and sources of information. For example the threat of 
retaliation with the `V weapons' was monitored and the analysis, using Walmsley's 
method, in the Weekly Report for 8-14th January 1945 stated that there were 
increased references to these weapons in broadcasts which was measured at 7.1 % and 
in talks at 2.1 %. " The reports included details of the social and political conditions 
in Germany for all sectors of society, from the peasants' grievances to the July 1944 
bomb plot, and from women's opposition to conscription and the war to the measures 
the Nazi regime was prepared to use to stamp out any dissent or opposition to its 
authority. Specific themes included Goebbels' Strength Through Joy, Strength 
Through Fear and Total War campaigns with commentary on the problems facing the 
Ministry in successfully achieving the desired results of each campaign. 
An increasing concern to the Nazi regime, particulary after 1943, was the morale of 
troops at the front line and it was therefore also a concern of the PWE. Any signs 
of weakening morale were reported including evidence of the rift which was emerging 
between soldiers in the East and civilians at home, the desertion of soldiers, and 
domestic issues such as the refusal of the firefighters on the home front to attend fires 
caused by the Allied bombing campaign. The apathy of women to enlist in the Total 
War effort combined with the increasing pressures of an economy suffering an acute 
"Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. pp. 61 - 62. 
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shortage of labour were included in the Weekly Reports as evidence of the failure of 
the Nazi regime and the success of the economic blockade. It also provided the 
propagandists with specific targets for political warfare where their activities might 
be most effective. 
As the war progressed into its final stages the intelligence officers concentrated on the 
rapidly chaotic situation emerging as Eastern territories were evacuated, and refugees 
of all nationalities poured into central Germany and notably Berlin. They also 
increased their analysis of Russian movements and propaganda, including summaries 
of anticipated German reaction to the `Freedom' campaign and overtures apparently 
being made by Russia to the German people. The reports also contained information 
of accusations against the US Army and their treatment of German civilians as they 
occupied German territory. Finally, the reports considered the potential threat to the 
Allies from a resurgent militaristic and aggressive Germany after defeat. 
By 1943 the major problems of organisation and control of the PWE had been 
addressed and to some extent solved, though not without a great deal of frustration, 
anger, pain and bitterness. In June, 1942 Peter Scarlett who chaired the Planning 
Committee of the PWE for the Foreign Office had replied to a letter from the British 
Embassy in Washington asking for details of the PWE. In his reply he referred to the 
`young Gargantua whose initials are the PWE' which was `no ordinary war baby... 
and since birth it has suffered a series of sea changes, all more or less painful' and 
outlining the problems of various `personality' clashes between members of the PWE 
and the Ministry of Information. " As we have seen, the changes in ministerial 
control, the appointment of Lockhart as Director General and the re-organisation 
instigated and carried out by Lockhart and Bracken had, together, solved many of the 
major internal issues involving policy and responsibility. By 1943 the PWE was 
functioning efficiently and effectively, the intelligence operation had been formalised 
and expanded and this had facilitated the diversification of the activities of the 
u`Personal and Secret letter from Peter Scarlett, Foreign Office to F. R. Hoyer 
Millar, British Embassy, Washington, 6th March 1942'. PRO/FO 898/10. For details 
on Scarlett see Select Biography. 
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Executive. The German Section of the PWE was providing a complete repository 
of information about the social and political conditions in Germany during the war, 
the intimate knowledge of aspects of German life necessary for successful propaganda 
campaigns, and for other individuals and departments working on aspects of Nazi 
Germany both then and now. Today the Weekly Report can be seen as an important 
document for reasons already discussed earlier in this thesis, but at the time there was 
little importance attached to it by the Foreign Office. According to Walmsley in 1941 
the Foreign Office had complete contempt for the subject and the people. Only in 
1943 did they begin to recognise the `special position of the PWE' in their 
contribution to the war effort and in 1946 Walmsley commented that it was still too 
early to say whether the Foreign Office had understood the importance of public 
opinion research. " This is not altogether an accurate picture, since evidence exists 
to show that the Foreign Office was sufficiently interested in the intelligence work of 
the PWE to make arrangements to carry on some of their work into the post-war 
years. " 
Looking at the output of the PWE during the last two years of the war under Lockhart 
as Director General illustrates the way in which he did bring some element of co- 
ordination and organisational efficiency and effectiveness to the PWE. The three 
main areas of propaganda and political warfare can be broadly identified into two 
areas: the spoken word, as in broadcasts and rumour (or whisper) campaigns, and the 
written word, as in leaflets, posters, pamphlets. 
Taking broadcasting first, this can also be divided into two separate areas. The first, 
the `open' broadcasting of the BBC consisted largely of talks, bulletins and news 
which were sometimes aimed at particular audiences such as women, workers or 
. 
troops. These usually involved `invented' personalities, with whom the German 
people would identify, such as ordinary women workers and wives of soldiers waiting 
to hear from their husbands at the front. The programmes were not designed to be 
"Walmsley, `EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence'. 
"See Chapter Five 
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subversive but to indicate to the German people that Britain had some idea of, and 
were sympathetic to, the everyday life they endured. The importance of these 
programmes was that they broke the monopoly of the Ministry of Propaganda on the 
information the German public were given, forcing the Ministry into a continual 
dialogue of justification for the war. The `black' propaganda was a totally different 
exercise, using dishonesty and deceit to undermine the morale of the enemy. The 
`black' stations, known as Research Units (RU's), were ostensibly run by secret 
resistance groups from within the territory at which the propaganda was directed in 
order to gain credibility. In France the aim was to encourage hatred of the Germans 
by pointing out German designs on the French colonial empire, the manipulation of 
France's finances, the forcible use of the French people as German workers and great 
emphasis was made of German brutality. It was suggested that the letter `T' (for 
Traitor) should be daubed on the doors of collaborators. The `black' broadcasts 
against Germany had the objective of causing as much inconvenience as possible to 
the regime. Programmes informed the German people that the details of air raid 
casualties would be available at local police stations, thereby inundating the already 
overburdened officers with anxious relatives all wanting immediate attention. The 
German people were told that the SS took certain brands of sleeping pills, the implied 
suggestion being that they too should do the same in order to sleep through the air 
raids. Horrific tales of families being destroyed in air-raids were given with the aim 
it would persuade others to avoid fire-watching duties, and stories of the pornographic 
eccentricities of their leaders and their luxurious lifestyle were used to increase 
dissension amongst the population. 
An important advance was the purchase of an extremely powerful radio transmitter, 
codenamed `Aspidistra', from America. This 500 Kw. transmitter was powerful 
enough to be able to transmit to enemy-occupied Europe and was also flexible enough 
to change frequencies quickly in order to avoid `blocking' of broadcasts by the 
Ministry of Propaganda. The transmitter was located on a seventy-acre site in the 
Ashdown Forest new Crowborough, Sussex and was used by the PWE for `black' 
operations and also the BBC who used it to boost their own capabilities. It was first 
employed on 8th November, 1942 and broadcast a speech made by President 
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Roosevelt after the landings in North Africa had been made. " It was also used by 
Sefton Delmer to transmit his programmes Soldatensender Calais, Sender Atlantik and 
Gustav Siegfried Eins. The latter was the invention of Delmer, and the character was 
used to criticise the National Socialist regime, to broadcast details of secret `prisons' 
where Party sadists tortured their captives and of the first concentration camps. ' 
According to Cruickshank, this programme was one of the greatest exponents of the 
purely `black' broadcasting stations, stimulating distrust of the Nazis and 
administration in general and also creating distrust between the Party and the 
Wehrmacht. " 
In conjunction with these broadcasts rumour, or whisper, campaigns were used to 
confirm and add to the essence of the propaganda themes. These were usually 
infiltrated by SOE and other agents in the field, and included details of ships arriving 
into port with pig disease which would result in a reluctance of the population to eat 
bacon, or stories of typhus sweeping across the continent from Poland. The U-Boat 
crews were informed, by rumours, of the weakness in the construction of their 
vessels, designed to create anxiety and confusion and problems for the Ministry of 
Propaganda to counter. 
The second main activity of the PWE was the production of leaflets, and by 1943 fifty 
versions a month were being produced in ten languages. These could be either a single 
sheet or a forty-eight page booklet, printed in black or white or colour. Other items 
of propaganda dropped over or infiltrated into Germany, which fall into the category 
of political warfare, included forged ration books which would be used and thus 
distort rations and produce dissension, instructions on how to go-slow at work, how 
to fake illnesses to avoid work or conscription and forged bank-notes and stamps. 
The majority of this material was produced at Woburn in Ellic Howe's unit. Howe 
was a printer by trade, and an expert on European methods and types of printing. In 
"Howe, The Black Game. p. 164. 
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October 1941 he became aware of the existence of the PWE and wrote to Hugh 
Dalton with details of his work, and included a paper he had written entitled 
`Political Warfare and the Printed Word: A Psychological Study'. " In this paper he 
included enough technical detail and information to persuade Dalton that he should be 
brought into work for the PWE, and in October 1941 he left his job and moved down 
to Woburn. He worked for the PWE throughout the war, and made a major 
contribution to Sefton Delmer's work and `black' operations in general. 
However, whilst the Executive had recruited an expert in the field of printing, and 
had set up a unit to produce the goods, the PWE had major problems with the 
delivery of this propaganda. The use of the RAF was problematic, as it felt it was 
being used as a postal service, and complained that it had been `saddled with the 
chore'. 39 They did however, have grounds for resenting the task of delivering the 
goods, since the danger of heavy loads affecting the trim of the aircraft or of the 
leaflets getting caught in the slipstream when they had been pushed out of the aircraft 
could be disastrous. Of course, `Bomber' Harris had his own opinion of this work 
of the propagandists and resented his involvement in any way with the PWE. He 
believed that the leaflets merely kept `Europe in lavatory paper', to which Balfour 
replies that at least they would be read before they were used. '0 But the real problem 
was that Bomber Command had no long-term details of targets and therefore the PWE 
could not produce specific propaganda for any issue or recipient of the leaflets. This 
did change after 1942 when Southern and Western Europe came into the field of battle 
and propaganda could be used in conjunction with Bomber Command to instruct or 
influence enemy troops and civilians. 
What impact did this have? According to Cruickshank the main problem for Britain 
. was 
that they were ill-prepared or unwilling to take the necessary steps to deliver the 
propaganda to the right people, on the right issues at the right time. He argues that 
"Howe, The Black Game. pp: 15-16. 
"Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. p. 87. 
'Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 97. 
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the Americans, the `professional brothers' played this part of psychological warfare 
game `exactly right' with special squadrons, delivering special leaflet raids at special 
times to special targets. " Nevertheless, despite the problems Balfour argues that the 
combined operations did create a cleavage between leaders and led, stimulated an 
atmosphere of war-weariness and defeatism and above all the use of propaganda as 
political warfare to subvert or inconvenience the regime did help to spread deception 
and confusion. 42 
The PWE also expanded into other areas of activity, and the intelligence collected 
became a basis for much of this work. Almost as soon as Sachs had brought together 
his team of intelligence experts at the PWI, which by January 1943 numbered almost 
100, the department was given its first major task. Bruce Lockhart informed him that 
the JIC recommended that Basic Handbooks should be produced for the guidance of 
the Commanders-in-Chief who were involved in liberating enemy-occupied territories 
and the conquest of enemy territories. An additional branch was formed, headed by 
Sachs who appointed Henry Hope (later Lord Rankeillour) as Assistant Director in 
charge of these volumes. Fourteen Basic Handbooks for individual countries were 
produced, the smallest containing some 160 pages and the largest, the one produced 
for Germany, was over 900 pages. " Each volume was delegated to the Regional 
Directorate responsible for that particular country or region, thus the responsibility for 
the German Handbook was given to Duncan Wilson and those working with him and 
was produced using the intelligence gathered by that Region, including the Weekly 
Reports. Wilson, Balfour's brother-in-law, had worked initially for the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare and then moved to the PWE until the end of the war whe he was 
posted to Germany. 
The Basic Handbooks, which in some countries such as Germany became known as 
"Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. p. 90. 
42Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 99. 
"Basic Handbooks 1943/44 for Enemy and Enemy Occupied Europe. Middle 
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the 'bible', were produced using the intelligence system already in existence in the 
PWE and expanded by Sachs in 1943. The books were up-dated regularly with 
supplements containing any new information relevant to the Country or zone from the 
intelligence of each Regional Directorate. The Handbooks were in fact circulated to 
a much wider audience than the Commanders-in-Chief, and records in the PRO 
identify a number of Embassy offficials requesting and thanking the PWE for the 
supply of these including the OWI, the US Government, and the American 
Embassy. " An interesting addition to this list is the War Crimes and Damages 
Group which thanked Dr. Derry, the Secretary of PWE/PID at Bush House for the 
sets of Handbooks supplied to them. " In the same file there exists a letter to 
Walmsley from Derry telling him that Colonel Wade had requested details on certain 
key men in Germany. 46 This was obviously in response to Derry's note to Colonel 
Wade, at the Royal Courts of Justice, The Strand, two days earlier on 15th May 
giving him information on war crimes in Yugoslavia. " 
Gradually from 1942 the PWE also became involved in the planning of propaganda 
to support military operations. In June 1942 a `secret' organisation had been 
established, identified as the London Controlling Section (LCS), which was 
specifically setup for planning and implementing deception operations. The planning 
for such operations was done by the XX (Double Cross) Committee which met on 
Wednesday afternoons throughout the war- and included representatives from MI5, 
Directors of Naval, Air and Military Intelligence, the War Office, PWE and 
eventually COSSAC and SHAEF. " The first military operation in which the PWE 
was involved and in which the LCS also played a separate part was Operation 
" See PRO/F0898/423. 
`s `Letter from Office of War Information, War Crimes and Dangers Group, 
American Embassy London to Dr. Derry, PID. 13th June, 1945'. PRO/F0898/423. 
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" `L. etter from Derry to Col. Wade', 15th May, 1945. PRO/F0898/423. 
48M. Young and R. Stamp, Trojan Horses. Deception Operations in the Second 
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`Torch'. This operation was planned for November 1942 and designed to give the 
Allies control of French West Africa from which to launch an attack on Europe. It 
was also thought that this would help Russia by drawing off German troops from the 
Eastern Front. For various political and military reasons it was to be seen by the 
outside world as an American operation but in fact the PWE were part of the Political 
Section attached to Eisenhower's Headquarters which included members from the 
OSS, OWI, PWE and SOE. " The PWE's role was to provide propaganda which 
would show that the liberation of French territory had begun and that the Americans 
had been welcomed as Allies. Importantly, propaganda was to instruct those living 
in enemy-occupied countries that this should not be seen as the beginning of the 
Second Front and that it was not a signal for a premature revolt or internal uprisings 
in the occupied countries. The LCS meanwhile set into operation three plans designed 
to deceive the German General Staff about the destination of the Anglo-American 
forces in order to lure German re-enforcements elsewhere. The operation was a 
complete success, not least because the Germans had believed that Malta or Sicily 
were the targets and failed to prepare to attack the landing convoys off Algiers and 
Oran. s° 
In March 1943 the PWE also became involved in the plans for Operation `Huskey', 
the Allied invasion of Sicily, and Eisenhower was particularly interested in using 
propaganda to bring about an immediate surrender of the Italians after the landing. 
The PWE suggested that propaganda to `soften up' the Italians might be useful since 
all indications were that the Italians would fight to the end in defence of their country. 
It was considered that a fake Armistice should be used, but after deliberations between 
Churchill and Eisenhower this idea was dropped. 
. In addition 
the PWE also began to be included in Committees and organisations 
concerned with the preparation of propaganda and political warfare materials which 
'Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm. p. 136. 
'Wartin Gilbert, The Second World War. Revised edition (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1989). p. 375. 
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would be needed when the Allied forces began the liberation of Europe. The first 
meeting of the Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee was held in Room 
705, Bush House, London on March 29th, 1943.3` Between then and the 21st 
January, 1944 the Committee held thirty-three meetings to consider the financial, 
military, civil and cultural aspects involved in re-occupation. The aims of the 
propaganda at the end of January, 1944 were defined as a) combat propaganda, that 
is 'tactical propaganda against enemy forces and towards the population behind enemy 
lines' and b) consolidation propaganda, that is 'designed to ensure friendly co- 
operation; and to create among the population opinion favourable to the war and post- 
war aims of the United Nations'. " In August 1943, the Foreign Office contacted 
Sachs to inform him that a new JIC Sub-Committee known as the Future Intelligence 
Needs Sub-Committee had been formed and asked him for suggestions for future 
operational intelligence, 'particularly political intelligence on areas likely to come into 
the operational picture's' In the months before D-Day the PWE was involved 
extensively in the preparation for the Operation 'Overlord', which was to signal the 
beginning of the long-awaited invasion of Europe from the beaches of Normandy. 
Broadly speaking, they prepared propaganda which sought to lower the morale of the 
enemy troops and civilians, and to inform, instruct and raise the morale of those in 
occupied countries which were to be liberated. The Executive attempted to outline 
and understand the problems to be faced in the occupied territories and the ways in 
which they could ease those problems using prepared materials to accelerate 
rehabilitation. 
Before moving on to evaluate and discuss the content of the Weekly Reports it is 
necessary to consider the political climate existing in the PWE and Whitehall during 
the time they were being produced, and to ascertain whether this affected the success 
sI `Minutes of the Ist Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee', 29th 
March 1943. PRO/FO 898/361. 
52 `Minutes of the 33rd Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee', 21st 
January 1944. PRO/FO 898/361. 
11 PRO/FO 898/361 2nd August, 1943. 
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of the intelligence operations of the German Section. To do this it is necessary to 
look at the people working in the German Section who produced the intelligence and 
the personalities and politics of the elites in the PWE and Whitehall who were the 
users of that intelligence. According to Michael Handel intelligence success depends 
on three elements, all of which are interlinked and all of which are dependent upon 
human perceptions and interpretation; a separation for the sake of analysis is 
helpful. " These three elements are: the availability of sufficient raw data for 
balanced intelligence analysis; the extent to which the perceptions of the intelligence 
officers are accurate; and the political dimensions of intelligence. 
Taking the first element, as already discussed the German Section had a wide range 
of sources available to it which was both detailed and current. Additionally, the 
systematic way in which it was gathered, classified and stored suggests that this 
material was quickly accessible. The second element, the extent to which the 
perceptions of the intelligence analyst and all other participants are accurate, is far 
more problematic. Information only constitutes intelligence through the medium of 
the individuals employed to gather, sift, interpret, analyze and then present the 
resulting `intelligence'. The people involved in this process are operating from a 
position of subjectivity, pre-conceived ideas and beliefs, values and prejudices which 
all influence the process and conclusions. At the same time it is possible for them to 
be unduly influenced by the situation which they operate in, by the people for and 
with whom they work. The problem then is that "the very process of assessment 
carries with it the danger that it will emphasise intelligence which conforms to the 
conventional wisdom of the time (which is invariably afterwards discovered to have 
contained at least some false assumptions) and exclude or underplay apparently 
eccentric information which points in other directions'. " 
"Michael Handel, `The Politics of Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security 
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According to Handel individuals involved in intelligence work are aware of this and 
he argues that two approaches can be identified which are adopted by intelligence 
officers, and which determine the accuracy or otherwise of their intelligence. The 
first is the `professional approach' which is adopted by those individuals who believe 
that political pressures are inevitable but are nevertheless considered as dangerous and 
unethical and should be minimized. This approach puts `truth' in reporting above all 
else and is committed to improving quality through distancing itself from the policy- 
makers. According to Handel the best professionals are the amateurs who serve their 
country during war, do not seek military promotion and are therefore in a better 
position to insist on the `truth' since at the end of the war they can return to their 
civilian life. The second is the `realistic approach' which arrives at the opposite 
conclusion about political pressures and rather than assuming the `utopian' vision of 
the `professional amatuers' actually advocates going with `the flow of the tide' of 
political pressure whilst at the same time attempting to turn around the situation to 
their advantage. These individuals believe that the intelligence community must 
become more involved with the policy-makers in order to give them the best 
information available. 
There are problems with both approaches. The first can lead to political sterility and 
aloofness which can, of course, lead to the policy-making elite disregarding the 
intelligence produced, whilst the second can be accused of being too sensitive to the 
policy-makers and therefore less than objective. 
Applying Handel's theory to the officers working in the German Section, and from 
my own assessment of the content of the Weekly Reports some conclusions can be 
drawn. The majority of these individuals were amateurs, civilians from academic life, 
usually liberals who returned to their posts immediately after the end of the war and 
who therefore had less self-interest in the political pressures at other levels in 
Whitehall. What also stands out is the number of historians who worked for the 
intelligence service, drawn mainly from Oxford and Cambridge. To compare the 
profile of the people in the German Section with that of the Research and Analysis 
Department (a parallel organisation based at Yale University in America) one is struck 
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by the commonality of academic disciplines of those involved. " According to 
Winks, `research and analysis are the core of intelligence', and the success of the 
Research and Analysis Department was due to some extent to a system devised which 
used the methods of the historian for both research and analysis. " A system which 
was also adopted, or as Walmsley would no doubt argue created, within the PWE. 
Additionally, talking to Michael Balfour about this issue he is absolutely clear that 
because of the danger of political pressure recognised at the ti me the German Section 
worked on the principle that their job was `to put the picture as it was in reality rather 
than portrayed in terms of what it was wished to be', and they were determined to 
counter such a tendency and to `depress those who would be asphyxiated by their own 
hot air' by offering `a more sober assessment than. others'. "' 
It is important, then, to take into account a range of factors which support the view 
that the intelligence officers in the German Section were concerned to adopt a 
`professional' approach. Firstly, there was their social and educational background 
which provided a level of freedom from the necessity to take into account personal 
ambitions within the service. Secondly, according to Balfour, they were more than 
aware of the degree of political use of intelligence and took -counter-measures to 
prevent it. Finally, the analysis provided within the Weekly Reports manifestly 
attempt to provide an objective and realistic interpretation of events regardless of the 
potential political consequences. 
But whilst sufficient information for intelligence officers to work from was assured, 
and the interpretation of that information appears to have been as objective as could 
realistically be expected these two factors alone cannot be assumed to indicate the 
success of the German Section. The third element in the process is perhaps the most 
. 
important, that is the political dimensions of intelligence, the acceptance or rejection 
"Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown. Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961. 
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of intelligence by elites in Whitehall for particular reasons. The, ways in which 
intelligence is used, mis-used, disregarded or misunderstood is the main obstacle to 
successful intelligence. 
The political use of intelligence by individuals to promote their own interests is one 
particular area of concern. Churchill's use of intelligence to achieve his own political 
aims is a perfect example. His position as Prime Minister during the war gave 
Churchill the right and duty to make political decisions which involved the use of 
intelligence, was informed by intelligence, but not determined by it. An example of 
this is the way in which Churchill released information about German U-Boat losses 
to boost morale during the early days of the war, and alternatively suppressed 
information that the invasion of England had been called off in order to stimulate 
increased war production in Britain and increase anxiety in the United States at a time 
he was trying to bring them into the war. ' 
But what about the Ministers in control of the PWE? Handel identifies this level of 
the civil service as the `users' of intelligence who are in a position to use the 
intelligence of the German Section for `particular reasons'. Here, as in the German 
Section, there is a commonality of educational and political background but unlike 
those working in the German Section they were involved in politics in Whitehall at 
a much higher level. A brief biographical outline of the key personalities involved 
illustrates this. 
Starting from the top with the two Ministers responsible, with the Foreign Secretary, 
for control of the PWE. Brendan Bracken [1901-1958], was born in county Tipperary 
and was the youngest son of a builder and monumental mason. Using private money 
he obtained entrance into Sedbergh and then secured teaching posts in Liverpool and 
subsequently in a preparatory school in Bishop's Stortford. He quickly made the 
acquaintance of Oliver Locker-Lampson, the owner of Empire Review, and at this 
time met and worked for Winston Churchill in his unsuccessful election campaigns in 
J°Handel, `The Politics of Intelligence'. p. 8. 
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Leicester in 1923 and Westminster in 1924. During this time he was introduced to 
Major Crossthwaite Eyre, the owner of the publishers Eyre and Spottiswoode, who 
recruited him to work on an illustrated monthly magazine. By 1925 he had become 
a Director of the firm, which acquired and let him run the Financial News. From 
there he went on to found the Banker which gave him the introductions necessary to 
enter City institutions, and also to gain joint control of The Economist in 1929. The 
Financial News established him and with the support of Churchill, then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, he secured adoption as Conservative candidate for North Paddington. 
In the 1930s he became close to Churchill, sharing his political views as a staunch 
imperialist and in opposition to the Appeasement policy of Chamberlain. At the 
beginning of the Second World War he became parliamentary private secretary to 
Churchill at the Admiralty, and when Churchill became Prime Minister Bracken went 
to Downing Street with him and throughout the war was one of his staunchest allies. 
In 1941 he was appointed Minister of Information and, according to Douglas 
Woodruff, Bracken `deserves great credit for the vitality and imagination which he 
brought to the Ministry and for lifting it out of the disregard into which it had 
fallen'. 59 At the end of the war he was made first Lord of the Admiralty in 
Churchill's caretaker government. For Balfour, Bracken was an `unconventional 
Conservative' who appeared to have a somewhat romantic approach to the truth and 
assumed attitudes which were not really his own. Nevertheless, his background in 
Fleet Street meant that he was the first Minister of Information to know how a 
newspaper worked and, most importantly, his friendship with Churchill and 
Beaverbrook meant that he `was at the centre of things and able to argue on level 
terms with more senior colleagues'. 60 
Hugh Dalton [1887-1962], was born at Neath, Glamorganshire the eldest child of 
Canon John Neale Dalton. He was educated at Summer Fields, Oxford and Eton and 
went up to King's College, Cambridge where he became a close friend of Rupert 
Brooke. He was a socialist, and began work at the London School of Economics in 
39DNB 1951-1960, (Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 135-137. 
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1911 on a thesis entitled `Some aspects of the inequality of incomes in modern 
communities'. He also joined the Middle Temple and was called to the bar in 1914. 
In World War One he served in France from 1916-1917, transferred to Italy for the 
remainder of the war and was demobilised in 1919, returning to the LSE to lecture 
and complete his thesis. He entered politics in 1922 and by 1924 had fought three 
general elections and two by-elections as a Labour candidate. In 1929 he won the seat 
in Bishop Auckland, and when Ramsay MacDonald formed his Labour Government 
Dalton was appointed parliamentary under-secretary to Arthur Henderson at the 
Foreign Office. But his political career appears to have taken a turn for the worse 
in the early thirties as he did not serve in MacDonald's government in 1931 and lost 
his seat in the ensuing general election. For the next four years he travelled, visiting 
Russia, Italy, Australia and New Zealand and Germany, where he was appalled at the 
Nazi treatment of Jewish academics. On his return to England he also returned to 
politics, and in the years leading up to the outbreak of war established himself in the 
Labour Party, speaking out vociferously against National Socialism and warning of 
the menace of Hitler's Germany. He was, in this, a fellow traveller with Churchill 
and Bracken, and at the outbreak of war supported Churchill in his foreign policy. 
In 1940 he became Minister of Economic Warfare, and later that year was given the 
task of setting up the SOE. According to Nicholas Davenport, Dalton's work at the 
Ministry and SOE was recognised by Churchill and for this he was rewarded by his 
appointment to the Board of Trade in 1942.61 As already outlined above this is not 
the view of his contemporaries, nor did Dalton himself perceive this as a promotion 
in recognition of his work at the Ministry. Dalton's greatest problem was his 
personality; many people found him to be a bully and rude, and his socialist political 
creed also worked against him in his battles with Churchill's inner circle in Whitehall. 
The conflict between Bracken and Dalton over the ministerial responsibility of the 
PWE was a battle over the principle of `tradition' and political power in Whitehall. 
Ellic Howe discussed the `apparent puerility' of the manoeuvres of Dalton, Eden and 
Bracken many years after the end of the war with Clifton Child, who had worked for 
61DNB 1961-1970. (Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 266-269. 
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the PWE at Woburn. According to Child they were `jockeying for control of what 
they could make into a very influential (and personal) power-sustaining-machine in 
post-war British politics. There was a lot, career-wise, at stake for them... control 
of it was still very much worth fighting for'. ' But did this affect the -way in which 
the German Section worked or jeopardise the success of their intelligence work? I 
think not. From Walmsley's recollections of the way in which the intelligence 
operations evolved in `EH' and then in the early months of the PWE it-would seem 
that it would have progressed in the same small, ad-hoc and incremental way 
regardless of who had been in control at the top. The problems between the Ministers 
did affect the way in which the PWE was initially set-up, and no doubt acted as a 
brake on progress, but it seems that because the conflict was of such a personal nature 
the intelligence work started by Walmsley and others 'evolved quietly and without 
interference. Furthermore, Dalton and Bracken did share the same political views 
about Germany as Churchill and therefore it could be argued that they would have 
viewed and used the intelligence of the German Section in the same way. 
The political level below this ministerial one, those in direct contact and control in the 
PWE with the German Section, is more interesting since it is these people who were 
the channel of communications for the intelligence between Whitehall and the German 
Section. 
The Director-General of the PWE, Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart [1887-1970], 
was born in Anstruther, Fife the eldest son of the Headmaster of the Waid Academy. 
He won a scholarship at twelve years old to Fettes College but failed in his scholastic 
promise and spent the next five years in sporting activities. His father sent him to 
Berlin and then to Paris where he learnt fluent German and French, and he became 
. widely 
read in the literatures of the languages he studied. For three years he was a 
rubber planter in Malaya, and his memories of that time in Return to Malaya are 
characterised by an almost school-boy, romantic approach to life which was ended 
"Child cited in Howe, The Black Game. p. 52. 
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abruptly with a severe attack of malaria which brought him home. '' His diplomatic 
career began when he was sent to Moscow in January, 1912 as vice-consul where he 
stayed until 1917, until he was recalled on `sick-leave', but in reality because of his 
affair with a Russian Jewess. Six weeks before the Bolshevik Revolution he was sent 
out again to Moscow as Ambassador on a Special Mission, where he resumed his 
acquaintance with `Moura', and was arrested and held in the Kremlin for a month on 
the suspicion of being involved with counter-revolutionaries in a plot to assassinate 
Lenin. " In the inter-war period Lockhart left the Foreign Office and spent time 
working in international banking before coming back to England and working on the 
Evening Standard as editor of the Londoner's Diary. At the outbreak of the war he 
re-joined the Foreign Office, working in PID and `EH' between 1938 and 1940 and 
was also appointed the British representative with the Provisional Czech. Government. 
In July 1941 he worked on the committee which helped devise the structure which 
later became PWE and was given the rank of Deputy-Under Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office. He became Director General of the PWE in the summer of 1942 after 
the departure of Dalton where he stayed until the end of the war, and was knighted 
in 1943. Personal opinions about Lockhart are less than flattering with Balfour 
describing him as someone who `drank too much and spent too much ... whilst 
Director General he spent a night in a police cell after being picked up inebriated in 
the street and at another time in danger of being declared bankrupt'. ' Cruickshank 
described him as a `sycophantic Scot"and `anything but a dynamic leader .. more 
interested in finding reasons for not doing things than taking the lead in shaping 
policies of the Executive', and quoted a dossier prepared for the Office of War 
Information which also identifies personal problems. The dossier, prepared for the 
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American Secret Service, described Lockhart as `essentially an `outside operator' with 
no real sense of executive or organizational work or loyalties. He was once an 
extremely aggressive person but for various reasons including his `personal habits' he 
is a shell of the man he formerly was... he has shown himself to be weak and unable 
or unwilling to take over effective control. He depends slavishly on Eden and tries 
to build up his strength by undercutting the strength and loyalty of his former 
colleagues'. " 
Against this evidence of Lockhart's weaknesses, Balfour identifies some of the 
reasons why Lockhart was made Director General, not least because he `had great 
charm, a gift for inducing people to work together and an ability to make himself 
trusted in high places, which when combined with the patronage of Beaverbrook 
enabled him to obtain for his staff freedom to get on with their jobs secure from 
undue interference'' Equally important, Churchill wanted to bring the PWE under 
Foreign Office control and Lockhart's relationship with Eden and Bracken and his 
acknowledgement that the PWE should interpret and not make policy made him the 
ideal candidate for the job. According to Howe, Lockhart's promotion in 1942 
`simply meant that it was the Foreign Office which now effectively controlled 
PWE'. 70 
Reginald (Rex) Leeper [1888-1968], was educated in Melbourne Grammar School, 
Australia and at New College, Oxford. He had an equally long diplomatic career, 
beginning with his work for the Political Intelligence Department from 1917 to 1919; 
he began working for the Foreign Office News Department in 1929 and became Head 
in 1935. He chaired the Sub-Committee of the CID which shaped the Ministry of 
Information in 1935-36 and moved to Woburn in 1938 as head of the revived PID 
where he worked with Stuart's propagandists of `EH'. When Stuart left `EH', Leeper 
was made Head of SO1 by Dalton. Leeper was anti-German, an anti-appeaser and, 
68RG 208 OWI Box 74, Ibid. p. 184. 
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according to Balfour, it was his friendship with Vansittart who was policy adviser to 
Dalton at SOE that got him the job. 71 Leeper stayed with the PWE until 1943, 
leaving to take up his appointment as Ambassador to Greece. 
Sir Ivone Augustine Kirkpatrick [1897-1964], was born in Wellington, India the eldest 
son of Colonel Ivone Kirkpatrick. His mother was the daughter of Sir Arthur Edward 
Harding, commander-in-chief of the Bombay Army and later Governor of Gibraltar 
and Kirkpatrick spent the years between the ages of seven and ten travelling Europe 
with his mother learning French and German on the way. He was severely wounded 
in the early months of the First World War and spent the rest of the war on 
intelligence and propaganda work. He worked for British intelligence between 1916 
and 1918, and from 1920 to 1930 spent his time working in the Western Department 
of the Foreign Office. In 1933 he was appointed First Secretary in Berlin [1933-38] 
where he gained an in-depth knowledge of Germany and in his book, The Inner 
Circle set out his detestation of the Nazi leaders and their doctrine. He acted as 
interpreter for Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg and was sent to identify and interview 
Hess in May 1941. Early in 1941 he was appointed by the Government to act as 
Foreign Affairs `adviser' to the BBC and in a reorganisation in October 1941 he was 
made Controller of European Services. Later in 1941 he was invited to join the PWE 
Committee as a Regional Director with responsibility for liaison between the BBC and 
PWE. In 1944 he began to work with others in the PWE and Foreign Office for post- 
war planning, working on the Control Commission for Germany 1944-1945. He was 
instrumental in the setting up of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the Information 
Research Department in 1947. In 1950 he worked for the British High Commission 
in Germany, where he stayed for three years, before returning to England as 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office until 1956. 
Major Dallas Brooks continued the work he had started in Stuart's organisation at 
Woburn and was responsible for liaison between the PWE and the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare, Ministry of Information, MI5 and the Secret Service. Given the 
"Balfour Conference Paper, 1991. 
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political problems surrounding the establishment of the PWE it is not surprising to 
find that when appointed to the PWE he spent the whole of the wartime in PWE 
fighting its battles at the highest level with other departments, the Chiefs of Staff, 
War Cabinet and a Prime Minister who according to Baker-White, `remained sceptical 
as to the value of political warfare'. 72 Baker-White also attributes Dallas Brooks with 
bringing some co-ordination into the PWE, stating that `after a number of high-level 
rows what had looked like a jig-saw puzzle thrown on the nursery floor became a tidy 
picture'. " 
It is clear from the above that the changes in the institutional framework which were 
brought about throughout 1941 and 1942 that by 1943 the people in charge of the 
PWE were all highly experienced, conservative and career led diplomats. They all 
shared similar educational and social backgrounds, had travelled Europe and had 
worked in the Foreign Office during the First World War either for the intelligence 
services or as a diplomat. Churchill, through Bracken and Eden, ensured that 
propaganda and political warfare towards Germany were of the same political 
persuasion and held the same views towards the German people as he did himself. 
Bracken eventually managed to get Dalton removed, and worked with Eden to get the 
appointment of Lockhart as Director General of the PWE which would mean that the 
Executive was brought under Foreign Office control. The appointments of Leeper, 
Kirkpatrick and Dallas Brooks closed this particular inner circle. This is, of course, 
not of earth-shattering importance or unique in political life. But by understanding 
the political climate within the PWE in which the German Section operated it can help 
to explain or to suggest the way in which intelligence could be interpreted to `fit' the 
existing views held in the PWE. It can also be helpful in understanding the way in 
which the views of the PWE might be slanted towards the views of the Ministers in 
control, who either subconciously, because of the existing climate of opinion, or for 
particular purposes of self-interest might present a particular interpretation of 
intelligence. As shown in this and the previous chapter Churchill's style of leadership 
nJ. Baker-White, The Big Lie. (London: Evans Bros. 1955). p. 52. 
" Ibid. p. 53. 
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was forceful, he appointed and promoted those people who had the same ideas and 
was quite willing to use or disregard intelligence when it suited him. 
Historians writing about the personality of Lockhart all point out that he was a 
`Foreign Office' man, Cruickshank accusing him of being a sycophant and Balfour 
arguing that his willingness to go along with his superiors, being `unduly subservient' 
was due to his own self-interest and the lessons he had learned in the past from going 
against them. 74 Balfour also comments that Lockhart would not have lasted long if 
he had not had the ear of Eden. " Whilst it is without doubt true that Lockhart 
became a `Foreign Office man' it also seems that he had great difficulty in adapting 
to the conditions he found in Whitehall during his time at the PWE. He may have 
been destined to become a career diplomat both by birth and by social pressure but 
his personality seems to have been ill-fitted to the constraints of such a life. His 
exploits in Malaya and Moscow, where he demonstrated a certain amount of political 
naievety, from which he had to be rescued by others does not suggest someone ideally 
suited to the political in-fighting that he was to be involved in during the Second 
World War. In essence Lockhart was always happiest away from the political life of 
London and preferred to spend time alone fishing in the glens in Scotland. 
Increasingly failing health led to his retirement at the end of the war. 
Whilst the intelligence officers appeared to be able to distance themselves from the 
political process, this could not of course always be the case in terms of those 
responsible for conveying intelligence assessments to policy-makers at the highest 
level in Whitehall. The people surrounding Churchill and Eden were not in the same 
position as the people working for the German Section, the `professional amatuers'. 
These people, it could be argued, would be those most likely to adopt the `realistic 
approach' to intelligence, accepting that political circumstances and pressures had to 
be taken into account when considering the use of intelligence. The issues of self- 
"Balfour, Propaganda in War. p. 93. 
"Balfour Conference Paper, 1991. 
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interest and politicisation of the process have then to be seen as a factor in the way 
in which the intelligence output of the PWE could have been used. Thus, the politics 
of power for influence in Whitehall carried on during the war, as illustrated by 
Dalton's war with both Cooper and Bracken, is a factor to be considered in the 
analysis of the PWE. 
What emerges from this examination is that there is a general division of approaches 
to intelligence between that of the individuals in the German Section who produced 
the Weekly Reports, who appear to have at least attempted to take a `professional 
approach', and those at a higher level within the PWE who adopted a `realistic 
approach' to the use of intelligence. These individuals could have consciously or 
subconsciöusly slanted the conclusions of the German Section or suppressed views that 
they knew would not `fit' with the climate of opinion or views in Whitehall, and can 
be identified as Bracken, Lockhart, Leeper and Kirkpatrick. However, this was not 
a static situation, and approaches to the production of intelligence and the political use 
of intelligence changed according to the issue and political conditions prevailing at the 
time, according to the particular issue, the climate of opinion at the time and political 
conditions and influence within and between the PWE and Foreign Office. 
Whilst no hard and fast rules can be established about the politicising of intelligence, 
the consideration of the people at all three levels of the hierarchy within Whitehall and 
the PWE does indicate some of the factors which should be borne in mind when an 
evaluation of the work of the German Section is made. It also helps to explain some 
of the apparent contradictions between the content of the intelligence reports and the 
way in which this was interpreted and used by various individual and departments. It 
identifies some of the reasons for the tensions between the `professional' and 
`realistic' interpretations of intelligence, where in certain areas of central concern the 
German Section produced intelligence about conditions in Germany which appeared 
to 'go against the grain' of thinking in Whitehall and challenged specific policies. On 
balance it would be accurate to say that the intelligence officers of the German Section 
were concerned to provide objective and accurate information and assessments. They 
were aware of the political climate surrounding them, to the extent that they took 
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positive action to counter that climate. This is the context for the following analysis 
of the intelligence output of the German Section. 
108 
nd Public Oninion inGerrmanv 
At the beginning of the previous chapter it was argued that the two main tasks given 
to the PWE in 1941 denied the existence of `resistance' in Germany: propaganda and 
political warfare was only used to support resistance in the enemy-occupied countries. 
The disappearance of the `other Germany' which was explicit in the propaganda policy 
of the PWE was then confirmed with the announcement of `Unconditional Surrender' 
in January, 1943. However, although the PWE's propaganda strategy denied any 
public acknowledgement of the existence of resistance in Germany it would be 
absolutely wrong to assume that Britain was uninterested in the relationship between 
the people and the Party. Quite the reverse. In fact the very reasons for Churchill's 
policy of `Absolute Silence' in 1941 and the following Allied policy of `Unconditional 
Surrender' in 1943 determined the need for continued surveillance of Germany society 
for any signs of opposition or resistance to the Nazi regime. 
In 1938 the links sought between Germany and Britain failed, according to Maier, 
because Britain was `too appeasement-orientated, too sceptical of the German efforts, 
or too anti-German without discrimination'. ' By 1941 the increasing scepticism and 
suspicion regarding the motivations and aims of the German resistance was matched 
by a distinct anti-German climate of opinion in Britain. Furthermore the recognition 
of the need to consider both America and Russia in British foreign policy decisions 
was becoming increasingly important. According to Klemperer, Churchill was 
adamant that there should be no co-operation with the German Resistance for `fear 
of offending the Russians'. ' Thus the policy of `Absolute Silence' was adopted. The 
announcement of `Unconditional Surrender' in 1943 confirmed that a total military 
defeat was the fundamental aim, that the whole of German society was responsible in 
one way or another for the Second World War, and that all Germans would be treated 
'Maier in David Clay Large, Contending with Hitler. p. 146. 
2Klemperer, German Resistance Against Hitler. p. 316. 
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as Nazis until that aim was achieved. There are a number of reasons why interest in 
the internal political and social conditions in Germany increased in Whitehall and the 
PWE after January 1943, despite the conclusion implicit in Allied policy that there 
was `no resistance' in Germany. 
In Whitehall the concern centred on the recognition that any co-operation with the 
Resistance would depend upon the rescinding of `Unconditional Surrender'. ' 
Furthermore, it was feared that if the Resistance was successful in overthrowing the 
regime then `the "Old Army" generals might launch from the Vatican a peace move 
that would allow Germany to sue for terms other than those of unconditional 
surrender'. ` After 1943 a total military defeat of Germany by the Allies was the only 
outcome acceptable, and the post-war plans for the eradication once and for all of the 
German `problem' rested on this. If the Nazi regime were overthrown by internal 
resistance this would undoubtedly threaten those plans. For these reasons Whitehall 
continued to keep a careful watch on the internal situation in Germany. 
For the German Section their interest was wider in scope. The intelligence reports 
provided detailed information for the invention of propaganda by the PWE which 
would undermine the morale of the German people. The German Section also 
monitored the behaviour and response of the German people to the regime for signs 
of any changes in the political climate in Germany as the war continued. This 
information was useful in identifying any potential resistance groups and was also used 
to anticipate the political and social conditions in Germany which would be useful to 
those engaged in formulating post-war plans for the occupation of Germany and the 
re-education of the German people. From an examination of the Weekly Reports it 
is possible to ascertain how much information the British government did have 
available to them about `resistance' and public opinion in Germany during the period 
1943-1945 when the policy of `Unconditional Surrender' was being pursued. 
Ibid. p. 339. 
Ibid. pp. 385/6. 
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Throughout this period the intelligence officers in their reports, and in their dealings 
with Whitehall through the PWE and the Foreign Office, repeatedly provided evidence 
which contradicted Allied policy. In fact in almost every Weekly Report for the last 
two and a half years of the war there is information which illustrated that `despite all 
its shortcomings, the "other Germany" was a reality'. ' This chapter considers the 
`other Germany' and the way in which it reacted to the increasingly authoritarian 
policies, coercion and terroristic violence of the Nazi regime. 
Ideas of German resistance have been transformed over the decades since World War 
Two. The initial, and influential, description of a `totalitarian' state and society 
described by Hannah Arendt and Karl Dietrich Bracher began to lose credence in the 
1960's following the publication of David Schoenbaum's book, Hitler's Social 
Revolution which proposed a new agenda for research on Nazi Germany. ' The last 
fifteen years has seen an enormous amount of research and literature on the realities 
of everyday life in the Third Reich which has now replaced the `black' and `white' 
description of the early post-war years with a complex picture of a society at war and 
under extreme conditions reacting in a myriad of ways, some conflicting and often 
contradictory, towards the Nazi regime. 
One of the most difficult problems of the history of German resistance concerns the 
definition of resistance. In 1995, fifty years after the end of the war, there is no 
consensus amongst historians about a definition of `resistance'. What type of 
behaviour should be included or excluded under the heading of `resistance' ? Should 
resistance in Germany be identified as being radically different from resistance in the 
occupied territories, on the grounds that those resisting in Germany were active in 
resisting their own government and could therefore be accused of committing treason 
against their own country ? Do those involved in resistance have to be seen to be 
effective in fundamentally challenging the Nazi regime ? Or, can we say that to resist 
'Willy Brandt, Address to Conference at Goethe House, New York. 
(April, 1988). David Clay Large, Contending With Hitler. p. 9. 
6 David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution. (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1967). 
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the regime at any level, publicly or privately, is important enough to be included in 
the history of German resistance ? Such decisions are sensitive and difficult to 
discuss, and have often led to emotional and accusatory discussions. 
For Anton Gill, `the smallest act against the Nazi government required enormous 
bravery" and he questions the right of those who have not existed under such a 
regime to make judgements on such issues. $ For Broszat `the long-standing 
exclusive definition of resistance focusing only upon exceptional cases of fundamental 
resistance and active opposition has produced an idealized and undifferentiated picture 
of German resistance. A revised definition that includes the less heoic cases of 
partical, passive, ambivalent, and broken opposition - one that accounts for the 
fragility of resistance and the inconsistency of human bravery - may in the end inspire 
a greater intellectual and moral sensitivity towards the subject than a definition that 
includes only the exceptional greatness of heroic martydom'9. This chapter adopts 
Broszat's approach and examines the reaction and response of the German people to 
the Nazi regime. It outlines the many varieties of resistance, opposition, dissent, 
protests and non-conformity which existed at all levels in German society and the way 
the Nazi regime responded to this behaviour. In doing so it also incorporates German 
public opinion which was anti-Nazi in content, since this was defined by the regime 
itself as oppositional, and illustrates the changing relationship between the Party and 
the people as the war moved into its final phase. 
Beginning with the `ordinary' people, in the first week of January 1943 the 
intelligence officers studied Goebbels' New Year speech which they considered `most 
revealing' because of his acknowledgement that the war was having a detrimental 
effect on the German people who, it seemed, were putting individual interests above 
. 
patriotism. They concluded that as far as a sense of `community' was concerned, the 
7Anton Gill, An Honourable Defeat: A History of The German Resistance 
to Hitler. (London: Heinemann, 1994). p. 23. 
$ Ibid. p. 1. 
4Broszat in David Clay Large, Contending With Hitler. p. 25. 
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`tendency is not towards consolidation under adversity but towards disintegration', and 
the evidence of this weakening community was provided by the growing list of 
executions (and the need to publish the list). ` A supplement to Weekly Report for 
the following week entitled 'Growth of Peasant Troubles in Germany' surveyed the 
reaction of the peasants to new Nazi regulations which included information about the 
increased dissent amongst these people and their refusal to comply with the regulations 
which resulted in the hoarding or sabotage of foodstuffs, refusal to bring in the 
harvest and the refusal to maintain extra cattle stock for the benefit of the government. 
The reports of prosecutions for unjustified abandonment of farm work by labourers, 
open complaints for the first time about the war, the government and living conditions 
all seemed to underline this conclusion. Much of the dissent amongst the peasants 
was due to the `speculation' by officials and their involvement in black market 
activities, and the warning given by the Reichsobmann of the Reich Food Estate was 
considered `remarkable' not only because of its severity but because it seemed to be 
addressed to both officials and peasants, with a threat from the Fuhrer that they 
should both `take the opportunity to collaborate politically .. or remain on the 
outside'. " 
This information was important to the PWE, since it was believed that it was possible 
to slow down the war economy of the Third Reich by using propaganda to encourage 
the sabotage of the production of food. This intelligence would serve as the basis for 
future propaganda to support and incite such actions. Assessing the significance of 
this information the intelligence officers concluded that the refusal to obey the 
authorities was due to a combination of factors including the feeling amongst farmers 
that the newly acquired Eastern Territories would or should supply all the necessary 
food for the Reich, and the problems existing due to the shortage of everyday 
consumption goods. The report concluded that the failure of the peasants to meet the 
higher standards of production set by the authorities had caused sufficient concern 
'o Weekly Report `German Propaganda and the German' (Hereafter 
WR[GPG]) PRO/FO 898/185. For week 28.12.42 - 3.1.43. 
11 Ibid. For week 4.1.43 - 10.1.43. `Growth of Peasant Troubles in 
Germany', 10th January, 1943. 
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within the regime to warrant a fairly threatening response, but nevertheless 
emphasised that this particular form of dissent should not be seen as anything more 
than `localised' reaction against the increased demands of the Reich Food Estate. " 
This report also included details of the treatment of the aged and infirm in the Third 
Reich with evidence of people accusing the regime of having no sympathy with the 
old and ill people, and of only being interested in the healthy and robust. The 
intelligence officers commented that it was not surprising that fears were aroused 
about this issue, and quoted a Dr. Kloos writing in the 'Deutsches Teberkuloseblan' 
in October, 1942 who had outlined the problems caused by 'asocial' patients and 
confirmed that 'nothing is done to arrest the course of the disease, and thus to prolong 
a life which is of no value to the community', and report from a Dr. Gercke, writing 
in 'Deutsches Aerzteblatt' on 15th November, 1942 who stated that patients suffering 
from malign tumours should not be given extra food. The intelligence officers 
commented that there was direct evidence to show that in Germany the consciousness 
of this position was now widespread, giving details of a German officer who had 
gone home on leave from Russia in March 1942 and found that the SS had 'killed off 
his father', whose mind had suffered owing to an injury received in the last war. 
Also included was information that a young soldier who was in Germany in June 
1942, had said that soldiers were being used as subjects for chemical experiments. 
From a number of sources it seemed to be apparent that the practice of euthanasia was 
being used for cases of incurable illness, mental cases and aged people who were 
unable to work. " 
Throughout January and February the reports observed reaction to the `Total War' 
measures being introduced, and noted that the judicial authorities were urged to show 
greater severity towards offenders against war-time regulations. In February, 
Goebbels made a `rampant' attack on the German people, stating that `Total war is 
thus the commandment of the hour'. The time had come to take off the kid gloves, 
12 Ibid 
13 WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 4.1.43 - 10.1.43. 
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and Goebbels uttered unmistakable threats to the shirkers and `bars in night clubs, 
luxury restaurants and shops, fashion salons, hairdressers, and beauty parlours, 
received their now customary measure of abuse'. " Goebbels had a `special dose of 
venom' for the people in the Tiergarten, the officials who pack up the moment their 
8-hour day is at an end, and `the certain men and women who loll in the health 
resorts where they exchange idle gossip and rumour'. He warned these people that 
the National Socialist government had the moral and political duty to mete out 
`draconian' punishment to anyone who avoided their responsibilities. The report 
noted that there was increasing evidence to show that many of those affected by 
labour conscription had been busy preparing their claims for exemption. Gauleiter 
Greiser of Poznan identified the `certain groups of idle Germans ... who sit in cafes 
and discuss ways of evading the recently published labour duty regulations'. " The 
intelligence officers identified five points which pointed to a change of mood and 
attitude in Germany: people had lost the belief in victory; they were tired of fighting; 
they were no longer in the mood to submit to increasing war work which the 
government asks; they were now actively resisting total war measures and had lost 
confidence in the Fuehrer. 16 
At the end of February, the increasing concern of the authorities about manif ons estati 
of social disorder in Germany resulted in the regime establishing a special urban 
constabulary, the 'Stadtwacht', which was a semi-military force in addition to the 
local police, regular and SS forces. Reported in the 'Ostsee-Zeitung' in Stettin it was 
described as 'an invisible auxiliary band of men trained in the use of arms who are 
ready to ... crush relentlessly any attempt 
by asocial elements of the population who 
endanger the property or security of other people'. " It was thought that the 'asocial' 
elements were probably foreigners, and the need for the 'Stadtwacht' was considered 
11 Ibid. For week 1.2.43 - 7.2.43. 
Ibid. For week 15.2.43 - 21.2.43. 
11 Confirmed in Steinen, Hitler's War and the Germans. p. 186 and p. 201. 
11 WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 22.2.43 - 28.2.43. 
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to be an indication of the shortage of man-power as a result of the depletion of the 
police and SS personnel. This report was found particularly interesting to the German 
Section, since it showed the concern in the Nazi regime about the presence of millions 
of foreigners now working in the Reich, and the friendliness and sympathy being 
shown to them by the German people. The possibility of collaboration between the 
foreign workers and the German people against the authorities was something both the 
Nazi regime and the PWE had already considered. The PWE recognised the important 
role the foreign workers might play if such a collaborative relationship were forged, 
specifically in terms of their potential for taking part in an internal uprising, sabotage 
and subversion activities. Because of this the situation was monitored closely and 
details of the conditions and location of the foreign workers in Germany became the 
subject of a supplement to a Weekly Report at the beginning of April, 1943. This 
included data and information about the number of foreign workers in the Third Reich 
and the crimes they had been accused of committing. Briefly, the report concluded 
that `Poles are the only large category of foreign workers who provide a percentage 
of reported crimes higher than the proportion of the total foreign worker population 
they represent. Whilst the Poles are represented as specialising in crimes of violence, 
the Russians appear to specialise in truancy, which accounts for over 60% of Russian 
crimes. The French, who represent 17% of both crimes and foreign worker 
population (including working prisoners of war), owe three-quarters of their 
convictions to their friendly relations with the civil population, almost entirely to 
relations with women'. " The report commented that there was clearly a brake on 
the reporting of crimes committed by Italians, who formed 4.5 % of the foreign 
workers, where only one crime was reported. This `forgery', is pointed out by the 
intelligence officer who also adds that a `good source' has confirmed that the Italian 
workers had a bad reputation in the heavily-raided districts for looting after raids, 
even though no conviction on this charge seems to have been permitted in the German 
press. Finally, the report concluded that the Poles and Czechs accounted for the vast 
"Ibid. For week 5.4.43 - 11.4.43. 
12th April 1943. 
`Foreign Workers and Their Crimes', 
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majority of crimes classed as `treason'. " This categorisation by the German Section 
of the foreign workers into nationalities and types of crimes they were assumed to be 
capable of committing would be useful in deciding which tasks could be given to 
which section of the foreign workers in any campaign launched by the PWE in order 
to get the foreign workers to do something rather than merely feel something. If this 
was the case the French would be used to `persuade' the local population to help 
them, whilst the Poles and Czechs could be relied upon to take part in the subversion 
and sabotage. By the middle of July 1943 there was growing evidence of anxiety in 
Germany that the foreign workers might rise up against the German people in defeat, 
and that this fear had come to obsess a large part of the civilian population. " But 
it was not until a year later that serious plans were put forward by the PWE 
concerning the use of this `pool' of foreign labour. 
Meanwhile the information about the attitudes and behaviour of women to the Nazi 
regime was brought to the attention of the German Section. This is particularly 
interesting since the role of women in the Third Reich has until fairly recently been 
neglected by historians, with women categorised as either `perpetrators' or 
`victims'. " The reality was much more complex, and was documented at the time 
in the intelligence reports of the German Section. In January 1943 women were 
included in the plans for the `total mobilisation' of German society and they were 
warned by Dittmar that their allotted task was compulsory hard work in the 
factories. 12 However, the regime's attempts to `encourage' women to register for 
19 Ibid 
20 WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/185. For week 5.7.43 - 11.7.43. 
21For the debate see Adelheid von Saldern, `Victims or Perpetrators? 
Controversies About The Role of Women in the Nazi State', in Crew (Ed. ), 
Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945. (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 141- 
165. Ute Frevert, Women in German History. (Oxford: Berg, 1990). pp. 207- 
239. Gisela Bock, `Antinatalism, Maternity and Paternity in National Socialist 
Racism', in Crew, op. cit. pp. 110-140. Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the 
Fatherland. (London: Methuen, 1988). 
12WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 10.1.43 - 17.1.43. 
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industrial work met with a negative response, and attempts to evade the call-up 
resulted in the creation of a bizarre range of illnesses and excuses. Amongst the many 
reasons given were such ludicrous ones as `Studying Japanese and Chinese', or being 
a secretary 'to a friend', or the slightly more believable one of having heavy family 
responsibilities. Doctors' waiting-rooms were besieged by women trying to get an 
exemption certificate, and the authorities reacted swiftly by announcing that the 
Labour Office could and would disregard these certificates unless they were signed 
by a Doctor attached officially to the Labour Office. ' It was clear that some women 
did not take the orders seriously, and others simply disregarded the instruction to 
register. ` Eventually the evasion of the call-up resulted in publicity for these 
`offenders' by the regime who announced in the Essen 'National-Zeitung' that 'for 
incomprehensible reasons not everybody has taken any notice of the final date for 
registration. All these people are liable to be punished'. Women had still not 
registered for industrial work and it was believed they were being shielded by other 
members of society. To try to counter this the Dresden Labour Office stressed that 
`all endeavours to protect over-anxious women by giving them less important jobs, 
are acts of sabotage, which must absolutely not occur'. ' Of course the refusal to 
register and work in the factories cannot be assumed to be politically motivated action 
against the regime, any more than it cannot be assumed that it was not. One of the 
many complaints made by `ordinary' women at this time was that they did not see 
why they should work in industry when the wives of influential men in the Party were 
exempt. " They also questioned whether it was either necessary or fair to be asked 
to do this sort of work, and this public questioning caused enough anxiety to the 
authorities to issue a warning that `Nobody benefits by listening, but many are 
11 Ibid. For week 8.2.43 - 14.2.43. 
2`Tim Mason comments that 'women conscripts proved themselves adept 
at fulfilling conditions for exemption' in Tim Mason, Social Policy in The 
Third Reich. The Working Class and the 'National Community'. (Oxford: 
Berg, 1993). p. 201. 
u WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 8.3.43 - 14.3.43. 
16 Ibid. For week 15.3.43 - 21.3.43. 
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injured, since their confidence is paralysed'. 2' But one of the most important 
reasons for the failure of conscription of women was seen to be the way in which 
women had hitherto been identified within Nazi ideology and practice and the efforts 
needed to show somehow that the situation had now been reversed without 
undermining the authority of the regime. 
An article in the 'St. Galler Tagblatt' on 31st January, 1943 illustrates the dilemma 
faced by the Ministry of Propaganda : 
`A significant fact which has not escaped widespread notice and 
popular comment is that only a year ago even Hitler declared himself 
opposed to the employment of women on a larger scale, because the 
future stamina of the German race depended upon girls and young 
women being shielded from the rigours of war for the function of 
marriage and motherhood. To-day Sauckel mobilises all women from 
17 to 45 without exception, including all women who are married but 
not yet mothers'. " 
The intelligence officers concluded in this report that the prevailing climate of opinion 
that `the woman's place is in the home' was `much more strongly and widely held in 
Germany than in this country', and that `under these circumstances, it is to be 
expected that there will be considerable passive opposition to the new decree, and that 
women will find evasion of the decree easy to reconcile with their consciences. 
But all women did not use this `evasion clause' just to avoid registration for industrial 
work; they also protested about other issues. Many questioned the regime about the 
very essence of Nazi ideology, and the role (outlined above) which had identified their 
tasks in the Reich as mother, home-maker and carer and now it seemed in war as a 
worker. in the `male' sphere for the Third Reich. They registered their protest in the 
latter case by their refusal to move into industry, and protested about the former in 
2' Ibid. 
28 Ibid. For week 1.2.43 - 7.2.43. 
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a variety of ways. ' The disillusionment and horror of the huge loss of life on both 
the home and battle front brought a reaction from some women who asked `Why 
should we have children if they are to be killed in 20 years time? ' and a young 
mother who bitterly complained that `In Europe one does nothing but build for 20 
years and then destroy - we mothers,.. educate children for this, and when we have 
brought them up, from 14 years they no longer belong to us but to the state'. 10 
These women were not talking from a nationalist perspective but from a human one 
which fundamentally questioned the reasons and purpose of war. It is a perspective 
that would, of course, be shared by many women in Britain at the same time. " 
In May 1943, the intelligence reports included more details of women's willingness 
to confront openly the Nazi regime with details of a riot in front of the 0KW 
Information office when `thousands of women and elderly men gathered to obtain 
news about their relatives in the Afrika-Korps' and that `similar' riots were reported 
from other parts of Germany. " In July it was noted that `men and women still take 
up an attitude of passive resistance.., and seem only to submit to compulsion and do 
not conceal their feelings towards the new work'. " Amidst this questioning and 
challenging of the regime, there were of course women who supported Hitler and 
were mobilised by the Ministry of Propaganda in an attempt to reverse the trend of 
dissent and protest of women. In September, the Reich women's leader Scholtz-Klink 
declared that `The Fuehrer has mapped out for us the only possible path. It is of no 
19See Frevert, Women in German History. pp. 223-228. 
10 WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/185. For week 24.5.43 - 30.5.43. 
" See Penny Summerfield, `Women and war in the twentieth century', in 
-June Purvis, (Ed. ), Women's History: Britain, 1850-1945. (University College 
London, 1995). Penny Summerfield, Women workers in the Second World 
War. (London: Routledge, 1989). Gayle Braybon and Penny Summerfield, 
out of the Cage: Women's experiences in two world wars. (London: Pandora, 
1987). 
32 Ibid. For week 10.5.43 - 16.5.43. 
11 Ibid. For week 19.7.43 - 26.7.43. 
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importance where the Fuehrer's path leads: out duty is to follow him'. " This 
attempt to convince the women of the Reich that they had no choice but to involve 
themselves in the war also failed, and at the beginning of November the intelligence 
officers noted that the `passive resistance' of women was causing `a very difficult 
problem for the German authorities .. Here Himmier's methods cannot be applied, at 
least on the grand scale, if only on account. of the inevitable repercussions on morale 
at the front'. " At the beginning of December a Supplement to the Weekly Report 
included confirmation of the failure of the German authorities to force women into 
industrial work, the methods used to check up on defaulters and the use of police 
literally to force women out of their homes and off to work. -' 
Moving away now from the issue of women, the intelligence officers had noted in 
April, 1943 signs of the weakening of German morale with people publicly 
discussing the issue of responsibility for the war and increasingly talking of the desire 
for peace. Goebbels attempted to clear the regime of responsibility for continuation 
of the war by insisting that the Fuhrer was not responsible and in fact had done 
everything to avoid it. Later in the month the increasing instances of people listening 
to foreign broadcasts for `information' which they realised the Ministry of Propaganda 
either would or could not give them was commented on. Their willingness to 
continue to transgress, despite the punishment for doing so, was the subject of an 
article in 'Der Fuhrer', on 11th April which, according to the intelligence officer, 
went much further than usual in admitting the authorities' fear of vulnerability of 
German morale to propaganda : 
`Broadcast propaganda has become a weapon which, if it is not met 
with suitable counter-measures, will prove more paralysing and deadly 
than guns and machine-guns. For, if from the start the fighting morale 
of the people, their will to resist and their belief in victory are sapped 
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or broken, the best weapons will be of no use'. " 
It had been noted by the PWE that Hitler had maintained a low-key profile during the 
first half of 1943, and in fact had not made any speeches since he given a short 
statement on `Heroes Day', 21st March. However, the defeat of Italy in September 
now forced him to break his silence. This was seen in Britain as `evidence of the 
extreme importance of Italy's surrender as a factor affecting home morale', " and 
the intelligence officers noted that it was the first time a Hitler speech appeared to 
have been recorded in a studio. This latter fact was seen as evidence of the 
unpreparedness of the Nazi regime for Italy's surrender, and that they were, despite 
their denials, surprised by it. They commented that the speech must have been 
written by the Fuhrer himself, and in a hurry, since it was `involved and illogical'. 
They believed that what Hitler was trying to get across to his audience was that the 
defeat of Italy did not affect Germany. at all: `Italy's withdrawal means very little 
from a military point of view'. The officers also believed that the regime was having 
to convince the German people that it was due to base treachery, and to use this 
constructed opportunity to warn the public and any internal oppositional groups 
against thinking such developments might be repeated in Germany. Underlining this, 
Hitler announced that brutal 'measures would be taken in Italy which would both 
satisfy the desire for revenge, for the regime it would act as a warning to remaining 
allies and finally urge the home and fighting fronts to still greater efforts. The 
German Section were encouraged by the response of the authorities, since it indicated 
that Hitler was `clearly conscious of the possibility of a `Badoglio coup' in Germany, 
when at the beginning of his speech he announced that measures had been taken `in 
order to protect the German Reich from a fate which Marshall Badoglio and his men 
not only inflicted on the Duce and the Italian people, but into which they intend to 
drag Germany'. " What was important for the intelligence officers was the clear 
indication that Hitler was trying to identify external forces as being most likely to 
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challenge the leadership, in order to take the focus away from internal dissent. But, 
for the German Section, Hitler was demonstrating his awareness of the existence of 
the German oppositional leaders was anxious to avoid mentioning them. This was not 
the `usual' pattern of behaviour of the leadership to opposition and dissent, and the 
intelligence officers considered that the coup in Italy had in fact brought about a panic 
amongst the Nazi elite. ' 
This theme was continued in German propaganda, when Goebbels' Reich broadcast 
of 17th September contained what the intelligence officers took to be `clear and 
significant warnings to Germans at home, not to follow in the footsteps of the Italian 
traitors'. "' It also appeared that Hitler's speech about the treachery of the King of 
Italy and Badoglio had backfired when information arrived showing the anti-Italian 
feeling amongst some German workers and their relations with Italian foreign workers 
which had resulted in `undisciplined outbreaks of exasperation' . 42 What was also 
important news for that week's report was information that Himmler had been 
promoted to Minister of Interior. There was also a rumour in German official circles 
was that this move had been made to allow him to control Goebbels. But there were 
indications that this promotion may also have been made for other reasons, since it 
was noted that it had been announced alongside the publication of a spate of police- 
court reports warning of the future `hard-line' approach to such behaviour. Whilst 
Himmler's promotion may not have given him much more power, it was certainly an 
indication of a change in policy towards defeatist talk and rumour in Germany. The 
lengths to which the Nazi regime felt they had to go in order to maintain their 
authority was entering into another phase, as the author of the report noted that 
`Propaganda against rumour-mongering etc., has failed , and now the method of 
iOSteinert discusses the impact of the coup in Germany and reaches the 
same conclusions. See Steinert, Hitler's War and The Germans. pp. 215- 
217. 
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arrest, imprisonment and execution is being tried'. " 
To underline the results of this new policy under Himmler the report included details 
of what they described as a `striking' example of a court case involving a 52 year old 
man from Korselt, sentenced to death according to DNB for `helping the enemy and 
for activities aimed at destroying the power of defence by defeatist talk and spreading 
rumours'. " This is a good example of the awareness in the German Section of the 
paranoia of the Nazi regime which increasingly used the judicial procedure to control 
a disaffected public, a divided and fragmented society and the failure of the regime 
to achieve what was rapidly becoming the `myth' of the `Volksgemeinschaft', the 
`national community'. 
Following Himmler's appointment the Ministry of Propaganda publicised details of 
the recently announced `Code of Duty' for the German people which constituted thirty 
rules, one of which was that `sabotage of war morale means death', warning that 
`high treason leads like lightning to the scaffold', treason being defined by the regime 
as `those who commit treachery verbally or in their thoughts'. Himmler's `mailed fist 
against defeatism' would be used in a purge against the well-to-do conservatives, 
particularly business-men who were labelled as `profit-patriots', as well as the 
`ordinary' people and all were warned that `weaklings and traitors will be seized and 
annihilated'. `s This report also contained details of the Gestapo arresting seven 
people for rumour-mongering, including one elderly man who was sent to jail for 
three weeks because he had `incommoded his neighbours with his rumours to such an 
extent that they lost their patience'. 
At the beginning of October the PWE reported that the morale of the German people 
and their ability to support the regime was weakening considerably. The evidence 
supporting this conclusion had come from two `neutral' observers in August and early 
43 Ibid. 
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September, from different parts of Germany and different strata of society, who had 
stated that `almost anything would be an improvement on the present state of things'. 
Germans, even those who were ardent Nazis a year ago, were saying openly to 
foreigners that they desired nothing but an end to the war, and were prepared to draw 
the conclusion that the regime must go, 'though there was still no evidence that they 
considered the possibility of themselves in assisting its departure'. 14 In the same 
week the report gave details of a 59-year-old Regensburg man, Johann Kellner who 
had been executed on 12th August because he had `carried out Communist whisper 
propaganda and painted inciting slogans on house walls'. ' Since his appointment 
on 24th August as Minister of Interior the German Section had received information 
of fourteen deaths and twenty-eight convictions which the intelligence officers noted 
was a tenfold increase. More publicity, increased terror and increased severity of 
punishment now included the death sentence for four people accused of distributing 
`a political poem of an inciting and disruptive nature'. ` 
Whilst the weakening of morale on the German home front was seen as an important 
factor the intelligence department was also looking for signs of more practical results 
of this change in mood or attitude. As mentioned previously one of the ways this 
could be achieved was through the disruption of the war economy, and all the 
information received about strikes and demonstrations in the workplace was put 
together in a special supplement. Entitled `Strikes and Demonstrations in Germany' 
the report included details of strikes in Austria, Hamburg, Essen, Duisburg and 
Oberhausen where some workers had been arrested whilst others were induced to 
return to work by the threat of shooting. " The report commented that this was not 
a practical solution the regime would be able to take since the `acute shortage of 
labour, particularly skilled labour' would in any case make it difficult for the 
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authorities to deal with major strikes by wholesale imprisonment or execution. Whilst 
such behaviour might disrupt the regime's ability to carry on with the war, through 
lack of armaments and other vital equipment, the intelligence officers were also very 
aware that issues of self-interest were involved. This was illustrated in the report with 
a quotation from a letter written by a woman from Bocholt, Westphalia which implied 
that the strike action there had been `designed to extract treatment according to 
regulations arbitrarily refused by the employer or manager'. However, a strike in 
Austria was seen to be a demonstration against food shortages, whilst anti-war 
demonstrations were also reported, particularly from heavily-raided towns where 
workers also deserted their work and fled to safer areas. The report acknowledged 
that the strikes might be `not so much industrial disputes as political or quasi-political 
demonstrations, protesting against food shortages or demanding peace'. " 
A major cause of anxiety for the regime had always been the possibility of a repeat 
of 1918 as a result as a result of morale and public opinion going against the regime. 
At the end of October the intelligence officers commented that `the 1918 parallel 
continues to be prominent in the press all over Germany', with the need for endless 
reassurances from the leadership that this was not possible because `This time 
iermany has the Fuhrer. Like a rock in a stormy ocean, never wavering, never 
doubting, an example to all in strength and tenacity, in unshakeable determination and 
supreme concentration'(emphasis as original). " Two weeks later the intelligence 
officers include details of a speech made by Hitler which, for them, contradicted this. 
The report commented that again the speech appeared to have been written in a great 
hurry, and although Hitler's voice sounded fairly strong he had raced through his 
script and revealed little of his old powers as an orator and demagogue. But `more 
striking than his delivery, however, was the absence of logical development of his 
arguments, his frequent return to points he has already made, and (increasingly 
towards the end) his inability to construct a straightforward, coherent - let alone 
S0 Ibid. 
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grammatical - sentence'. '? At the end of this report the officers emphasised the 
increasing weakness of the regime and the growing criticism of the leadership which 
illustrated a growing rift between the Party and the people, and between the Party and 
the SS. It also highlighted the general acceptance of defeat amongst German officers 
who now thought that the regime would put off the admission of defeat until the last 
possible moment, and that these people were hoping that under these circumstances 
the Anglo-Saxon powers might forestall a Russian occupation. " 
By the middle of November it had become clear to the intelligence officers from their 
analysis of the situation in Germany that since `no German appeared to have any 
rational grounds for expecting any end to the war except defeat, it seems profitable 
to consider not so much the moral factors tending towards national collapse but rather 
those inhibiting immediate capitulation'. Importantly the German Section thought 
capitulation could be brought about either by the leadership or by the German people, 
an important distinction being made between them. The report contained a warning 
about the problems which might present themselves if a capitulation by the leadership 
did occur, reminding the reader that it may not necessarily represent a rejection on 
National Socialism but only `abdication in favour of other leaders'. But, realistically, 
the officers confirmed that this was `most unlikely', unless it was as a result of 
dissension between the leaders with `some thinking that they see a way out for 
themselves by sacrificing others'. 54 But the intelligence officers also thought that `the 
mass of people can, however, produce a situation which forces. the leadership to 
capitulate'. As far as the intelligence officers were concerned the `So-called leaders', 
ie. generals, . industrialists `must be regarded for the present purpose only as 
outstanding representatives of the general mass of the people, and despite their 
important status and position, cannot act. They are inhibited from acting by much the 
same factors as inhibit the general mass - difficulty of discussion, fear of 
denunciation, lack of organisation, lack of agreed aims, uncertainty as to the 
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consequences of action, conflict of loyalties, etc. ' The report also noted that German 
Generals would be inhibited by their Oath of Loyalty to Hitler. 
Underlining the recognition in the German Section of `the other Germany' the 
intelligence officers considered that, `the mass of people might act directly by 
revolution'. But in the final analysis this, too, was dismissed by the recognition that 
`a revolution arising spontaneously out of the German people is very unlikely, since 
the most powerful factor inhibiting any revolution from below is still undoubtedly the 
Gestapo and all that it stands for'. Finally, the report considered one more avenue 
open to the German people to force the leadership out of power. This was the effects 
on the regime of the failure of the people to produce the goods necessary to carry on 
the war. The report concluded that even if this were to happen it would be achieved 
`not so much by voluntary sabotage as by involuntary failure owing to the lack of will 
to make the necessary effort'. " 
As 1943 drew to a close the intelligence officers again assessed the situation between 
the regime and the `mass of people', given the information they had at hand 
concerning the conditions under which they lived which had resulted in total apathy 
and broken morale. The `mass of people' could not be relied upon to bring down the 
regime, any more than the regime could rely on them to support it. The increased 
pessimism amongst the `ordinary' people regarding the outcome of the war had 
resulted in their withdrawal into the `private' sphere and a reluctance to become 
concerned or involved in political issues. Instead the civilian population were 
resorting to the `simple, unpolitical ideals of domesticity and purely personal relations, 
and whilst accepting that the ideals of National-Socialism were an "illusion" they 
appeared to have no conception of any alternative for which they are prepared to 
work'. Equally problematic for the regime was the evidence which suggested that the 
troops now appeared to be `taking refuge in the simple, unpolitical ideals of 
comradeship, obedience to established authority and physical courage'. -" 
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Interestingly, the reports do not contain a great deal of information about German 
youth, but what is included certainly does not correspond with the idea of a massive 
army of young people supporting Hitler and the Nazi regimes' The Weekly Report 
for the period 22nd to 28th March, 1943 contained the information that over one 
million boys over 14 years old had been sworn in to the Hitler Youth. " At the end 
of May however, the report noted a `serious problem' and evacuation difficulties in 
Oberhausen had arisen because the juvenile workers whose parents had been evacuated 
were not `taking advantage' of the hostels provided for them by the authorities. " 
The problem seemed to be that these hostels were actually Hitler Youth training 
centres and were so unpopular with the working boys in the area that they preferred 
to find homes with other people living in the area than with the Hitler Youth 
organisation. It seemed that the Ministry of Propaganda had performed its job only 
too well by announcing on 12th May that the juveniles living in these hostels would 
`be brought up physically, ideologically and morally according to the regulations 
which apply to the Hitler Youth, by specially selected hostel leaders and for 
educational reasons must wear the regulation uniform of the Hitler Youth'. ' 
One group of young people in Germany who did not conform to the above behaviour 
were known as the `Swing'. At the end of June the intelligence officers quoted a Party 
announcement in the `Hannoversche Zeitung' dated 8th September, 1942 which 
revealed the existence in Hanover of a movement in Germany comparable with the 
`swing' or `zazou' movements of the Occupied Countries. 
'Recent research, also using PWE intelligence sources, confirms that the 
`Hitler Youth were challenged at the very height of the Third Reich by a 
number of oppositonal youth gangs'. Perry Biddiscombe, `The Enemy of our 
Enemy' :A View of the Edelweiss Piraten from the British and American 
Archives', Journal of Contemporary History, January, 1995. pp 37-63. p. 37. 
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The announcement read: 
`we owe it to the honour of German youth ruthlessly to make a clean 
sweep of these adolescents and conspicuous types who .. draw attention 
to themselves by their physical neglect, their defective deportment, 
their dirty appearance and their provoking hairstyles and who already 
in peacetime refused to undertake any tasks whatsoever for the benefit 
of the community ... complaints of provoking and brazen behaviour , 
these people have met in the shelter huts and at seats and have annoyed 
passers by, insulting them in a vulgar manner'(emphasis as original). " 
The same report went to on describe how, on the personal instructions of the 
Gauleiter, a whole group of these boys and girls of ages ranging between 14 and 18 
were rounded up by the police. The usual punishment was that they would have to 
present themselves in working clothes with their hair cut according to the regulations 
and would be put to work for the President of the Police. Failure to observe this 
order could lead to arrest and even imprisonment . In October 1943, the intelligence 
officers commented that `Doubts concerning the political attitude of the rising 
generation , as well as the need to employ every available labour unit, is suggested 
by the drastic measures adopted to round up those who have escaped mobilisation. 
`Compulsory Youth Meetings' were announced in Kreis-Salzburg-Land to be attended 
by all young people between the ages of 10 and 18, and those who did not attend 
were warned that they would be fined up to 150 RM. 1 An even more drastic 
measure promised in some areas was that the Food Offices would collaborate in the 
registration of all juveniles by the Hitler Youth and food cards for these young 
people would be only be issued against completed Hitler Youth membership 
application forms. ' 
The following Weekly Report considered `The Condition of the Young People', and 
found that the `Hitler-Jugend training, the absence of fathers at the front and mothers 
" in the factory, etc., have combined to destroy the family in Germany and leave 
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adolescents to grow up wild', that the Hitler Youth had `taken the matter into their 
own hands' and subsequently an order had been issued forbidding all under the age 
of 18 from attending the cinema where performances are not due to end before 21.00 
hours. " Additionally, the effects of the Hitler Youth programme were now being 
publicly criticised for the deterioration of school results. An article in the press in 
December, 1943 attempted to reject the claims that the amount of time taken out of 
school for training for the Hitler Youth was to blame for this, and argued that the 
problems stemmed from the conditions where the father was called up some years ago 
and the mother often `professionally detained', resulting in deterioration of discipline 
in the home. The article did finish, however, by admitting that `the pupils entrusted 
with tasks of leadership in the HJ might be physically and mentally overstrained'. ' 
In the second week in January the intelligence officers returned to this issue and 
confirmed that they thought it might be a problem confined to the Meckleburg area 
since in the rest of Germany the Hitler Youth appeared to be `fortifying' its position. 
They also noted that a decree published on 4th January (which had already come into 
force on December 11th) empowered Axmann, the head of Hitler Youth, `uniformly 
to direct the utilisation of German youth for additional war tasks outside their school 
and vocational work'. A more sinister turn of events was noticed by the intelligence 
officers who reported that a directive had also been issued from the Ministry of Justice 
associating the Hitler Youth closely with the administration of the juvenile courts as 
from January 1st, 1944. They commented that `It is hard to see what this means 
except that unruly HJ leaders will be able to snap their fingers at the judges, as at 
everybody else, while their more quiet contemporaries are completely at the mercy 
of adolescent sadism'. ' 
The problems the Nazi regime was facing with German youth , were considered in 
a supplement dated 10th July, 1944 entitled `Youth Protection Camps in Germany', 
which included details of two camps that had been set up in Germany and which the 
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intelligence officers believed were to deal with the increased problems of German 
youth `running wild'. ' The officers commented that it would be `fanciful' to 
describe these as concentration camps, but that there were certain commonalities 
between the two establishments: the anonymity of camp administration so far as the 
public was concerned; the stress laid on harsh discipline; the possibility of adding an 
indefinite term of detention in a YPC to any legal sentence; and the imposition of 
police supervision on released camp inmates without the necessity of any legal 
process; and the possibility of imposing detention in a YPC without legal process and 
without warning. The officers of the German Section concluded that these 
commonalities indicated that it was `safe to describe these camps as the first stage 
towards concentration camps for the young'. 
Whilst the authorities took increasingly repressive measures against youth the Gestapo 
continued to use and increase their violent methods in order to pacify the increasingly 
resentful sectors of German society. It was repeated that people were now beginning 
to question openly the punishment meted out to individuals on account of the opinions 
they held and some of those persecuted and killed by the Gestapo, such as the Korselt 
man, had now come to be regarded as martyrs. " 
The morale of soldiers on the Eastern Front was of particular interest to the PWE, 
and from a batch of captured letters written by German soldiers in Russia the 
intelligence officers quoted one from an officer who stated that every one of his 
soldiers was shouting `I did not start the war, we were better off when we were 
unemployed, we were much better off before the National Socialist government set 
in'. This letter contained information about the breakdown of discipline on the 
Eastern Front, with the officer `praying' that there would not be an unprecedented 
retreat homewards warning that `I am deeply convinced that these hordes would 
behave in a worse manner than the Bolsheviks themselves, if only in order to 
6' Ibid. For week 3.7.44 - 9.7.44. `Youth Protection Camps in Germany', 
10th July 1944. 
" Ibid. For week 14.2.44 - 20.2.44. For details of the `Korselt' man see 
fn. 44, p. 121. 
132 
establish some sort of political `alibi' for themselves. One can sense a change in 
outlook among the majority of men - especially among the N. C. Os. '. " These 
indications of a disaffected army were important areas of interest for the PWE, since 
if this dissent could be turned into positive action and become widespread amongst the 
soldiers and Army Generals then the possibility of a coup in Germany could still not 
be ruled out. 
Moving from the `ordinary' people to the possibility of a resistance movement in 
Germany, information that had been coming into the German Section since the end 
of May 1943 that there were problems within the Party and between the Party and the 
Army, was now confirmed by the regime. The officers had recognised the necessity 
for a general purge of defeatist, rumour-mongering individuals within the Party and 
prompted the intelligence officers to comment acidly that these people were `rats on 
a sinking ship', who had no possibility of doing anything to form a political 
movement against the regime. '° The reasons for, and effects of, the Purge were 
considered in the following week's reports, with the intelligence officers concluding 
that it was an attempt to clear out the educated and cultural elites within the Party who 
might be most susceptible to Allied propaganda. The information that such `high 
personages' as Gauleiters might be involved in the Purge did, however, lead the 
German Section to consider that this might be a further `breach within a supposedly 
united community . 
The possibility of a direct challenge to the Nazi regime began to take shape in August 
1943 when information in a Swiss newspaper on the subject of the Italian coup asked 
"whether a similar fate may not be in store for Hitler and National Socialism, naming 
Keitel, Doentiz and Goering as possible leaders. " The intelligence officers thought 
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Brauchitsch was an `obvious analogy for Badoglio -a professional soldier, former 
Commander-in-Chief, latterly in retirement on account of his disagreement with the 
political Leader'. " Discussing at length the potential leaders the report concluded 
that at this stage all information available pointed to little more than'idle speculation' 
and even if it were more than that it still `represented the crudest possible 
interpretation of the Wehrmacht taking over'. The Weekly Reports continued to 
include details of the information regarding the events, rumour and gossip 
surrounding the Badoglio coup, and concluded that this move would be welcomed by 
the German people . The German Section 
included in this report information from 
a `not very reliable report, from inside Germany through German emigre channels' 
that Rundstedt had been named as a possible Badoglio. " 
In order to assess the probability of an internal coup the intelligence officers observed 
the reaction of the Nazi leadership to the situation, and noted that Goebbels was 
obviously taking the threat very seriously when in his speech of 3rd October he 
repeatedly stated that there was no soldier to be found of any rank who would put 
`cowardly subjection above honour' since the German nation was too politically 
mature to be taken in by the hypocritical lies of the enemies and the `bitter lessons of 
November 1918'. " The report concluded that the speech was `practically an 
admission that the example of Badoglio has the same sort of appeal to the German 
people now as Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918' . In other words the German people 
would be willing to surrender on the basis of a negotiated peace, a situation that the 
Nazi regime could not contemplate. This was confirmed in October when a report 
came into London that rumour in `grand bourgeois' circles alleged that Himmler 
would soon be found co-operating with the Wehrmacht to oppose Hitler. This seemed 
to corroborate with `good evidence' previously obtained that a military coup would 
be impossible without Himmler's co-operation, even if it meant that he would have 
to be eliminated later. The report suggested that Himmler proposed to make peace 
Ibid. 
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with Russia over Hitler's head, which was thought by the German Section not to be 
`impossible' since reports were also coming in that opinion in `higher circles' in 
Germany suggested that `the young men destined to be Germany's future leaders were 
inspired by admiration of Russia's success against Germany'. Unfortunately these 
`future leaders' also were coming to the conclusion that National-Socialism had not 
been sufficiently totalitarian'. " This had always been at the heart of the problems 
between Churchill and those individuals who had tried to put out `peace feelers' 
towards Britain. The feelings of mistrust about the aims of these people had resulted 
in Churchill's policy of `Absolute Silence' in January, 1941. " But, in mid-October 
the intelligence officers concluded that those who had hoped for a German Badoglio 
in July had now lost heart due to the passage of time and also as a result of 
Himmler's increased campaign of terror against all dissenters. The main reason, 
however, according to the intelligence available was that the Generals who might be 
involved were `paralysed by the occupation of key positions by other generals 
irrevocably committed to the regime'. " 
For the next four months discussion concerning an internal coup seemed to have 
disappeared, but in mid February 1944, the intelligence officers began to receive 
information of rumours of impending developments, and that Rundstedt was already 
involved in negotiations with the Western Allies. Himmler, having already made 
contact with the Allies, was also still considered a possibility. " In the mid March 
the rumours continued, and a `neutral source in contact with upper-class Germans' 
informed the PWE that high German officials were still talking of the desirability of 
a German Bodaglio but to the consternation of the German Section the rumours now 
emphasised a `pro-Russian' approach. 8° 
76 ibid. For week 4.10.43 - 11.10.43. 
"See p. 107. 
's WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/186. For week 11.10.43 - 17.10.43. 
" Ibid. For week 7.2.44 - 13.2.44. 
10 Ibid. For week 6.3.44 - 12.3.44. 
135 
,,. 
As the military situation,, worsened the intelligence officers recognised what they 
described as an expected sense of hopelessness of the German people given the 
`German propensity for self-pity', with the added barb that they would now cling to 
Hitler as a 'scapegoat.. somebody on whom the whole blame could be laid when the 
victorious Allies came to allot punishment for war-guilt'. " 
Throughout this period the existence of `the other Germany' to the intelligence 
officers of the German Section had resulted in various notes and memoranda being 
exchanged between the PWE and the Foreign Office concerning the possibility of 
issuing a declaration to the German people concerning Allied intentions in the post- 
war settlement. At the beginning of December, 1943 a note was sent from Harrison 
at the Foreign Office to Scarlett at the PWE about the announcement of a Joint 
Declaration of intention towards the German people. ' Harrison asked if the PWE 
could `dress them up' in a form which would be palatable to the German people. " 
A Memo from the PWE, setting out the principles of political warfare viz-a-viz the 
Draft Declaration included the suggestion that the Declaration `should not suggest that 
we intend to interfere more than necessary over the long term in German internal 
affairs. In particular, the suggestion should be avoided that we intend to impose a 
Constitution on Germany or ourselves to undertake the re-education of the German 
people'. °4 
But, in a Foreign Office Minute entitled `Propaganda to Germany' a typed note from 
11 Ibid. For week 3.4.44 - 9.4.44. 
12The issue of re-negotiating the declaration of Unconditional Surrender 
made by Roosevelt was an important issue for the PWE, as the correspondence 
shows. The Draft Declaration was an attempt to change this policy to 
`prompt' surrender, or at least to outline to the German people the British 
understanding of this. 
00 'Memorandum from Harrison at the Foreign Office to Scarlett', 7th 
December 1943. PRO/F0371/39076. 
1` `Memorandum from PWE on Foreign Office paper', 9th December 
1943. PRO/FO371/39076. 
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Roberts attached to the Draft Declaration indicated the feeling in the Foreign Office 
against such action : 
`It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Vansittart's peace terms as 
published in the `Sunday Dispatch' on December 3rd are not very 
different from our own. He goes rather further that we do in regard 
to detailed interference with German education but generally speaking 
his ideas seem to me to combine the necessary firmness and safeguards 
with moderation, and to be such as the British public might reasonably 
be expected to support after the first wave of and-German feelings has 
subsided'. " 
In February 1944, as a result of further discussions and the anxiety caused by the 
emergence of a pro-Russian tendency in Germany led the PWE to make 
representations to the Foreign Office. Talks had been taking place between the 
PWE/JIC/PID/War Cabinet and Foreign Office concerning the policy of 
`Unconditional Surrender', and Charles Peake, the political Liaison Officer at 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force asked whether `prompt 
surrender' should replace `unconditional surrender'. ' On 10th February Scarlett 
wrote to Sir Orme Sargent at the Foreign Office pointing out why a Declaration was 
desirable, including the fact that Goebbels' propaganda of the `Devil's Plans' should 
be refuted and that as the war grew steadily worse the Germans would be likely to 
accept any alternative than continuation of the war. " Eventually, after further 
discussion on 25th April the proposal was put before Churchill by Sir Alexander 
Cadogan. Churchill's lengthy reply was a refusal to get involved: 
`The matter is on the President. He announced it at Casablanca 
without any consultation. I backed him up in general terms. 
I have pointed out to the Cabinet that the actual terms contemplated for 
&s "Foreign Office Minute "Propaganda to Germany" ' December, 1943. 
PRO/FO371/39076. 
" TLetter from Charles Peake, Political Liaison Officer to Foreign Office', 
31st January 1944. PRO/F0371/39024. 
v `Letter from Scarlett to Sargent "Why a Declaration of Allied Intentions 
is desireable"', 10th February 1944. PRO/F0371/39024. 
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Germany are not of a character to reassure them at all, if stated in 
detail. Both President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin at Tehran wished 
to cut Germany into smaller pieces than I had in mind. Stalin spoke 
of very large mass executions of over 50,000 of the Staffs and military 
experts. Whether he was joking or not could not be ascertained. He 
certainly said that he would require 4,000,000 German males to work 
for an indefinite period to rebuild Russia. 
By all means circulate historical summary of events. Personally, I am 
not going to address the President on the subject. For good or ill, the 
Americans took the lead, and it is for them to make the first move. 
It is primarily a United States affair'. " 
This correspondence is important because it is an indication of the acknowledgement 
of the existence of `the other Germany' despite the policy then in force, and 
Churchill's reply in refusing to `get involved' illustrates the problems of those in the 
position of taking policy-decisions which might appear to others to disregard the 
intelligence services input. It is also an example of the intelligence officers' concern 
to get others to see the picture as it was, rather than as they would like it to be. This 
is not to say that the German Section sympathised with `the other Germany', but that 
they were aware of the potential problems of the pro-Russian tendency the 
existence of Germans to whom they could appeal over the heads of the Nazi regime. 
One of the ways in which the PWE thought it might be able to appeal to the 
`ordinary' people was by formulating a plan to bring them together with the 7 million 
foreign workers inside the Third Reich in an attempt to overthrow the regime. A plan 
had been put forward in 1940, which had been `shelved' but was then revived by 
Ritchie Calder in April, 1944. The details of the numbers and locations of the foreign 
workers was information the German Section regularly updated, and the PWE 
believed that these people might act as a whole and fundamentally attack the heart of 
the German war machine from within. Calder's operational plan was codenamed 
`Trojan Horse', and was designed specifically to come on-stream in support of 
"`Memorandum from Churchill to Cadogan', 25th April, 1944. 
PRO/FO371/39024. 
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Operation `Overlord' - the planned invasion of Europe which would begin with the 
landing of Allied troops onto the beaches of Normandy. The aim of the paper 
produced by Calder was to `examine the potentialities of foreign workers at present 
located in Germany..., what was already being done to utilise this element/force in 
psychological warfare operations and... to submit proposals on the subject which 
would link up with Overlord'. ' 
The paper estimated that there were 8,650,000 foreigners in Germany, comprising of 
6,582,000 workers who were recruited as such, and 2,068,000 prisoners of war and 
civilian internees. Representing twenty nationalities and speaking as many different 
languages, with large numbers concentrated in Berlin, the industrial cities of the Ruhr 
and the northern ports and Austria, the report suggested that they had been recruited 
by enticement, indirect compulsion or by conscription. Calder argued that `The loss 
to Germany of the foreign workers services would strike a mortal blow at the Nazi 
war machine and economic system'. The appreciation or definition of the problem 
was outlined first: `hitherto the mass of foreign workers and conscripts in Germany 
has remained relatively docile, and the German authorities. have succeeded in 
exercising an effective measure of control over them ... there is little evidence of 
industrial opposition .. apart from the practice of go-slow methods and restriction of 
output'. The paper went on to argue that `It seems likely that the latter practices are 
as much a result of laziness and indifference as that of inspiration and organisation'. 
Nevertheless the report proposed that `a conglomeration of approximately 9 million 
foreigners, including women, of whom many have been working in Germany for 
several years and have contracted certain social ties may be expected to develop 
certain explosive or revolutionary forces as the war enters its final critical period'. 
It was also thought possible that their fellow German workers might join in with them 
causing widespread strikes `which in turn may lead to civil war' which was also 
considered to be a desirable outcome. ' 
19 PRO/F0898/370 22nd April, 1944. 
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Calder recommended `fast action and policy', suggesting advice on go-slow tactics, 
exhortations to foreign workers to escape from their centres of concentration following 
heavy air raids, and to make their way home. It was also thought that it might be 
profitable to spread defeatism among German factory workers and civilians generally 
by getting them to listen to the BBC broadcasts. The use of leaflets to support the 
operation was rejected since there was little or no evidence that any of the ten million 
multi-language leaflets dropped during the previous nine months had even reached 
their target. Indoctrination of workers through PWE and SOE personnel was 
considered the more effective route, alongside a plan to drop five million small, 
powerful time-fuse incendiaries (Braddocks) for the use of the foreign workers in any 
way they chose. 
Finally the report concluded with the one advantage of the plan, which was that if it 
were timed to coincide with `Overlord' the operation could result in `national 
revolution' and complete breakdown of the home and fighting fronts. The two 
disadvantages were that if the operation failed, then reprisals on foreign workers by 
the Nazi authorities would be blamed on the Allies and, secondly, if it were to be 
successful the chaos inside Germany would seriously hamper Allied military 
operations. The disadvantages heavily outweighed the advantages and the problems 
of political issues and military operations resulted in the plan being rejected - as 
Dalton's plans in 1940 had been rejected. 
Whilst this plan was shelved, the German Section continued their observations of the 
situation in Germany and the possibility of an internal coup. The last report available 
before the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20th, 1944 considered the impact 
of the Invasion of Europe on morale and concluded that there was `an unwillingness 
to face facts' and that there now appeared to be a split between the service and 
civilian population. " The Weekly Report for 17th - 23rd July 1944, contained 
details of the failed attempt on Hitler's life. The intelligence officers noted that 
German propaganda was designed to implicate Britain and to deny any suggestion of 
" WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 5.6.44 - 11.6.44. 
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an internal plot92. The report considered exactly who had been responsible, and 
identified Stauffenberg as the man who had placed the bomb under Hitler's table. 
They also believed that the strenuous denials from Hitler and the regime that the 
Germany Army were not involved probably indicated the exact opposite of this. The 
following week the officers noted continued attempts to describe the coup as `Nothing 
more than a crazy attempt by a group of reactionaries on the Fuehrer's life'., 
Goebbels' attempt to convince what the German Section describe as `the ignorant and 
superstitious masses .. with his sober and unvarnished account.. amounted to an 
account of a miracle'. The report noted that Goebbels proclaimed that the Fuehrer's 
life was `saved by a miracle-from a plot hatched in the enemy camp' who had been 
supplied with explosives by the British, illustrating the fear that the German people 
should not be made aware of the existence of internal resistance in Germany. The 
leaders of this `enemy camp' were identified as Olbricht, Beck and Hoepner. 
The German Section considered all the information they had available and concluded 
that Goebbels' account `suspicious', not least because it did not account for the cutting 
of the telephone to Stockholm on the evening of the 19th'. The report also included 
the details that Fromm, Beck and Witzleben had been executed-whilst Brauchitsch, 
Haider and Rundstedt had been arrested, and that Helldorf and Zeitzler had been 
involved in the planning but had failed to act at the critical stage. This information, 
included in a report just four days after the attempt testifies to the amount of accurate 
information the PWE had about resistance throughout this period. 
At the beginning of August more information came through to England that exposed 
Goebbels' propaganda of `a small internal plot .. and nothing to do with the German 
Army' for what it was: an attempt to smooth over what had been a serious and almost 
successful attempt on the Fuehrer's life. Goebbels offered one million RM ransom 
money as a reward for information leading to the capture of Goerdeler, and published 
a list of twenty four people who had been found guilty of being involved by a Court 
12 Ibid. For week 17.7.44 - 21.7.44. 
11 Ibid. For week 24.7.44-31.7.44. 
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of Honour. Included in these were Field Marshall Witzleben, nine generals and 
thirteen other officers with `famous names', and additional information that a Major 
of the General Staff had deserted to the Bolsheviks. The report concluded that 
Fromm had probably been the `key' man and that Zeitzler and Hoepner had been 
involved, adding that they received information `months ago' which discussed such 
a possibility and that Goerdeler was an intermediary. The severity of the punishment 
handed out by the Nazi regime which promised a `universal purge' in which they 
would `slaughter everyone who lifts a hand against us' was also included in the report 
and seen in London as further evidence of the pressure under which the regime now 
existed. A Berlin source `believed to be reliable' informed them that between one and 
two thousand officers had been taken into custody for questioning by July 23rd. 1 
Towards the end of August the German Section began to receive information about 
the increasing criticism of the regime and the way they had handled the people alleged 
to be involved in the July plot. A particular criticism was the way in which the 
conspirators were summarily tried and executed. Furthermore, the intelligence 
officers believed that the `discontent' in the Army which had led to the coup was now 
becoming more widespread. Another crisis for the regime was also identified in the 
reports when the appointment of Junglaus as Commander-in-Chief in Belgium was 
announced. According to the intelligence report Junglaus was not even a Waffen-SS 
General, but `purely a policeman', and that the appointment `suggested that the higher 
ranks of the Wehrmacht are so honeycombed with oppositional tendencies that a 
wholly reliable general cannot be found even for the supreme military command in 
an area directly threatened by invasion'. The report also pinpointed the date of 
Goerdeler's arrest as August 11th, which suggested that he had been shielded within 
the Third Reich by an organisation large enough to move him from house to house 
and therefore avoid detection. The news of Goerdeler's arrest was accompanied by 
the information that Lindemann, originally accused of deserting to the Bolsheviks, was 
now posted as 'Wanted'. " 
" Ibid. For week 31.7.44'- 7.8.44. 
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The German Section believed that a `dangerous' situation had been created by the 
Nazi regime and their treatment of the `Putchists' which had caused a further 
breakdown of loyalty within the ranks of the German military. Again, however, it 
was not seen as potentially leading to a political crisis for the regime because of the 
fear of persecution of those who might be willing to be involved. This fear had, of 
course, been increased by the severity of the Purge following the attempted coup 
when the Nazi regime had used it as an excuse to rid themselves of many 
troublemakers and dissenters. ' 
As the Allied forces approached the Reich frontiers the reports included details of a 
changed attitude amongst the soldiers expected to fight for Hitler `to the bitter end'. 
Whilst not forming a resistance movement, which would be regarded as a treasonable 
offence, the troops were making an important distinction in their interpretation of the 
Soldiers Oath which they insisted was to the Fatherland and not to Hitler. The mass 
of `ordinary' people were forced to dig trenches as part of the plans for the beginning 
of `The People's War' in which the civilian population were expected to save the 
country from an enemy which demanded their extermination. Certainly Goebbels' 
propaganda had an effect, aided by the policy of Unconditional Surrender, and many 
in Germany believed that annihilation was their fate. An old woman living in Breslau 
had written `The Russians haven't far to go now to the German frontier. If it gets 
very bad, there will be nothing left for us but the gas tap'. " 
During the last months of the war the German people were bombarded with 
propaganda to re-enforce the message that it was now up to them to defend their 
country. Hitler's war had now truly become the `People's War', and victory, they 
were told, was inevitable simply because they had managed to survive 1944. An 
appeal' signed by Bormann, Funk, Goebbels and Himmler appealed for greater 
involvement of the people in this sacrifice and re-stated the need for the collection of 
all possible articles of clothing, particularly old Party uniforms, and equipment for the 
" Ibid. For week 21.8.44 - 27.8.44. 
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new Volksgrenadier and Volkssturm. Despite this, and the message that `sentiment 
would have to be foregone - and the clothing of dead men sent in', the first day of 
the collection was met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm and only `old rags' were 
handed in. 9b The German Section recognised that the military situation provided little 
material for the Ministry of Propaganda to fall back on and that they were now 
reduced to atrocity propaganda and the Strength Through Fear campaign. This was 
largely centred on the ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war and civilians, who according 
to the Ministry, were being shot in the back of the neck by the Allied troops. The 
intelligence report noted that this was accompanied in propaganda for Europe with a 
denial of German atrocities : `German military quarters have stated emphatically that 
there have been no orders in the whole of the German Wehrmacht to shoot 
prisoners'. ' As the position in Germany deteriorated rapidly, the Ministry 
attempted to keep the news of the military advance of the Allies secret and intensified 
the 'People's Sacrifice' campaign. The contradictions between propaganda and reality 
became pronounced, with the Ministry on the one hand claiming total success for the 
textile and equipment collections, and on the other announcing that in order to avoid 
`inconveniencing' people by their having to take goods to the collection centres Party 
members would visit each household individually, with lists of requisitioned goods. 
Lists of names were also to be taken, ostensibly to be put into the German People's 
Book of Honour, but the underlying reason for the need for names was clear. " It 
was also noted in this report that a large number of those who had taken the oath to 
join the Volkssturm in Lodz on November 12th 1944 had not reported for service at 
all by December 8th. Officials in West Prussia and Danzig urged the people `not to 
weaken, not to lose their nerve' whilst in the Saar region it became clear that Hitler 
youth were being called up for service for fear that they might leave and seek safety 
with their families in the interior. All juveniles born in 1928,1929 and 1930 (13,14 
91 Ibid. For week 1.1.45 - 7.1.45. 
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and 15 years of age) were kept back. "' 
At the end of January the intelligence officers included in their report a `remarkable 
speech' said to have been made at Poznan by State Secretary Naumann of the 
Propaganda Ministry in which `he not only took it for granted that Poznan would 
ultimately fall but instructed the women as well as the men (and all children over 12 
instead of the normal minimum Volkssturm age of 16) to die fighting. The 
disintegration of the defeated armies had forced the Ministry of Propaganda in an 
article in 'Front and Heimat' dated 22nd January, to `stand firm at all costs' and that 
Himmler had been sent to the front `to guarantee the command'. Whilst Himmler 
`guaranteed the command at the front', the SS, Hitler Youth and Volkssturm with the 
support of the judicial administrative system `guaranteed' the loyalty of the home- 
front. The first shell to hit in Ohlau coincided with the first execution in public of 
`a coward devoid of honour' by a squad of Volkssturm men. The victim was the 
Second Burgermaster of the City of Breslau, Dr. Spielhagen who, the PWE initially 
believed, had been executed because he had tried to bring about the surrender of the 
City. 102 Later in February they discovered that in fact he was alleged to have 
deserted his post, and that others since had shared the same fate. "' The `ordinary' 
people in the besieged towns* were increasingly subjected to a physical and mental 
bombardment. They were told that they must overcome `tank-phobia' and to `fight 
in cold-blood, unconfused, without reasoning why or when'. 1°4 
A supplement to this Weekly Report entitled `Morale in Baden in Autumn 1944 
Through German Official Eyes', contained the details of civilian conditions, with 
trench-digging, conscription, inadequate food and accommodation causing bladder and 
101 Ibid. 
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kidney infections amongst the elderly. The intelligence officers also noted that the 
authorities were keeping a `careful watch on the Churches who they regarded as 
hostile political organisations', and that the foreign workers who were receiving 
leaflets encouraging them to commit sabotage and abandon their work `represent a 
danger to the homeland'. "' 
Even at this late stage the German Section was considering the potential for an 
internal challenge to the regime, and indications were that the authorities were having 
to make efforts to control the Army. Now they believed that : 
`nothing but a move by the Wehrmacht could overthrow the present 
regime and provide an alternative capable of executing an orderly 
capitulation. Present circumstances are such as might easily convince 
a rapidly increasing number of conscientious officers that it was now 
their duty to save at all costs whatever could still be saved out of 
Germany's ruin rather than allow the whole future, as the present, to be 
sacrificed to political intransigence` . 
106 
The use of terror to keep back the inhabitants of the towns to fight to the end 
continued, and `the mailed fist without the velvet glove' delivered `brutal hardness' 
to anyone to disobeyed the authorities. A crucial part of the use of such tactics was 
the regularising of the policy of terror by a decree announced by DNB on 16th 
February and the setting up of a special court-martial for instant action against 
offenders. The court-martial would deal with `all criminal actions endangering 
German fighting strength or fighting determinism'. Himmler, as Reich Minister of 
Interior, issued the decree on the Fuehrer's orders and now shared with Thierack, 
Reich Minister of Justice, the right to `issue the regulations necessary to supplement, 
alter and execute it'. 107 This total control of the judicial procedures illustrated the 
loss of control of the civilian population, including Party and State officials since it 
103 Ibid. `Morale in Baden in Autumn 1944 Through German Official 
Eyes', 5th February 1945. 
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now `regularised the procedure of the way in which the officials at Bromberg and the 
runaway Mayor of Konigsberg were treated, and probably the execution of the Mayor 
of Breslau too'. The decree had been drawn up very carefully, in order to preserve 
the authority of the Gauleiter who in his capacity as Reich Defence Commission was 
responsible for appointing the members of the court and the prosecutor. He also 
confirmed the sentences and arranged the executions. The court-martial set up by this 
decree , however, could only pass the 
death sentence or order acquittal, otherwise 
the case was passed on to the ordinary courts. In effect Himmler and Thierack were 
now in total control of the judicial procedure in an attempt to terrorise the population 
to fight on, and could summarily sentence to death and execute individuals, and 
change the laws at a stroke in order to legalise their operations. 1" 
Throughout February the Ministry of Propaganda made desperate efforts to prevent 
the people from `sinking further into apathetic acceptance of inevitable defeat', whilst 
the intelligence officers noted that `Hitler seems oblivious to evidence of widespread 
defeatism which appears from his own Press and wireless - or refuses to admit it goes 
beyond a few individuals'. In reply to an accusation against Hitler as being 
responsible for the problems Germany faced, the German Section quoted Hahn, a 
party publicist who argued that if Hitler had not taken control Moscow would have 
done so and would `eradicate the German intelligentsia, lower the standard of living 
to the level of the Russians, decimate the German population by famine, mass 
deportations and executions, and enslave the rest in a gigantic mass-production of 
armaments'. The officer writing the report commented sarcastically, that `if death in 
war' was substituted for `famine and deportations' the list would appear like one of 
Hitler's achievements. " 
One of the main tasks of the intelligence officers at this stage was to try to anticipate 
when the end of the war would finally be admitted by the regime, and the morale of 
the population was considered an important indicator of this. This was based upon 
I's Ibid. 
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experience of November 1918 which had shown that an important factor was 'the 
general conviction of the civil population that the outlook was hopeless has been one 
of the principal factors bringing about the end of a war'. Considering this the 
intelligence officers concluded that : 
`In Germany we are witnessing an attempt by an authoritarian 
government to continued an apparently hopeless war, not disregarding 
the civil population but recognising their co-operation is essential and 
methods of applied social science (propaganda, calculated intimidation, 
neutralisation of every potential nucleus of resistance, etc. ) to force co- 
operation out of the civil population'. 
Because there are no precedents nobody can guess how near it is likely 
to come to succeeding - that is, for how long it will be possible to 
wring the necessary support out of an unwilling population'. "" 
As the war entered into the final phase the intelligence officers recognised that all the 
hopes of the Nazi regime and the Fuehrer were now based on the youth of Germany, 
with the regime reduced to recruiting children into the Hitler youth, the youngest 
being 12-years-old. As the British forces crossed the Rhine the civilian population 
were ordered to `stick it out and, if need be, to face death bravely'. Again all those 
under 14-years-of age were left behind, the propaganda of the previous years 
proclaiming that they were the future of Germany and therefore should be saved at 
whatever cost was cruelly forgotten, and they were sworn to unconditional obedience 
to the men left behind to take charge of the defence of German soil. This `unheroic 
slinking away of the fighting men leaving defenceless non-combatants' caused even 
greater resentment and fear amongst the `ordinary' German people. "` 
But the young people of Germany were not all in agreement with the aims or the ideas 
of the Nazi regime, as a `strictly confidential' circular addressed by Himmler to the 
police authorities confirmed. The information of the `cliques or associations of young 
people outside the Hitler-Jugend leading a life of their own according to principles 
incompatible to the National-Socialist ideology' were interesting to the German 
110 Ibid. For week 5.3.45 - 11.3.45. 
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Section because they seemed to be in nature the same type of `oppositional youth 
groups' as the Edelweiss-Piraten and Swing. Himmler's memo informed the German 
Section that these groups had been formed in all parts of the Reich, and increased in 
extent lately, bearing names such as `Clique, Mob, Blase, Meute, Platte and Schlurf'. 
Whilst the groups were loosely connected, often with no membership certificate, 
Himmler pointed out that `between individual cliques cross-connections sometimes 
exist, which may be either of a friendly or a hostile nature'. He identified three 
different types of `cliques': one `criminal-asocial', indulging in anything from 
mischief to organised robbery and sexual (particularly homosexual) offences; 
`political-oppositional', with a general hostile attitude to the State and rejection of 
Hitler Youth; finally `liberalistic-individualistic', who represented an Anglo-Saxon 
type who were upper-middle class, with English ideals, language, attitude and clothing 
who favoured jazz and hot music, swing dancing etc., '. Himmler gave detailed 
instruction on how to combat the behaviour of these `cliques', using police patrols, 
etc. and whilst the German Section point out the destabilizing effect these groups 
might have had on German society they commented that Himmler did not see in them 
even the `germs of an opposition - that is, (in the narrow sense) politically 
dangerous. (emphasis as original) 112 
The last reports in this series cover the weeks April and May when the Battle of 
Berlin was in progress. Hitler's Order of the Day on 16th April included desperate 
measures to ensure that not only civilians but also the Army stayed to fight. Soldiers 
were ordered to kill any officer of whatever rank, if he did not know him, if he 
ordered a retreat. That such orders had been issued indicated to the German Section 
the extent of the disintegration of the Nazi regime and that Hitler had no grasp of 
reality or understanding of the situation in which he was in. Berliners were instructed 
that they were to arrest agent provocateurs and rebellious foreigners. Hitler's birthday 
was celebrated with an effort to revive what the intelligence officer called the `blind 
and mystical faith' in him, whilst the enrolment of 10-year-old children into the Hitler 
Youth emphasised for the German Section the barbarity of the regime in its sacrifice 
112 Ibid. For week 26.3.45 - 1.4.45. 
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of children. "' Women were urged to arm themselves and fight, using the guns 
taken from the dead or in desparation the `scissors from the home'. "' 
Finally, the `playing down' in Germany of Hitler's death was viewed warily in the 
German Section who considered that it could have been done to `support the line that 
Germany had turned over a new political leaf. At the beginning of the report they 
even commenting that `It would probably be excessive scepticism to doubt that 
Hitler is really dead'. They did, however, also make the point that it would also be 
doubted by the faithful, warning that `if the body is not quickly found and publicly 
displayed the belief may be expected to persist among simple people (and perhaps 
become politically important from time to time) that Hitler never really died but is 
being hidden away somewhere and will come again'. Underlying their distrust of the 
whole situation the officers also warned that `All German accounts of the manner in 
which Hitler met his death are suspect'. In considering the information they had which 
amounted to a disbelief that he had died in Berlin, thinking he had probably had an 
`apoplectic seizure' on April 22nd or 23rd and had been moved to Berlin to use in the 
creation of the legend that he had died in defence of the Reich Chancellory. 
At the end of this report the intelligence officers outlined the problems to be faced by 
the occupying powers which in essence contained a warning about the disappearance 
of major Nazi leaders, the existence of the `Werewolf organisation which was sworn 
to fight a guerilla warfare in Germany against the Allies, and the problems which lay 
ahead of the long-term effects that the ideological training of the Hitler-Jugend may 
have had on German youth. "" 
To summarise, it is clear from the work of the German Section that the British 
government was supplied with detailed, accurate and up-to-date intelligence of 
resistance and public opinion in Germany throughout the period covered by these 
"' Ibid. For week 16.4.45 - 22.4.45. 
114 Ibid. 
"s Ibid. For week 30.4.45 - 7.5.45. 
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reports. Information about the plans, potential leaders and the people likely to be 
involved in the Resistance Movement were known long before the July '44 attempt 
on Hitler's life. From the analysis of the intelligence officers it is also clear that they 
understood the practical problems facing these conspirators, their inability to take 
decisive action because of the relatively small number of generals and civil servants 
willing to become involved, and the power structure of the Nazi state in which all the 
key positions were held by people loyal to the Nazi regime. 
As far as the `ordinary' people were concerned, the Weekly Reports contain a wealth 
of evidence of a disillusioned and fragmented society, a society existing under extreme 
stress which increasingly registered its dissatisfaction with the regime in a variety of 
ways ranging from non-conformity through protest to resistance. In doing this `the 
other Germany' challenged the authority of the regime and questioned both the 
ideology and motives which rendered them worthless as individuals. After the fall of 
Stalingrad the refusal to submit to the regime in `blind faith and loyalty' was, for the 
intelligence officers, confirmation of the failure of the totalitarian aims of the Nazi 
regime and the `myth' of the `Volksgemeinschaft'. The control of the `other 
Germany' was ensured by the terror and brute force of the Gestapo and SS, aided and 
abetted by a corrupt judicial system, which was used against all who those did not 
fully support the regime. 
This is not to argue that the intelligence officers were misled in their observations, or 
created naive `images' of the German people for the policy-makers. Their 
interpretations were almost always accompanied with a consideration of the motives 
of those who challenged or opposed the authorities, such as political or economic self- 
interest. Thus the strikes of the industrial workers, and the behaviour of the young 
people were seen. not as manifestations of political unrest or ideological resistance to 
the regime but as localised dissent to the authority of the regime for economic or 
social reasons. The `asocial' behaviour of women in refusing to register for industrial 
work and their evasion of their `duty' to involve themselves in the `Total War' 
campaign were, for the intelligence officers, something they would need and be able 
to come to terms with. This is an interesting conclusion, since it presupposes that 
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German women might be expected to have supported the regime, and yet the PWE 
was actually engaged in propaganda and political warfare to undermine support. This 
is surely connected in some way with the understanding of `male' and `female' roles 
in society, and particularly in a society at war. Added to this is the fact that all the 
intelligence officers working within the German Section were almost certainly males 
interpreting women's behaviour. 
In the final analysis, however, the intelligence officers were looking for signs of the 
existence of a potentially successful mass `resistance movement' in Germany capable 
of challenging or overthrowing the regime, and as a result of this concluded that there 
was no `resistance' in Germany. Nevertheless, the existence of `the other Germany' 
was acknowledged and in February 1944 this was used in an attempt get the Allied 
leaders to make a declaration to these people. In this the German Section, and the 
pWE, were `going against the grain' of existing policy in Whitehall, and doing what 
Michael Balfour argues they believed they should be doing, which was putting the 
picture as they saw it rather than supplying the one Whitehall would have preferred 
to see. What is most striking about these reports is the accuracy of the detail and 
interpretations made at the time , which was initially disregarded and contradicted by 
the post-war `totalitarian' thesis of the 1950's and 1960's. The history of the 
resistance movement, which emerged immediately at the end of the war, providing 
detailed accounts of the protagonists has now been counter-balanced by the research 
into the `varieties of resistance' in the everyday life of German society. The history 
of consent, dissent, conformity and non-conformity, and resistance has been 
extensively researched in the past fifteen years and the list of contributors to the 
debate is enormous. "' The consensus of opinion amongst all of these historians is 
that `the realities of everyday life in Nazi Germany will simply not submit to black 
and white descriptions'. "' 
One of the most important studies was, and still remains, Detlev Peukert's assessment 
16See Footnote [72]. 
"'Crew in Crew, Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945. p. 1. 
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of everyday life in Nazi Germany. "' Peukert identified the `growing readiness to 
criticise the regime, and in part to engage in conflict with its representatives or with 
aspects of its policies, and how, although this criticism did not swell into a full-scale 
opposition movement, it was not suffocated either, by the Nazis' much-vaunted 
"national community"'. "' The 'Volksgemeinschaft' was, for Peukert and the 
German Section of the PWE, `primarily a facade' and not an expression of social 
realities as a whole. The dissent and protests of the workers documented in the 
intelligence reports, and the officer's assessment of the weakness of their position as 
a result of the destruction of their organisations is also mirrored in Peukert's 
assessment. Although in the strictest methodological sense `we should speak of 
"resistance" only where the motives and actions of the people involved were directed 
to overthrow the Nazi regime as a whole' and the structural conditions for `mass 
resistance' did not exist, he nevertheless believes that `resistance by workers formed 
the most significant component of the German resistance movement'. "' The 
understanding in the German Section of the everyday life of the `ordinary' people in 
Germany were reflected, 35 years later, in Peukert's summing up of his research: 
`Although soon robbed of its mechanism of political expression 
by Gestapo terror, the resistance mobilised tens of thousands of 
people into performing acts of courage and sacrifice, but it 
remained decentralised, disorientated and historically 
ineffectual. The historical significance of the resistance was its 
preservation of non-fascist traditions'. "' 
The role of women in Nazi Germany has also become the focus for research with 
Gisela Bock and Claudia Koonz representing the two ends of a spectrum of behaviour 
which range from `victims' to `perpetrators'. This polarisation of opinion is now 
11 Detlev J. K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and 
Racism in Everyday Life. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989). 
"' Ibid. p. 22. 
I" Ibid. pp. 118-119. 
121 Ibid. P. 247. 
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being challenged and Adelheid von Saldern argues that few women could be classed 
as either, and that the position of women in Nazi Germany allowed them a certain 
amount of freedom. She argues, as the Weekly Reports show, that women did not 
always choose the `safe haven' of home life merely to avoid conscription, nor were 
they exempt from Nazi violence. " The information and conclusions of the 
intelligence officers about the `myth' of the Hitler Youth and the problems the 
challenge they posed to Nazi regime by their unwillingness to conform the rules of 
the `national community', have also been extensively covered in the historiography 
of the Third Reich. In Hitler's War and the Germans, Marlis Steinert uses secret 
intelligence reports and sources of the Nazi regime and the SDP to discover public 
opinion and behaviour of German society. In relation to the youth of Germany, 
Steinert outlines the problem of `wild' youth and increasingly `subversive behaviour' 
which resulted in the intervention of the secret police who resorted to `special 
treatment' for these a-social elements in society. " In short, the information and 
conclusions contained in the Weekly Reports of 1943-1945 are reflected in the 
contemporary historiography of the Third Reich which illustrates the complex, 
paradoxical and sometimes contradictory behaviour of German society to the Nazi 
regime. The conclusion of the German Section of `no resistance' , in Germany denied 
the existence of the non-fascist traditions which Peukert, and others, have uncovered 
in their history of everyday life in Nazi Germany. The `establishment' view of the 
German people in the early post-war years confirmed the totalitarian theories of mass 
support for the regime , and the conclusions of the PWE supported and 
justified this. 
However, the contents of the Weekly Reports testify that `the other Germany' had 
continued to exist throughout the period of the Third Reich and explicitly rejects the 
policy of `Unconditional Surrender', which was that all Germans should be treated as 
Nazis. 
12von Saldern in Crew, Nazism and German Society. pp. 141-165. 
123 Steinert, Hitler's War and The Germans. pp. 219-223. 
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nal Rule and the R 
In May 1945 as Germany became an occupied country, the war was replaced by a 
battle for `the hearts and minds' of the peoples of liberated and neutral Europe. ' In 
competition with Russia and America, and using propaganda the British government 
hoped to persuade these people to look to Britain first amongst the victorious powers. 
In Germany, Britain also went for the `mind' and not the `body', where the battle was 
to be won by what Pronay describes as the `remarkable' and `breathtaking' idea of 
re-educating the German people. ' Psychological warfare would be continued, 
replacing the undermining of German morale during the war with the re-education of 
the German people after the end of hostilities. ' This line of thought, with historical 
roots in the colonial philosophy of the mid- and late-nineteenth century, was first 
considered appropriate policy for Germany during the First World War. This 
`unorthodox' idea emerged after World War One in the Political Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Office where Rex Leeper and William Tyrrell were based. 
However, after the Peace Conference of 1919 the idea was rejected in favour of a 
traditional policy based on established international codes of practice and conduct. 
During World War Two, the assumptions that the traditional approach to the German 
'problem' had failed and resulted in Germany's second attempt within thirty years to 
dominate Europe, reinforced the arguments being made by those in Whitehall who 
were calling for a radical policy towards Germany and the German people. The policy 
eventually adopted was in fact the policy of occupation and re-education which had 
been rejected in 1918. What distinguishes British policy at this time as `remarkable' 
therefore is not the policy itself, but the unprecedented application of colonial 
'Robert Cole, Britain and The War of Words in Neutral Europe 1939-45. 
(London: Macmillan, 1990). p. 169. 
2Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (Eds. ), The Political Re-education of Germany 
and Her Allies After World War II. (London: 
Croom Helm 1985). p. 4. 
Ibid. p. 23. 
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philosophy, which is identified in some of its forms today as `cultural imperialism', 
against a modem industrialised nation in Europe. 
To date the discussion on why such a policy was adopted has focused at the level of 
elite politics in Whitehall, which was represented by the polarisation between two 
schools of thought in Whitehall during the war. On the one hand, the supporters of 
the `Vansittart' school advocated demilitarisation, denazification, deindustrialization 
and democratisation with re-education being the core element in the plans. On the 
other hand the more `liberal' school argued that a democratic and peaceful Germany 
could only emerge from within German society itself, albeit with some `help' from 
the international community. 
This controversial area of German/British history has, in common with German 
resistance, become the focussed for sometimes heated debate. In the Spring of 1987 
David Welch published an article in German History which accused the British 
government of `deliberately setting out to destroy the political outlook and traditions 
upon which German society had been based' in it's determination to create a new 
society in Germany through the process of `re-education'. ` He added that recently 
released documents challenged the `somewhat congratulatory impression of British 
missionary zeal' and that whilst the policy of re-education was undeniably colonial in 
origins the `Vansittart' view was still prevalent in government circles. ' Furthermore, 
he dismissed the generally held view that Britain had a well-thought out and coherent 
plan for this colonial experiment, arguing that as a result of the intense rivalries 
within Whitehall between the proponents of this view and those who argued for a 
more `liberal' approach, confused and contradictory policies emerged as a result of 
compromises between the two. Central to Welch's argument in this paper was his 
accusation that in 1944, even before knowledge of the death camps had appeared, 
there was a shift in British policy towards the German people based on the idea of 
`David Welch, `The Political Re-education of Germany After World War II: A 
Need for a Reappraisal? ', German History. 4 (Spring 1987). pp. 23-35. p. 23. 
I Ibid. p. 25. 
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`guilt mobilisation'. ' This move towards `collective complicity and guilt 
mobilisation' he argued, `afforded the British the opportunity to reflect on the German 
national character traits and to ruminate on whether re-education was possible at all 
for such a people'. ' And, whilst Welch argued that the `insanity unleashed by the 
ideology of collective guilt produced some absurd observations' he also confirmed that 
people soon lost interest in the idea, instead choosing to use re-education in a 
pragmatic way as a means of projecting British values and the British way of life. 
This, of course, was seen as vital as a means of securing British interests in emerging 
conflict between the USSR and the USA for political influence in Europe. 
However, in his article Welch identified Michael Balfour, who had been working in 
Germany as Director of Information Services Control in the first eighteen months of 
occupational rule, as an `ally' of those people in the Foreign Office and Political 
Division who were responsible for the shift in policy in 1944 to `guilt mobilisation'. 
Balfour replied in the Autumn edition of German History that he was `saddened to 
learn .. that 
he (Welch) took such a poor view of our efforts to refashion German 
attitudes after 1945'. ' He pointed out that a `number of people in Britain, Europe 
and in America' had come to the conclusion that Germany had started two world 
wars and must be prevented from starting a third, that she had been left to carry out 
her own internal reforms in 1918 and had failed, and that there were very few 
alternative suggestions for policy towards Germany. ' Finally, he asked what could 
be made of Welch's 'fine sounding' term `guilt mobilisation', and suggested Welch 
should consider the difference between `responsibility' and `guilt'. . For Balfour `re- 
education' was the term used as a label for the plan of `somehow inducing the 
Germans not to want to make war'. He concluded by saying that if Welch thought this 
should not have been done he was `wrong-headed' and `living in Cloud-Cuckoo 
IIbid. p. 26. 
' Ibid. p. 27. 
`Michael Balfour, `Re-education in Germany After 1945: Some Further 
Considerations', German History. 5 (Autumn 1987). pp. 25-34. p. 25. 
' Ibid. pp. 25-26. 
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Land'. 'o 
This chapter examines the role of the PWE in this unique experiment in British 
history, and in doing so also contributes to the debate outlined above. Whilst re- 
education was the core element in British policy the Executive was involved in a 
number of different ways in relation to the immediate problems posed by the military 
occupation and administration of Germany. The first part of this chapter looks at the 
way in which the German Section provided intelligence for the short-term practical 
problems facing the occupying army. The second deals with `official' PWE 
contribution to Committees and planning for the occupation of Germany. Finally 
some comparison will be made between the interpretation of the German Section and 
the PWE concerning the Germany people and the German `problem'. Before the 
plan to re-educate the German people could be put into operation the short-term 
practical problems of achieving an efficient and ordered occupation had to be 
considered. The attitudes of the German people towards the Allied forces, and how 
they would react to the imposition of British control after six years of war was an 
important consideration. Central to this assessment was an understanding of public 
opinion and morale, and the question of what impact the twelve year rule of the Nazi 
regime had been on German society. 
One of the areas considered to be important for attitudes and behaviour of the German 
people towards the Allies was the physical and psychological damage done during the 
bombing raids in Germany. In April, 1943 it appeared that the air-raids were being 
successful in affecting public opinion, when the intelligence officers noted that in the 
heavily bombed areas public morale was at its worst and opposition to the regime was 
at its greatest. " The Ministry warned Britain that the bombing would not result in 
the surrender of Germany, but would increase the German people's stubborn resolve 
and fighting power. " The German people were urged to `Go through the streets of 
10 Ibid. p. 33. 
11 WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/185. For week 19.4.43 - 26.4.43. 
12 Ibid. For week 24.5.43 - 30.5.43. 
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Hamburg strewn with glass and rubble... set your teeth and do not forget who brought 
such misery. Let hatred glow in your heart'. " At the end of August the 
intelligence officers noted in their report that the Ministry of Propaganda had used a 
statement which have previously been made by Bracken in an attempt to warn the 
German people about the methods the British would use to implement their post-war 
plans: 
`Brendan Bracken, who is greatly favoured by Churchill for intimate 
personal reasons, has stated that instead of sending teachers to 
Germany to re-educate her people after the war, the best form of 
instruction was that provided by Air Marshall Harris ... this provides further evidence of Churchill's desire to wage war on civilians'. " 
It is not difficult to see why the German Section was concerned about the potential 
for conflict between the German population and the Allied troops, since the conditions 
the German people were living under as a result of these raids were bound to be 
instrumental in attitudes and opinions towards the occupying forces. Reports 
continued to contain information about the conditions in Germany as a result of the 
air warfare policy, with plagues of rats being reported, and the attendant fear of 
typhoid, and the lack of food and clothes for the civilians who had been made 
homeless. There was also increasing evidence that in the panic of the raids people 
were fleeing the towns, workers were abandoning their work, and fire-fighters were 
choosing to sleep outside the towns at night for their own safety. 
What became a serious issue for the PWE in May and June 1944 was the Ministry of 
Propaganda's attempt to use the death and destruction wrought by the bombing to 
incite hatred of the Allies as a pre-invasion measure. On 26th May Goebbels issued 
an article which, according to the intelligence officers, encouraged the German people 
to lynch the Allied airmen who had been responsible for the bombing raids. Arguing 
that the population showed justified rage, Goebbels asserted that only the use of armed 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. For week 23.8.43 - 29.8.43. 
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forces had saved the lives of enemy pilots, shot down during their attacks on the 
civilian population. He added that it would be asking `too much if Germany was 
expected to employ German soldiers to defend the murderers of children against these 
children's parents'. " As far as the intelligence officers were concerned the attitude 
of the population towards the Allied invasion would be created by their experience of 
the air war, and by the way in which the air war was used in propaganda to whip up 
hatred and the desire for revenge. This would be part of the legacy of the Ministry 
of Propaganda, and possibly an important factor providing an obstacle in the way of 
achieving a successful and peaceful occupation. 
The atrocity campaign mounted by the Ministry of Propaganda continually reminded 
the German people that surrender would mean annihilation, at the hands of either the 
Russians, British or American Forces. In January 1945 the German people were 
given details of the `Gangsters in Occupied Europe', and the alleged killing and brutal 
treatment of women and children by the US Army. An article put out by DNB on 
13th January included allegations that Americans who 
`raped women, killed children playing, burnt haystacks, - killed cattle 
and smashed furniture- .. out of pure lust for destruction. They poured 
milk for starving babies into the gutter.. deliberately bombed military 
hospitals, machine-gunned ambulances and the wounded .. put women 
and children behind barbed wire in open fields and forced them to 
camp out in the rain and snow'. 16 
All this was used in an effort to prove that American and Russian policy was to 
exterminate the German race. The following week Churchill's speech on his 
declaration of policy towards Germany was interpreted as reaffirming his plans for the 
`Unconditional extermination of the German people, since he did not even shrink from 
recalling how in ancient times people were assembled on a beach and butchered'. " 
's WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 22.5.44 - 28.5.44. 
16 WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 8.1.45 - 14.1.45. 
17 Ibid. For week 15.1.45 - 21.1.45. 
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The Ministry publicised Allied statements as `a new Wilson Swindle', accusing the 
Allies of attempting a `huge propaganda trick by `re-editing' Wilson's points in 
order... to make more agreeable their destruction slogan of Unconditional 
Surrender'. 'a 
The German Section considered the possibility of capitulation and concluded that the 
will to continue fighting was probably strongest in those areas where the Russians 
were fighting and where Nazi propaganda had instilled amongst the panic-stricken the 
`blackest fears'. The author of a report from Southern Germany stated that he 
believed the fighting might cease if the fears of the Russians were overcome. The 
officer writing the report concluded, however, that what was perhaps more likely to 
develop was a demand for some sort of accommodation with the Western Allies in 
order to set Germany free to resist the Russian advance. But the report warned that 
`it must be remembered that such talk has no influence on the German government, 
which is not dependent on public opinion like a parliamentary government'. 
Furthermore the officers commented that whilst `such considerations might make 
civilians in Western Germany more welcoming to Allied occupying troops (until they 
were disappointed by finding that after all they received no freedom of action against 
the Russians), they would not affect the troops'. In short the German civilians had a 
`low level of strategic understanding', although the arrival on German soil of the 
Russians has led to criticism of German strategy and a general loss of faith in the 
leadership including Hitler. " 
The strategy adopted by the Nazi regime to keep the German people fighting was 
based upon the need to instil fear and hatred of the Allies. They were told that they 
were to be destroyed biologically and politically, and that Europe would be handed 
over to `Bolshevism' in the event of a German defeat. Further it was claimed that the 
population was to be reduced by 40/50 millions and that `a synthesis of the hate 
programmes propagated by Morgenthau, Vansittart and Ehrenburg provided for the 
" Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45. 
" Ibid. 
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complete eradication of German industry and the deportation of German workers with 
Moscow as the centre of the modern slave trade. The destruction of Germany as a 
political entity was to be encompassed by complete disarmament, the immediate 
murder of all nationally minded Germans, the setting up of control commissions and 
the establishment of zones of occupation. 20 
In the middle of February the German Section commented that the Ministry of 
Propaganda was now being forced to give the German people a `deceptive picture of 
the military situation.. of growing stabilisation with the `Bolshevik masses contained 
at the Oder', offering the hope of a great German counter-stroke to turn the tide. The 
intelligence officers pointed out that the Ministry was now willing to go to 
`astonishing lengths' to paint a picture far removed from reality which was evidence 
of the very real difficulties the Nazi regime was now having in forcing the population 
to continue with the conflict. 21 During this last phase of the war the intelligence 
reports began to provide indications of the anticipated behaviour of the German people 
in defeat stressing that, contrary to what was required, which was a positive 
acceptance of responsibility before re-education could begin, the majority would 
probably try to deny their support of the regime and thus remove any responsibility 
from themselves. 
One particular group of people considered vital to the post-war task of re-building 
Germany was the businessmen and industrialists, and the German Section included 
information of interviews in order to ascertain the attitudes of this sector of German 
society. This would be useful for the de-nazification programme, and the 
identification of those people who would be required to help with the economic 
recovery of Germany. Interviews with three leading industrialists were included in 
the Weekly report for 23rd to 29th April, 1945. The first was Koehler, a high 
official of IG-Farben in Frankfurt who had admitted that he had conducted 
propaganda for the National-Socialist policies on visits to the USA before the war. 
20 Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45. 
21 Ibid. 
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He did not suggest that National-Socialism had caused any significant problems for 
his firm, except for excessive controls of the Gauleiters and others. He described 
himself as `now really poor', but only as a consequence of the destruction of his 
personal property and German industry by the Allied bombing campaign and the 
expected devaluation of the German currency. For the loss of the war he blamed 
Hitler, because he had undertaken too much. He seemed to believe that IG-Farben 
would be given contracts by the Allies for the supply of synthetic fuel and seemed to 
have `great confidence in the influence of `his many good friends in American big 
business'. He offered the assistance of `the leading brains in Germany' and was 
described as `shocked' when he was told that the assistance of ex-members of the Nazi 
Party would not be welcomed. According to the intelligence report Koehler defended 
his position and role during the war saying `We all had to join' and pointed out that 
if ex-Nazis were not involved in post-war reconstruction there would be nobody left, 
there would be chaos in Germany and he warned that `the Bolsheviks will take 
over' . 
22 
The second industrialist Lumme, who had been educated at Oxford and who was 
manager of the Metalgesellschaft, also sought to impress the interrogators by listing 
his `important friends' in both America and Britain. A Party member since 1936 he 
now `claimed to have joined for business reasons' and also blamed Hitler for the 
defeat of Germany. The intelligence officers noted that `Voicing the usual fears of 
`Bolshevism' he also expressed a hope for a prolonged American occupation in order 
to make sure that the Bolsheviks did not take over, and intimated that he expected the 
Allies to `grant possibilities' for German recovery. ' The third man in this trio, 
named Boehler, was a partner in a firm manufacturing frankfurters who, according 
to the report, `lacked the assurance and characteristics of the bigger men, representing 
the more `fawning' type found by the interrogators to be the majority in occupied 
Germany'. He was not himself a Party member, explaining that it had been sufficient 
for the business for his partner to be a member, he `showed consciousness of guilt, 
12 Ibid. For week 23.4.45 - 29.4.45. 
" Ibid. 
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having heard of atrocities in Poland, but said `We are moral cowards. We offered 
only silent protest and took no action. But what could we do? '. 24 
Assessing these three interviews the intelligence report concluded that `Most worthy 
of observation is the assurance felt by representatives of large concerns with 
international connections that they possess such influence in Britain and America that 
any weakening of their position resulting from defeat will be long-enduring. To have 
co-operated with the Nazi regime seems to them only normal business, which 
incidentally brought in good profits'. Finally, the intelligence officers warned that 
`so convinced are they that powerful interests in Britain and America share their own 
fears of `Bolshevism', that they regard Allied `anti-Nazism' as mere talk'. Here the 
`image' of a subservient, subjugated people is erased and transposed with the `image' 
of the powerful leading industrialists who were vital to British interests in re-building 
Germany not accepting responsibility for the regime, not denying involvement and not 
showing any remorse. Furthermore, they appeared to the German Section to be 
arrogant and confident enough of their value to remind the interrogators of the reality 
of the position in Germany and use the fears of the West of a `sovietized' Germany 
to suggest a re-thinking of the de-nazification programme. 
If the German industrialists raised problems for the successful implementation of the 
denazification programme, the possibility of Nazis `disappearing' into German 
society presented an even greater threat. The German Section warned of the evidence 
that whilst the `ordinary people' were forced to stay behind and fight on to the last, 
minor Party officials were making use of the opportunity of evacuation from the 
threatened and bombed areas to `shed their identity'. ' A letter written in September 
1944 by a woman in Bonn berated those involved saying, `What is going on here in 
the homeland is contemptible and so cowardly that my heart revolts within me .. now 
that the time has come to prove their worth .. the Party members destroy uniforms 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. For week 15.1.45 - 21.1.45. 
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and badges and all documents'. ' In February the intelligence reports included details 
of an order given by Bormann that the families of `political leaders' must be 
evacuated first and that in the event of an invasion those leaders must receive 
Wehrmacht uniforms which would entitle them to protection under the Geneva 
Convention. The following week the Weekly Report took considerable interest in the 
leadership's official provision for Allied Occupation which included plans for the 
evacuation of the `heads of offices who have been particularly politically exposed' 
who were ordered to hand over their jobs to local people and retreat to unoccupied 
territory. 
As news of German atrocities and concentration camps began to filter through to the 
German Section the Weekly Report included a speech made by Guderian in which he 
denied German atrocities in Russia, saying `I have never seen anything of the Satan's 
furnaces, gas chambers or similar products of a pathological imagination'. The 
German section commented that this was a `limited denial' since he did not refer to 
crimes committed by German soldiers' Nevertheless, it was the beginning of what 
the PWE saw as an indication of the problems which would have to be faced in 
bringing about a `change of mind' in Germany in advance of any re-education 
programme. Recognising the increasing reports of denial of involvement in the crimes 
of the regime the German Section now pondered on this, and whether the failure to 
co-operate with the Volkssturm was also motivated by the recognition amongst the 
German people that they must be in a position to say they did not support the regime 
in resisting the Allied forces. Reports from the invasion areas provided evidence to 
the German Section of soldiers changing into civilian clothes, 'apparently believing 
they have put off war-guilt with the uniform', which was seen a further proof that this 
problem was now becoming widespread. " As the East and West fronts advanced 
towards Berlin the massive scale of the evacuation and the hundreds of thousands of 
displaced persons now living in central Germany compounded the problems of 
21 Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 15.2.45. 
27 Ibid. For week 5.3.45 - 11.3.45. 
2D Ibid. 
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identification of Nazi Party members. Elites and soldiers in civilian clothes would be 
able to merge into this mass of people and make it almost impossible to carry out the 
process of de-nazification which was seen as vital to Germany's and Europe's 
interests. 
A serious addition to the concerns of the PWE was added in April and May, with 
details of the establishment of a guerilla army in Germany known as the 
`Werewolves'. It was known that the group had a radio station and, it was surmised, 
was probably controlled by the Waffen-SS. The intelligence officers noted the 
difference in the picture given of the organisation by Goebbels, who depicted it as a 
general movement of `all active men, women, boys and girls in the occupied areas' 
against the description broadcast from the Werewolf Station which expressly stated 
that it consisted of a limited number of fanatics. Furthermore, whilst Goebbels stated 
that the occupying forces were the main enemy, the Station put equal stress on threats 
to German traitors and even passive collaborators. But Kriegk admitted the object of 
the Werewolf organisation, which was to `ensure that German national unity, between 
the nation in the homeland and in the enemy-occupied areas, did not disintegrate. We 
had to make sure that Germans... would summon up the power to resist'. In their 
conclusion the officers of the PWE said that the creation of the `Werewolf' 
organisation had probably been planned some time before February 1945, since on 
22nd February commanders of certain Volksgrenadier divisions had been asked to 
select a number of men whose homes were in the occupied territories and who would 
be suitable to become leaders of this new organisation. These men would receive 
training in Slovakia, and the troops they would be likely to lead were assumed by the 
intelligence officers to be `the more fanatical young soldiers from units disrupted by 
the Allied advance'. What did interest the German Section was a broadcast put out 
on 3rd April, 1945 by the organisation which supported their earlier theory of conflict 
between the SS and the Party. This broadcast indicated that the new movement 
wished to dissociate itself from some of the unpopular features of National-Socialism, 
particularly, `We will suffer no careerists, no job-hunters, no doddering place- 
holders', which the intelligence officers assumed was an announcement by the SS 
leadership that there was no place in this new organisation for the Gauleiters, 
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Kreisleiters and others whose corruption and abuse of authority has, in their opinion, 
seriously damaged the prestige of the Party. " All this information led the German 
Section to warn that this new organisation was `no mere propaganda stunt' and should 
be monitored closely. The following week the report from the German Section 
considered the claim that the `Werewolf organisation warned of their intention to 
become `the rallying point for a European revolutionary movement fostered by chaos, 
distress and destruction'. " The PWE believed that the organisation was probably the 
result of internal re-formation by Himmler and the SS and represented `the emergence 
of a `neo-Nazi' movement as anticipated'. " The immediate danger for the Allies 
was in the claim that their `ceaseless fighting would make life a hell for the 
occupation troops'. 32 
Having identified the `Werewolf movement as a potential threat to the occupying 
forces; the German Section began to consider seriously the possibility of the continuity 
of the philosophy of National-Socialism which appeared to be increasingly likely from 
the speeches and proclamations being made by the leadership. On 30th January Hitler 
broadcast a speech confirming that Germany would be victorious because through a 
`superhuman effort' it would be able `effect a military regeneration of the German 
body politic', at the same time admitting this would not be brought about by re- 
equipping with a material armed force but by a `spiritual will to resist'. " He 
reminded the German people that on the twelfth anniversary of their advent to power 
it was even more necessary `to harden our hearts and live up to the sacred resolution 
to wield our weapons no matter where. no matter under what circumstances until 
j ttpry crowns nur exhortations'(emphasis as in original). In the final part of Hitler's 
speech the officers noted that whilst Party propagandists protested that `Germans only 
29 Ibid. For week 2.4.45 - 8.2.45. 
30 Ibid. For week 9.4.45 - 15.4.45. 
11 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45. 
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want to live', Hitler had made an oath that `One day our dead will not have died in 
vain.. One day we shall fetch back everything that belongs to us. We shall return to 
the East, you may be sure of that! '(emphasis as in original). " For the German 
Section this signalled an indication of the determination to continue the conflict, if not 
during this war, then through a third world war. At the beginning of February the 
speech made by Himmler on July 26th, 1944 was included in the Weekly Report, 
which appeared to support their conclusions of the previous weeks. The intelligence 
officers commented that it was a `remarkable statement of Germany's war aims' with 
Himrnler proclaiming that `It is the beginning and foundation of the Great Germanic 
Reich, the expansion of our national basis from 90 million Germans to 120 million 
of Germanic blood,.. the mastering and ordering of Europe, and the solid extension 
of the German population frontiers eastwards at least 500 km from the frontier of 
1939'. " The officers commented that although this speech was made within a week 
of the July 20th putsch, `we may discount any suggestion that Himmler was living in 
a `cloud-cuckoo-land' of megalomaniac dreams remote from reality. This is probably 
true of Hitler, but not of Himmler'. '' They remarked that `such a frank 
proclamation of German expansionist aims seemed very surprising at this last stage 
of the war', which led them to deduce that what Himmler was. actually doing was 
taking the last `great gamble' since for him there was no alternative between 
complete victory and complete annihilation. Any compromise settlement would entail 
his own and the regime's disappearance, and therefore the intelligence officers 
believed that Himmler was not looking for a compromise peace, but for an alliance 
with either Russia or the Western powers in what he assumed would be the 
, continuation of the war 
between these two. The German Section believed that the 
National-Socialist regime `have no inclination to imagine a desirable post-war 
settlement' adding that `the opposite, of course, is true of the ordinary Germany 
34 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45. 
m Ibid. 
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private citizen, whose passionate desire is for peace'. " 
Three weeks before the end of the war the German Section warned that `The 
Werewolf station continues to prepare for resistance after the defeat of the German 
armed forces', whilst the official broadcasts to the people in occupied regions did not 
make any attempts to encourage them to resist the occupying forces. Instead the 
intelligence officers noted that `they were rather sentimental appeals to patriotism, 
without any ideological tinge, they made no allusion to Allied `atrocities' and the 
worst that was said of the enemy was that 'he would never understand this country's 
soul'. " In complete contrast to official advice from his own Ministry, Goebbels 
seemed to support the Werewolf ideas in principle, but had a very different idea of 
the way in which they could be used to prolong the war. Whereas the Werewolf 
methods were based on elitist guerilla warfare, Goebbels preached a `people's war' 
involving all those in the Reich still able to fight, and whilst Goebbels believed it was 
the `will' to go on that was lacking, the Werewolves contradicted this now stating, 
`We believe that we do not lack men. arms and ammunition. But we need resolute 
hQ -'. (emphasis as in original)" The concern for the German Section was of 
course that whilst they believed the `ordinary' Germans were in no position to do 
anything at all and therefore did not represent a direct threat to the incoming forces, 
an elite and well-armed and trained guerilla organisation certainly did. In fact the 
German Section had information of a broadcast which indicated that three large 
Werewolf training camps existed, and that the first training course had been completed 
in these camps involving over 2,000 Werewolves who would be parachuted or 
smuggled in to occupied areas. ' In this report the intelligence officers again 
considered the seriousness of this organisation and surmised what appeared to have 
taken place was a total re-formation of the National-Socialist Party. The thought that 
17 Ibid. 




the 'Werewolf' ovement now represented the `new' National-Socialist Party in 
which the `essentials' of National Socialism were preserved, but its mistakes admitted 
and disowned. The remnants of the Nazi regime now represented the `old' Party. 
The picture was confused because although both organisations now existed, they could 
not come into open conflict because `such internecine strife' in the present military 
and political situation would destroy them both. 
The existence of a rival organisation, the `Freikorps Adolf Hitler', established by the 
`old' Party in reaction to the `Werewolf organisation was further evidence to the 
German Section of the chaos and rivalry within the Nazi leadership. In contrast to 
the `Werewolf' movement this was `a thoroughly amateurish affair' comprised of a 
`scratch body of Party officials' who were committed to resisting the Allied advance 
rather than fighting under-ground behind enemy lines. The intelligence officers 
dismissed this vague attempt at re-organisation of the `old' Party bosses which 
comprised of the `local Ortsgruppenleiter at the bottom to the fat drunken Reichsleiter 
Ley at the top, whom the Werewolves disown'. " 
Such was the pace of change at the end of the war that the previous two weeks 
concentration on information about the `Werewolf organisation in the Weekly reports 
was replaced by a short, sharp announcement that the organisation had apparently 
disappeared. After a short announcement on 23rd April, no more publicity had been 
put out, and it was assumed in London that the station had been transmitting from 
Nauen and overun by the Russians. The only other possible reason was that its 
disappearance may have been the policy dictated by the needs of the peace appeals to 
the West. `' This report also contained the news that `Werewolf' recruits had been 
made from the Hitler Youth, and BDM girls had been trained to operate radio 
transmitters in Allied-occupied territory. Two statements from 16 year old boys 
recently captured seemed to suggest that in trying to find `volunteers' for the 
organisation they came up against a certain amount of resistance and had therefore 
41 Ibid. For week 23.4.45 - 29.4.45 
42 Ibid. 
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used conscription to `persuade' recruits. These two boys claimed to have refused to 
join and were sent to a political reformatory school at Ballenstedt where they were 
taught. They informed the interrogator that approximately 600 other boys were at this 
school and they had been taught to become instructors in weapons for their home 
communities. 
During the last week of the war in Europe the intelligence officers reported the end 
of the Propaganda Ministry, and details of Hitler's death and `legend'. The concern 
here was the attempt in Germany to retain the spirit of the Fuhrer by the Party leaders 
as an ideological focus for the re-vitalisation of National-Socialism. The 
disappearance of the major Nazi leaders was discussed, the information that Goebbels 
had committed suicide was accepted as `probably true'. But the officers thought it 
`sinister' that nothing had been heard of Himmler although they did consider the 
possibility that he had been `eliminated' by rivals `in the highest circles'. As far as 
post-occupation resistance was concerned the report included the details of a broadcast 
to the German nation, instructing them that Admiral Doenitz ordered `all German men 
and women to abstain from any underground (illegal) fighting activity in the Werewolf 
or other organisations'. " The officers are still slightly unsure about the sincerity of 
the broadcast, saying `It is almost certain that Doenitz and his associates genuinely 
disapprove of the whole 'Werewolf' lan, which, in so far as it succeeded, would 
render impossible that reconciliation with the Western Powers which they certainly 
desire, whether or not they expected it. It would probably be a serious mistake, 
however, to attach much practical importance to this announcement.. Doenitz only 
`asks' Germans not to engage in resistance activities .. recognises he has no authority 
.. nothing at all 
is said about the dissolution of the organisation'. " 
At the end of the war, as the Allied forces occupied Germany the information 
collected by the German Section provided some of the information necessary for both 
43 Ibid. For week 30.4.45 - 6.5.45. 
" Ibid. 
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the short- and long-term objectives of British policy. The most logical and public use 
of this was for the formulation of propaganda campaigns, and the PWE used 
propaganda after 1943 to undermine morale and increasingly to begin to get the 
German people to understand that a complete social and political change of mind was 
necessary if they wished to re-enter the `civilized' world. 
Turning now to the `official' contribution of the PWE to this phase of British policy, 
the first meeting of the Committee on Re-Occupation took place on 27th March, 1943 
shortly after Lockhart had taken over as Director General of the PWE and Brigadier 
Sachs had reorganised and expanded the intelligence services of the executive. " The 
meetings were chaired by Ritchie Calder and attended by Sachs and Walmsley, 
Duncan Wilson (Head of the German Section), and representatives from the BBC, 
Ministry of Information and the war Office. Throughout the following year the 
committee met thirty-three times and discussed items of finance, personnel, 
broadcasting arrangements, printed matter, films and the Military Manual of Civil 
Affairs. From the records of these meetings it appears that the main concern in 
January, 1944 was to ensure the confidence and goodwill of the local population as 
their country was liberated. It was believed that this process could begin immediately 
if the people were given news, information and guidance about the activities of the 
outside world from which the Nazi regime had cut them off and to make sure that 
they understood the policies and intentions of the United Nations. It was decided that 
`combat propaganda' or `tactical propaganda' would be used against enemy forces and 
towards populations behind enemy lines. '" 
A joint PWE and BBC paper on `German Re-Occupation - Propaganda and Publicity 
to Germany' outlined the central aim as the `control and remoulding of the German 
's PRO/FO 898/361 `Minutes of First Meeting of Committee of Re-Occupation', 
29th March, 1943. 
46PRO/FO 898/361 `Minutes of Thirty-Third Meeting of Committee of Re- 
occupation', 21st January, 1944. 
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mind after the war'. " This was to be done through the use of radio, films, 
censorship, education and denazification. The substitution of Nazi text books was 
considered to be necessary and the paper suggested that Germans in exile should be 
asked to produce examples of books which could be recommended for substitution. 
The paper also suggested that a British researcher (PWE trained) should observe 
trends in Universities since `a national renaissance has more than once arisen in 
Germany through University; they therefore need very careful watching during the 
period of occupation and control'. Additionally, the `minds and leisure of the German 
people' also needed to be observed so that it would be possible to recognise and if 
necessary `arrest the development of a purely decadent trend as followed the last war 
and led to the rise of the `Nazi' type'. Finally the paper suggested that the PWE 
should watch social trends and examine the results, consider telephone censoring and 
check the results of the counter-propaganda they are sure to put out' ." 
Whilst the PWE and BBC were making these warnings and suggestions for the tight 
control of the media in Germany the difficulties of interpretation of policy amongst 
senior civil servants can be illustrated by the correspondence concerning a row 
between the Foreign Office and the PWE. On the 11th January, 1944 Duncan 
Wilson had put forward to Troutheck and O'Neill at the Foreign Office a Draft Paper 
for the way in which the `Book Officers' would carry out their duties in Germany. 
O'Neill wrote to Wilson saying that both he and Troutheck were in agreement that 
one of the suggestions - the refusal of allocation of paper to `objectionable publishers' 
- was not acceptable, mainly 
due to the problem of implementation. " Wilson's 
Second Re-Draft was also unacceptable to O'Neill who now informed Wilson that he 
had stronger objections to the re-draft than he had to the original. His main 
objections were that `the whole plan is based on the conception that our rule in 
47 PRO/F0898/370. `German Re-Occupation - Propaganda and Publicity to 
Germany', January, 1944. 
4 Ibid. 
49PRO/FO 371/39054. `Memorandum to Troutbeck and O'Neill from Wilson', 
11th January, 1944. 
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occupying Germany will be to exert the minimum interference over the whole field 
of German life which is consistent with securing our political and strategic objectives. 
I also attach great importance to avoiding the appearance of total control of German 
intellectual life'. " In particular O'Neill was concerned about the political 
implications of the suggestion that Book Officers should deal with school text books 
saying that this thought `fills me with horror. They will be regarded merely as British 
propaganda agents, and as such, any dealings they may have with German education 
will merely prejudice all our efforts to get the Germans to agree to this reform'. In 
summing up Wilson's proposals O'Neill concluded that the plans were not feasible and 
were impractical, and more importantly indicated an `undesirable interference of 
British officials in the field of book publications'. Wilson submitted a Third Re-Draft 
at the beginning of February to which O'Neill said he now had `no objections'... 
which makes the unending difficult correspondence about this seem even more 
superfluous'. 
Wilson's suggestions for the control of films during military occupation which set out 
what he saw as the three phases of occupation, and which required three different 
approaches to the type of films used, were also met with hostility in the Foreign 
Office. Wilson suggested that the initial phase would require films showing fighting 
on German soil and Allied control, but of a non-political nature. During this phase 
the Security Police were to `comb out all pro-Nazi elements', and the immediate 
months of Allied occupation would bring an end to all film production in Germany, 
and substitute `escapist' films to help the military in `keeping people occupied'. The 
second phase would continue to use American-English films but would also introduce 
a gradual re-commencement of studio activity and film-making in Germany. The third 
phase would mark the gradual transition from direct to indirect controls' O'Neill's 
reply was to remind Wilson that the purging of the film industry by the Security 
Police would, contrary to Wilson's understanding, have to be led by the PWE who 




would be relied upon to tell them who to go after in this field. O'Neill also 
commented that he doubted that the problems Wilson envisaged in this area were as 
real as Wilson believed. " 
At the end of 1944 the PWE became involved in a row between Richard Crossman 
and O'Neill concerning the non-fraternization and non-rehabilitation policy towards 
the German people. Crossman wrote to Lockhart on 29th December, enclosing an 
`aide memoire' he had prepared for General McClure which was being taken back to 
Washington by General Barker, head of Gi, responsible for non-fraternization 
policy. " Crossman outlined his fears about the effects of the `sudden and violent 
change in SHAEF policy' towards the German people which he argued, had the 
effect of fundamentally changing the conception of their task from one of `releasing 
a people from subjection and not simply conquering it' to what now seemed to be 
merely punitive since `apart from the narrowest military requirements, nothing should 
be done to assist the Germans'. Crossman argued that whereas the `soft' approach 
was successful in beginning to `adjust the German mind', the `hard' line was actually 
helping the Nazis by turning the German people against the Allies. He claimed that 
the policy had resulted in the whole nation of Germany now being the enemy of the 
British and American soldiers, with Germans living `troglodized, living in shelters and 
digging up roots ' to survive. O'Neill's response to this was to sweep it aside, 
commenting that Crossman's paper was `a bit hasty, over-emphatic, and alarmist'. 
He did however, admit that there was `something in it, suggesting that the policy 
should perhaps be more generously interpreted. 
The contradictions of O'Neill taking Wilson to task for his harsh and impractical 
interpretation of policy in relation to books and films, and yet placating the PWE in 
its concern about the change in attitude to the German people illustrates the ambiguity 
surrounding the objectives and motivations of British policy. Additionally, O'Neill's 
52PRO/F0371/39054. `Memorandum to Wilson from O'Neill', 6th March, 1944. 
"PRO/FO 371/46729. `Letter to Lockhart from Crossman', 29th December, 
1944. 
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correspondence with Wilson and Crossman over particular issues can be seen to 
represent what Welch describes as the `internal rivalry and conflict' and power politics 
in Whitehall, in this instance between the Foreign Office and the PWE, and on a more 
personal level between O'Neill and Wilson. "' 
What is clear from a 'Secret' paper sent from O'Neill to Steel entitled 'SHAEF 
Military Occupation Handbook. Policy on Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces 
and Inhabitants of Germany' is that the policy became even more punitive. This 
document is a perfect example of Welch's argument about the absurdity of 
observations made at the time which were based on the notion of 'collective guilt' and 
the pre-occupation with German national traits. " Whilst the document is lengthy, 
the general tone can be understood from a few chosen quotations: 
`The German mental attitude during the previous occupation of 
GERMANY ranged from hatred, through friendliness to fawning 
subservience'. `Because of this war's greater air bombing damage and 
ground combat within GERMANY and because of the intense Nazi 
indoctrination, German hatred may be far deeper and more universal 
than in 1918'... `The German conception of themselves as a "Master 
Race" has been too deeply implanted to be eradicated outright; 
... efforts will no 
doubt be directed towards regaining a commanding 
position in EUROPE'... `occupying forces must be prepared for civil 
disorders, including sniping and assaults on individuals, sabotage, 
provoked riots, perhaps even organised raids'. ' 
The Appendix then listed the way in which Allied personnel should conduct 
themselves, and which in some ways sought to eradicate some of the problems 
Crossman had highlighted in his report. These included strict measures in the control 
of alcohol consumption, non-fraternization defined as `avoidance of mingling with 
Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy .. but does not demand 
rough, undignified or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has 
"`Welch, `The Political Re-education of Germany'. pp. 25-26. 
sspRO/FO 371/46729. `Secret paper from O'Neill to Steel', 13th March, 1945. 
`6 Ibid. 
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characterised the Nazi leadership'. 
Finally, the PWE had two additional important areas of work connected to the post- 
war plans for Germany. The Central Intelligence department run by Sachs, set up 
two separate but interlinking projects, incorporating the social and political 
intelligence collected by the Regional divisions of the PWE. The first collated the 
Personality Index Cards of prominent figures, whilst the second developed the Basic 
Handbooks. The Personality Records section consisted of index cards which contained 
details of leading figures in Germany: Church leaders, important administrative and 
political officials, publicists and journalists, leading figures in finance and industry, 
and Judges and others involved in the legal system. This file was useful in the 
planning for de-nazification as it provided information concerning leaders of the 
party, and other important officials. At a general level this information was useful 
to the occupying forces, since it would enable them to identify and deal with Nazis 
and other `politically unreliable' elements in German society. It would also provide 
them with the information about the location of the people whom they would need to 
help administer the occupation of Germany. The way in which this was done was to 
identify and categorise people into three `types' of people and to have them registered 
according to three lists - `black', `grey' and `white'. The purging of the German 
Educational system was to be carried out by this method. The `black' list consisted 
of all persons condemned as war criminals, Reich ministerial officials, all National- 
Socialists working in education at all levels, particularly Universities, present or past 
members of the SS, SA, present or past leaders of the Hitler Youth, DBM and any 
persons who acted as agents of the Gestapo or SD. In addition existing Rectors of 
Universities and Heads of Teachers' Training Colleges should be dismissed if they had 
obtained their position under the National Socialist regime. The `grey' list contained 
the `remaining categories of persons against whom there are reasonable positive 
grounds for suspicion', basically those -employed before the Nationalist Socialist 
regime came to power and who should not be dismissed without further investigation. 
Finally, the `white' list contained `persons inside Germany whose character, 
professional standing, experience and political reliability render them especially 
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suitable to be placed in positions of special responsibility'. " It is not difficult to see 
the problems facing those given the task of purging the education system as a first 
step towards re-education, whilst at the same time being told by the Foreign Office 
(as O'Neill to Wilson) that they should not be seen to be taking too much control. 
In fact the authorities did attract some criticism from the German people themselves 
within the first weeks of occupational rule for not carrying out the process of de- 
nazification as thoroughly as some sections of the population would have liked. " 
The expanded intelligence work and records of personalities in Germany by the 
German Section meant that it was bound to become involved in the identification and 
bringing to trial the Nazis accused of committing war crimes. In February 1945 
Ivone Kirkpatrick wrote to Lockhart, this time at PID, Bush House, telling him that 
the Foreign Office had `under consideration the question of securing the punishment 
of Germans and Austrians for atrocities against their own people' and asked Lockhart 
for `lists of persons who might be guilty of such acts'. " On 19th March Sgt. Derry, 
the Secretary of the PWE, wrote to Sachs that Political Warfare Intelligence was the 
department `better qualified than any other' to the work for Her Majesty's 
Government in the compilation of a list of Germans committing crimes against 
Germans. He commented that `the work done in the department on the Handbooks 
must mean that we have the background knowledge from which to proceed'.,, 
In May the PWE was asked to provide information to the War Crimes Commission 
for which they furnished details about `certain key men in Germany'. " Following a 
visit from Colonel H. H. Wade who was working for the United Nations War Crimes 
57FO 371/46729 Undated, but probably dated 1944 or early 1945. 
"PRO/FO1005/739. `Commission Control Policy Directive', Paper No. 6. June, 
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Commission at the Royal Court of Justice in the Strand, Ian Walmsley, Head of the 
German Section Intelligence, replied immediately with information requested about 
particular figures in Germany. ' In this memo Walmsley informed Wade that 
`Oberlindober can be called a `notorious Nazi' like any other leading men in 
Germany', but there was no specific evidence of war crimes. Walmsley advised that 
the Minister of Justice on the list should be deleted, in fact all the Ministeriate had 
better be deleted because `many hundreds of others were just as implicated'. 
Answering the question about an individual called Rahn, the memo informed Wade 
that a capture order signed by him of a `war crime nature' had been sent to the 
UNWCC. Finally, Walmsley reminded Wade that `We would like to re-emphasise 
there are thousands of other individuals who are quite or almost as much "notorious 
Nazis" as anyone of the short list of about 200. '' This file has been very heavily 
`weeded' by the Foreign Office and many papers are retained until the year 2020. 
There was however, a brief list of some of the war crimes committed which give 
enough detail to show the amount of detail collected by the intelligence department. 
The list had dates and information. One piece of information, dated 16th December 
1944 gave details of, Oswieczim (Auschwitz) concentration camp, where `workers 
were beaten to death (mostly Jews)'. The note added `they walk. in through gates and 
out through the chimney'. In this camp there were also some non-Jewish political 
prisoners, and Russian and English prisoners of war. The Camp Commandant was 
identified as an SS man named Schwarz and his Deputy was a Sudetenland German, 
Teuschart. According to the note it was `generally known that thousands of Jews had 
been put to death in gas chambers', and the report also included the information that 
a 'popular trick of the Gestapo was to make prisoners fetch caps from over the 
electrified fence'. 6' The entry continued with: 28th August, 1944 `eight Englishmen 
(airmen) who had been shot down and hanged in Grabenstrasse, Russelheim'; 19/20th 
December, 1944 `Capt. Kugler in a village called Hahscheid ordered forty American 
62 Ibid. 
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soldiers to be shot. Confirmed from another source; October 1944 `the man most 
responsible for persecuting Hungarian Jews - Eichmann, Himmier's brother-in-law'. ' 
The other work undertaken by the special sub-committee set up by Brigadier Sachs 
early in 1943 was the production of Basic Handbooks for the Commanders-in-Chief 
in charge of liberating and occupying territories, from which the most important 
publication was the Handbook for Germany. ' This additional and specialised 
intelligence work proved to be so valuable that the JIC met with Sachs, Lockhart and 
members of the War Cabinet and Foreign Office in the early months of 1945 to make 
plans for the continuation of this work' At this meeting the Minutes noted that the 
JIC had held its first `representative meeting' in 1942 to discuss the production of 
these Handbooks, and the result was that Sachs had been appointed Head of the 
Political Intelligence Directorate of the PWE who immediately set to work on these. 
As already mentioned , this particular area of work of the PWE was one which was 
continued in the post-war months. At the meeting on 19th April, 1945 the Minutes 
also state that the `Handbooks had met a long-felt need, one never fulfilled in 
peacetime and the information provided would continue to be of great value in the 
day-to-day work of the War Office, Air Ministry, Control Commission and Foreign 
office, Department of Overseas Trade and Civil Affairs'. " 
What is interesting about the Basic Handbook for Germany is the different view of the 
German people as represented in the Weekly Reports and the image portrayed by 
those responsible for the Handbook. Welch's criticism of the pre-occupation in 
Whitehall with `national traits' is confirmed in this publication which relies on genetic 
features, historical legend and outrageous assumptions as useful indications of German 
`national characteristics'. This Handbook was published in July 1944 and had 
10 Ibid. 
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`Restricted Access'. In Part I, Geographical, Historical and Social, Chapter I 
contained details of the geography and climate and population statistics. Chapter II 
focussed on 'Racial and Linguistic Divisions' and pointed to the `age-long 
intermixture of `Nordic' and `Alpine' stocks , identifying the `long-headed Nordic 
type, which in the East of Elbe becomes rarer and where the `shape of the skull tends 
to be broader.. from Saxony to Silesia there is a continuation of broad heads, with 
light colouring' although adding that `the value of such descriptions is open to doubt'. 
The Commander-in-Chief was informed that the `differences between German tribes 
(tribal consciousness being seen as `folk' culture), speech and mentality' was seen as 
one reason why there was a late development of German unity'. Such differences, 
however, had been reduced in recent years - `giving no clue to the possibilities of a 
revival of separatism in Germany after the collapse of the Nazi regime'. 
Chapter III, Historical Outline, considered the `important epochs' in development 
which had particularly influenced modem Germany. The first was the'Roman 
influence' where the Handbook pointed out that 'Rome had been unable to conquer 
German tribes and therefore had recognised them as `federates' ... and these newly 
federated barbarians set about imitating Roman civilization to the best of their ability'. 
The Handbook informed the reader that this contradicted the `Nazi thesis of German 
antagonism to the decadent civilization of Rome! ', and sarcastically commented that 
the only thing the Nazis had in common with the Teutons of Tacitus' day was `their 
aggressiveness and preference for living on the spoils of the vanquished rather than 
by the sweat of their brow'. The `Medieval influence' had an important part to play 
in understanding the ideological roots of Nazism, with Nazis being seen as `inheritors 
of the tradition of medieval philosophy, philology and the literature of brothers 
Grimm, Savigny in Law, Freiherr von Stein and administrative reforms based on ideas 
of medieval corporate government'. 
According to the Handbook, the following epoch, `The Reformation and the Thirty 
Years War', had left a two-fold legacy of `vital importance for the development of 
modern Germany'. Whilst the intelligence officers writing this noted that the 
Reformation was `in England merely a part of the living past' they pointed out that 
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in Germany it had created a gulf between Catholics and Protestants and accelerated 
the trend of German history, which had ultimately resulted in the rise of Territorial 
powers. The strength of these territorial powers prevented the `quiet, gradual, organic 
development of national unity such as took place in England, and the Unity of 1871 
never freed itself from this artificial character... this in turn can be regarded as one 
of the main roots of the excessive, neurotic German nationalism of the twentieth 
century'. Furthermore, as a result of the devastation of the Thirty Years War feudal 
barriers were created along with feudal obligations where `slavish endurance, instead 
of a strong independent sense of enterprise, became the main feature of the mental 
make-up of many Germans'. 
This section of the Handbook described how the rise of Prussia and militarism and 
bureaucracy under Frederick William I (1713/40) had been marked by 'severe 
discipline, masochistic obedience to the military and other authority, and a concept 
of 'spartan duty'. According to the author, it was under Frederick the Great and the 
pressures of the Seven Years War that 'modem German nationalistic thought was 
born'. Following a potted history of the Congress of Vienna where the 'old 
authoritarian dynastic powers prevailed once more', followed by a brief note on the 
attempt in the Revolution of 1848 to gain 'unity and Liberty', and a discussion of the 
failures of the Weimar Republic which was 'born of one catastrophic defeat'. This 
was followed by the history of Germany and the German people, and the Handbook 
then moved on to consider 'Hitler', 'The Nazi Dictatorship' and the 'National 
Characteristics' of the German people. This section of the Handbook concentrated on 
the personal characteristics of Hitler and the German people, the philosophy and 
ideology of Hitler and the way in which the Nazi regime had seized and retained 
power in Germany. It also warned of the effects of this 'history' on the German 
. people 
in an attempt to indicate to the reader the 'type' of people he would be 
confronted with in Germany and to point out to him the danger of assuming they 
should or could be treated in the same way as he would treat English people. 
In the section on `Hitler', the most important characteristics were identified as his 
`fixed ideas of Pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, and hatred of Social Democracy, but 
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also an unlimited ambition, an intense propagandistic energy, a hypnotic power of 
mass oratory and an extraordinary grasp of political tactics, combined with a 
gambler's readiness to risk everything to attain his ends'. As far as the working class 
were concerned the intelligence officers believed that they would `attempt to continue 
the development forcibly interrupted in 1933', but would be even less prepared and 
more war weary than in 1918. The problems facing the working class in this attempt 
would be their distrust of words and promises, and as a result of their experience of 
the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich `this attitude of distrust and suspicion, 
particularly in political matters, may well be their outstanding characteristic'. 
The sections in the Handbook concerning the `National Characteristics' reflects a 
continued fear of the potential power of German conservative, right-wing political 
thought on a society already convinced of its basic principles. Accordingly the 
conclusion was made that the `majority of Germans still think in terms of the 
Prussian tradition, and see their salvation in military power and military conquest'. 
Late unification had resulted in a 'national inferiority complex.. a willingness to 
condone aggression.. and on a personal level the German has a relatively small 
appreciation of personal liberty'. The `German worship of power for its own sake 
partly explains the meagreness of resistance to Hitler'. A Note below did, however, 
point out that this generalisation had `obvious and important exceptions. It does not 
detract from the heroic fight put up by thousands of individuals acting from personal 
conviction or devotion to a cause'. 
Using this information to anticipate the reaction of the German people to occupational 
rule and the attempt to bring democracy to Germany the Handbook concluded that 
`The word `democracy' of course, exercises no magic spell on the German mind. 
Recent evidence of a revival in Germany in respect of democracy is not necessarily 
evidence of a genuine conversion'. This conclusion was based upon the German 
respect for power and the fact that the German people would, after all, accept that the 
`system'; in other words the Allied forces had shown their superiority and power over 
the `system' and would therefore appear to command some respect from the German 
people. The Handbook therefore suggested that the German respect for power and 
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legality should be used as the basis for occupational rule: `Any government in 
Germany which wishes to be respected should at all costs exhibit power. But it should 
provide, wherever possible, a legal basis for its actions'. But the warning given here 
was that there was `no reason to suppose that defeat will have made Germans more 
amenable to the indigenous British technique. Mild rule would probably be taken for 
weakness'. 
The Handbook then moved on to the problems of education, particularly the fear that 
the indoctrination and education of Hitler Youth had produced leaders `who , 
are 
nihilistic, cynical, amoral and often brutal'. The book argued that the `duality of 
character' of the German people manifested itself in the `synthetic attachment' to 
German nationalism, and that `once released from the influences of German 
nationalist thought, he becomes a peaceable, contented and hard-working citizen'. 
However, the officers using this Handbook were warned that beneath this exterior the 
darker `other' side of the German character remained since `even when he appears to 
have achieved a new and stable attachment, his latent aggressiveness and group 
ambition can be stimulated afresh, as the Nazi Auslandsorganisation has shown'. The 
Handbook warned that this duality of character meant that the. German attitude to 
British rule could change rapidly, with a `sudden change of heart from liking to hating 
the British' and that there was no reason to expect this dual attitude to be radically 
changed after the war. Finally, the section warned that The bulk of Germans are 
capable of greater brutality to human beings than the majority of Englishmen, 
Americans or Frenchmen, with an immature reaction to failure which resulted in self- 
pity'. The effects of the Nazi regime in its appeal to instincts and emotions had, 
according to the intelligence officers, `produced mental discord and confusion in the 
minds of the more intelligent Germans, while it has no doubt succeeded in debauching 
the instincts of many of the less intelligent'. This section finished: 
`To sum up, in dealing with Germans it is wise to be prepared for 
contradictions in behaviour which are uncommon in Britain and 
America. Hysterical behaviour is not uncommon .. technical experts 
may show a childish obstinacy and lack of proportion on questions 
outside their own sphere. Disillusionment with country and fervent 
patriotism. 
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The kindest hearted German may suddenly exhibit a brutality which 
alienates the foreigner. 
The problem is not so much how to distinguish one kind of German 
from another as to distinguish the different types of personality which 
seem to exist within each German breast, and to determine the 
conditions in which the better or worse is likely to gain the upper 
hand'. 
The following chapter in the Handbook assessed German foreign policy from 1870 to 
1939, dealing first with `The Prussian Tradition', then `Industrial Expansion, and 
finally with `Romantic Imperialism'. In concluding, The Handbook justified the policy 
of re-education of the whole nation in terms of the responsibility and guilt of the 
people and leaders for the way in which National Socialism had led to war and crimes 
against the international community: 
`Both the world conflicts of the century have been precipitated by 
German ambitions. [The] Lack of proper balance between ends and 
means : Germany aimed beyond her strength and damaged her chances 
of success by over-reliance on force and palpable hypocrisy. [Germany 
as] failed to convince other nations that extension of power on her part 
are likely to work to their advantage (or at least not to their 
disadvantage). 
But a verdict on German foreign policy cannot be allowed to rest on 
power politics alone. Germany has not merely failed, she has 
committed a crime against the comity of nations. During recent 
decades the world has been trying to get away from mere. power 
politics and establish some system of international relations which will 
be based not simply on submission to superior force but also on respect 
for common moral principles. 
The attempt is not easy and no nation may have been fully successful 
in carrying it out. But by reason of her failure to contribute to the 
development, but also in scorn, generally open and at best half-veiled, 
which she had displayed towards the underlying ideals. The 
Government preferred the method of unilateral repudiation, and most 
of her people applauded the policy and it's results. There is no real 
escape from guilt if it is argued that she was driven inexorably to 
expand and seek power abroad by the pressure of internal forces. For 
a great deal could have been done to resolve those forces if all the 
different elements in German society, but particularly those in power, 
had made a more generous and public spirited attempt to sacrifice their 
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narrow interests for the welfare of all citizens alike. 
After the defeat of 1918 only a minority of Germans (misinformed by 
nationalist propaganda as they were) seriously accepted Germany's 
heavy responsibility for the war. 
Yet, so long as Germans do not admit the wrongness (as well as the 
failure) of German foreign policy, a new start - an attempt at co- 
operation rather than domination - will scarcely be possible'. 
It is clear from the content of the Handbooks, which were seen as the `Bible' for the 
military forces and administration officers in Germany, that the Sub-Committee of the 
Political Intelligence Department of the PWE had a radically different 'image' of the 
German people from the German Section.. The Handbook for Germany had been 
published in July, 1944 and it can be assumed that it did influence the way in which 
the German people experienced the first weeks of British occupational rule. The 
connection with the issuing of this Handbook and the `shift' in policy which David 
Welch identified, and the effects of this `violent and sudden shift in SHAEF policy' 
which Crossman complained bitterly about during the last months of 1944 cannot be 
proved but must be considered. What is important is that it was PID who were 
responsible for producing the Handbook which was influential in the way the German 
people should be treated and the way in which the `German problem' should be 
solved. Whilst the German Section provided a very detailed and accurate, if at times 
negative, picture of German society and the complexity of the social and political 
conditions in Germany the Handbook offers a picture of a whole society in need of 
re-education. The problems of international order and European security could only 
be solved, it was believed, by the occupation and re-education of the German people 
and the adoption of the `indigenous British technique' of government to bring 
democracy to an undemocratic people. 
What then does the Handbook for Germany represent? A Whitehall-centric view of 
the German people as a race apart, a view in line with the Vansittart school of thought 
about all things German ?A Handbook full of what Welch calls the absurd 
observations that result from the `insanity of an ideology' based on national 
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characteristics? The use of physical characteristics to ascertain national characteristics 
was a return to the colonial philosophy of the nineteenth century. 69 How could it be 
adopted again? In Civilization: A Personal View, Kenneth Clark commented 'One 
mustn't overrate the culture of what used to be called 'top people' before the wars. 
They had charming manners, but they were as ignorant as swans' . 70 
But this is insufficient to explain the content of the Handbook and indeed the reasons 
for British occupation policy in general. This `image' of the German people is an 
image based on fear. The fear in Whitehall was of a resurgent Germany, the `other' 
ie Nazi Germany, and a third world war in less than thirty years. The decision to 
change the German mind was based on the belief in Britain that the German people 
had not been strong enough to resist Nazi rule, and in the post-war years would be 
in an even weaker position to do so. But more than this, as the Handbook illustrates, 
it was believed that the German national character was flawed by their experience of 
the failures in their history which had led to an unnatural acceptance of authority and 
militarism, and subservience to power. Most importantly, the Handbook suggested 
that this had led to the crimes against humanity for which the Nazi regime and the 
German people would be held responsible for. 
As the Allied forces liberated occupied Europe the information reaching Britain about 
the concentration camps confirmed the worst fears about Germany and, as Roberts 
commented in his Memorandum, British public opinion would demand retribution and 
The shape and size of the skull to determine national characteristics has a long 
history in American, British and French justifications for the subjugation of other 
races. Social theories derived from this `scientific' measurement of physical attributes 
has also been used to `rationalize, legitimize, or conceal repressive or unjust modes 
of social relation and expression' particularly in relation to state behaviour. See David 
Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture, Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993) p. 153. 
70Lord Clark, Civilization: A Personal View. (London: British Broadcasting 
Company and John Murray, 1969). p. 346. 
187 
a policy which would ensure that this could never happen again. " The denials in the 
Nazi press of responsibility re-inforced this opinion. " This was the final element 
which influenced British policy and also confirmed that a radical solution was 
necessary. 
British feelings towards Germany at this time were subsequently described by Lord 
Annan. " Discussing the `state of mind' of the British soliders and civilians engaged 
in Germany directly after the end of the war he said : 
`The days immediately after the Second World War were terrible days. 
They were terrible for so many reasons. The full enormity of the Nazi 
crimes - the holocaust, the extermination of Russian prisoners and of 
political enemies, the brutalities committed in reprisal against the 
guerilla forces in occupied territories - sickened the British Occupation 
Forces more than the Americans. The mood of the British in May 
1945 was bitter'. " 
The Commission Control Policy Directives for propaganda to Germany in the first 
weeks after the end of the war in Europe suggested the propaganda themes which 
should be used to address the `minds' of the German people. The first Directive, 
dated 13th May, 1945, identified Germany as a `hostile entity now disintegrated', and 
set out the themes of propaganda which would begin the process of re-educating the 
German people. " The four most important points to be followed were the `culpable 
responsibility of all Germans for Nazi crimes, the power and determination of the 
71`Foreign Office Minute - Sir Frank Roberts typed note attached to this' 
PRO/FO371/39076, January, 1944. 
n WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For weeks 5.3.45-11.3.45. and 23.4.45-29.4.45. 
"Lord Annan `How Dr. Adenauer Rose Resilient From The Ruins of Germany', 
The 1982 Bithell Memorial Lecture , Institute of Germanic Studies. (University of 
London 1983). 
74 Ibid. p. 3. 
71 PRO/FO 1005/739. `Control Commission Policy Directive', 13th May, 1945. 
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Allies to enforce their will, the unanimity of the Allies and the spiritual importance 
of the individual'. Particular emphasis was to be given to the completeness of 
Germany's defeat and the fact that the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany was 
carried out by German Generals and Admirals in full military fashion under the 
authority of the Civil Government. This first point reflects the determination of the 
Allies that there should be no `myth' created about Germany's defeat as in 1918. The 
second point emphasised the `common responsibility of all Germans for Nazi crimes', 
and in support of this the reporting of details of the concentration camps should be 
continued and informed while a poster campaign was shortly to be launched based on 
the exhibition of films of Belsen and Dachau. Thirdly, 'the moral responsibility for 
these crimes must be laid wholly and solely on the German nation. They cannot be 
excused in terms of the Nazi regime, which was accepted whether actively or 
passively, by the vast majority of Germans. They surrendered their birthright, and 
will, against a mirage of national glorification through militarism regardless of right 
or wrong in the place of their own conscience. They have been caught red-handed'. 
Finally, the Directive pointed out that `for all the victims of Nazism the Germans 
must be made to see the reasons for their treatment by the international society'. " 
The weakness of the German people as a consequence of the overwhelming power of 
the Nazi regime, understood by the officers working in the German Section. The 
brutality of the regime which had been legalised by the manipulation of the judiciary, 
gave the leadership of the regime unlimited powers over citizens. Looking towards 
the immediate future the German Section had the task of identifying the short-term 
problems for the Allied troops. In doing so they identified the potential for the 
continuation of an element of German society committed to an aggressive, 
expansionist and militaristic policy. The expectation of continued conflict in the form 
of guerilla warfare involving the `Werewolf' organisation, the existence of plans for 
a resurgent German nationalist movement and the disappearance of the leading Nazis 




In the final analysis the intelligence officers' first duty was to provide information 
which reflected the most important issues for the military occupation of the country. 
The accepted weakness of the German people and their failure to resist the Nazi 
regime from the beginning when it was physically fit and able, now led the 
intelligence officers to conclude that in their extremely weakened state these people 
would be unable or unwilling to do anything to stop the Nazi regime. The focus of 
attention was on those who constituted a continued threat, and in this the intelligence 
officers provided evidence of the ways in which the Allied forces would be in 
danger. In this way the PWE provided evidence which suggested that there were still 
`problems' to be faced in Germany, problems with the Nazi regime which the German 
people could not be relied upon to solve. The conclusion was that the occupation of 
Germany was the only solution. But whilst the intelligence may have been used to 
suggest occupation was necessary, it is difficult to conclude that re-education would 
be necessary after the elimination of the Nazi regime. 
In relation to the the Central Directives and the Basic Handbook for Germany, the 
divergence between the `image' of the German people and interpretation of the 
German `problem' between the German Section and the PWE output in these is 
striking. The evaluation and conclusions of political and social conditions in 
Germany, provided in the Weekly Reports is at odds with the sensationalism and 
racism of the Basic Handbook. The content of the intelligence reports of the German 
Section and the way intelligence was used, or not, in the production of the Handbooks 
and by those responsible for the Central Directive, is an example of the way that 
intelligence can be used for political reasons by those in a position and with a reason 
for doing so. Both the Handbook and Directives reflect the existence of the 
`vansittart' view of the German people, indicating that the PWE was a constituent 
element in the `government circles' discussed by Welch. But most importantly, they 
articulate the reasons for the adoption of the policy of occupational rule and re- 
education and in doing so justify that policy. 
The fact that `the other Germany' existed, but was judged to have at least passively 
supported the Nazi regime meant that in the `bitter mood' of May 1945 the 
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governments and peoples of Europe believed that a radical solution was needed for 
the German `problem'. The policy of occupation, re-education and democratisation 
was planned and implemented in the belief that Germany was an `uncivilized' society, 
with a history that had led them away from the liberal, western democratic style of 
government and. society. The British solution to the `problem' of Germany was to 




The history of the Cold War has, until recently, been the history of the conflict 
between Russia and the United States of America immediately following the end of 
the Second World War. If Britain entered into the discussion at all it was as a 
`minor' participant in what was seen as a war between the two super-powers who 
were divided by opposing ideological and political philosophies and principles. ` 
Britain, it seemed, had little influence over politics at such a `high' level of 
international affairs. 
This American-centric interpretation of the bi-polarity of the Cold War is now being 
re-assessed, and recent work has focused on the importance of including other issues, 
particularly the European dimension, in the history of the conflict. Equally important 
has been the search for an explanation for the origins of the c6nflict. 2 It is now 
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recognised that the events in Europe leading up to the defeat of Germany are 
important factors in understanding the way in which the division of Germany 
accelerated the deterioration of the relationship between the three partners in the 
Grand Alliance. In The Impossible Peace Anne Deighton has examined the role of 
British ministers and the way in which British policy-makers sought to secure British 
interests in what was rapidly becoming a struggle between the two super-powers for 
political control in Europe. According to Deighton, ministers in Whitehall recognised 
the dangers to British security from Russia long before America and in an effort to 
safeguard her interests in Europe targeted their political and diplomatic efforts towards 
gaining an Anglo-American Alliance. They believed that such an alliance was essential 
if the aim of establishing a western-style democratic Germany which would act as a 
buffer against the Russian bloc was to be achieved. The role of British ministers in 
the Council of Ministers meetings throughout the war, and the way in which British 
foreign policy was strategically constructed to achieve this alliance suggests, therefore, 
that far from a `minor' role, Britain played an important part in bringing about the 
pre-conditions which ultimately led to the division of Germany and the formation of 
the East and West blocs and the beginning of the Cold War. 
Whilst Deighton's thesis is open to the criticism of attaching an exaggerated 
importance to British foreign policy during this period, it nevertheless highlights the 
need to re-assess Britain's role in the period immediately before the breakdown of the 
Allied relationship in 1945 which signalled the beginning of the Cold War. Historians 
have now begun to look more closely at the way in which the climate of opinion in 
Whitehall towards Russia changed during the latter stages of the war, and the way in 
which individuals in the Foreign Office influenced the way in which foreign policy 
was formulated. 3 
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In British Labour and the Cold War, Peter Weiler argues that during the Second 
World War the Foreign Office planned to base post-war policy on continued Anglo- 
Soviet friendship, viewing the actions in Eastern Europe not with alarm but with an 
understanding that this was desired for security. He believes that British policy started 
to change as the war came to a conclusion and tensions between the USSR and Britain 
emerged, resulting in the initial judgement giving way to suspicion, fear and then 
outright hostility. " Finally, research is now progressing on the way in which the 
breakdown of the relationship between East and West can be linked into the changing 
attitudes and opinions in Whitehall, and the establishment of departments to deal with 
emerging anxieties about the Russian `threat. " 
Perhaps one of the most interesting facts to emerge from this research, and supporting 
Deighton's argument, is a rare consensus of opinion in Cold War historiography. 
This is that Britain was the f to recognise the threat posed by Russia and the f1LS. t 
to act upon that recognition. ' But exactly when this perception of threat emerged is 
still open to question, as Raymond Smith confirms: `the extent to which a precise 
view of likely postwar activity was developed within British foreign-policy making 
circles during 1945 is still very much open to question'. ' In Europe in Our Time, 
Walter Laqueur claims that `Churchill realised much earlier than the Americans what 
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the Soviet advance into Europe meant'. ' Furthermore, Peter Boyle argues that 
Churchill was also instrumental in shaping American public opinion in influencing 
their early perception of this threat. He comments that Churchill's Iron Curtain 
speech at Fulton on 5th March, 1946 created an equally deep shock in America as 
Stalin's speech had done one month earlier. Halifax, who had been posted to the 
Washington Embassy after his resignation as Foreign Secretary in 1940, reported that 
Churchill's speech `has given the sharpest jolt to American thinking of any utterance 
since the end of the war'. ' 
In The Politics of Continuity, John Saville outlines the growing concern in the Foreign 
Office for information about Russia and the Russian people, which resulted in a 
Committee on Russia Studies being set up in June, 1944. This committee, chaired by 
Sir Orme Sargent, was set up to `consider means of ensuring that adequate facilities 
existed in this country for the study of Russian languages, arts, science, history, etc. 
and generally for the study of Soviet institutions and forms of political, economic and 
social organisation'. 1° During the same period the SIS (MI6), also under Foreign 
Office control, was `quick to embrace the concept of a future Soviet adversary' and 
had turned its attention to forming a new Soviet section (Section IX) as early as the 
Summer of 1944. " Ray Merrick has described the `anxious questioning concerning 
Soviet behaviour' in both the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Moscow in 
the early months of 1946. In March 1946 the Joint Intelligence Committee had 
concluded that the Soviets would use all means, short of war, to challenge Britain, 
especially in Greece, Turkey, Iran and the Middle East. " Telegrams from Frank 
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Roberts, the charge d'affaires in Moscow, set out a `sombre and disquieting account 
of Anglo-Soviet relations' in which he stated `we are faced with a Soviet policy 
designed to advance Soviet interests at every possible opportunity, regardless of those 
of its allies, and it now seems regardless even of treaty obligations'. " Roberts was 
so concerned by the nature of Soviet policy that he proposed a body should be set up 
for the `close and co-ordinated study of Soviet activities'. " The result of these 
anxieties in Whitehall was the establishment of the Russia Committee to co-ordinate 
policy towards Russia. This committee was set up just one month after Churchill's 
Fulton speech and was given the task of reviewing the development of Soviet policy 
and propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world, particularly their activities 
against Britain, and to suggest what action the British government should take in such 
matters. " Merrick argues that the tasks given to the Russia Committee identified 
it as `centrally involved in the British interpretation of, and reactions to, the onset of 
the Cold War'. ` 
In the following year, 1947, the recognition in Whitehall of the need to take action 
to counter the Soviet ideological `offensive' against the West led to discussions about 
the need to maintain British prestige abroad and influence in the. shaping of the post- 
war world. As British military and political power diminished, the relative value of 
propaganda and political warfare was identified as an essential element in British 
foreign policy with which to counter Russian propaganda. As a result of the 
discussion throughout 1947 the Information Research Department was established in 
1948 to distribute anti-Communist propaganda in Britain and abroad. According to 
Smith, the role and functions of the Information Research Department demonstrates 
that Britain was the `first to adopt a counter-offensive position against what was 
perceived as the threat of Communism -and in a highly organised, determined and 
"Roberts to Foreign Office 14th March, 1946. FO 371/67763 in Merrick, "The 
Russia Committee and the British Foreign Office'. pp. 453/454. 
1 Ibid. p. 454. 
0 Ibid. pp. 453/445. 
16 Ibid. P. 455. 
196 
aggressive manner'. " Scott Lucas and Morris trace the rapid change from a counter- 
offensive strategy to a `defensive/offensive' programme in 1948 when Whitehall 
returned to the use of propaganda and political warfare as a weapons against Russian 
aggression. " The establishment of the IRD ilustrated the decision in Whitehall to 
return to the methods of the 
PWE in order to ensure that `the psychological conflict 
called the Cold War would be fought with psychological methods'. " Scott Lucas 
and Morris also the establishment of the IRD and the changes in policy towards 
Russia was not simply the product of the Foreign Secretary (Bevin) or of the Prime 
Minister (Attlee), nor even a co-ordinated reaction to Soviet expansion. It was `the 
culmination of a campaign waged since 1946 by permanent officials of the Foreign 
Office, later supported by the military, for the adoption of a general 
`defensive/offensive' strategy against the Soviets". The Foreign Office appears to 
have been instrumental as the location for the emergence of the anxieties in the West 
about future Russian intentions. The permanent officials of the Foreign Office are 
also identified as being responsible for the setting-up of departments to counter what 
was perceived to be a `threat' to British interests. The links are also identified 
between the PWE and the post-war organisations for political warfare, specifically that 
by 1949 the IRD had become the `peacetime version of the Political Warfare 
Executive'. 21 Britain was in a strong position to reconstitute the organisation for 
propaganda and political warfare due to the fact that even before the war had ended 
plans were made to continue elements of both SOE and PWE, and in doing so the 
`important continuities of personnel and doctrine were thus facilitated'. 22 Thus, 
despite the change of government in 1945 when Labour won a landsli de victory, the 
continuity in the belief in the use of propaganda and political warfare as an instrument 
17Lyn Smith, `Covert British Propaganda'. p. 68. 
. "Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, British Intelligence. p. 99. 
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of foreign policy was sustained. 
During the. war the PWE gradually became involved in the observation, analysis and 
reporting of Russian movements and propaganda in Europe. Again, this was an area 
not designated or foreseen in the tasks the PWE was given when it was established in 
1941. As an example of the interest taken in Russian affairs, in the two-and-a-half 
years of Weekly Reports used in this research the intelligence concerning Russia is 
omitted from just seven of those reports. During this period the PWE became 
increasingly pre-occupied with, and eventually anxious about, Russian motivations and 
intentions. The intelligence officers working in the German Section were not 
constrained by the `public' position necessarily adopted by Ministers towards Russia, 
and were free to include whatever information they considered important in their 
reports. This chapter is designed to illustrate the way in which the `image' of Russia 
as an `enemy' incrementally emerged in the Weekly Reports. The construction of the 
`image' was the result of a combination of factors: the intelligence officers' 
understanding of the past history of Russia and her relations with the West, the events 
in Europe after 1943 and their interpretation of those events, and the information 
provided by the existing network of sources including the Ministry of Propaganda. 
An examination of these reports provides an insight into the way in which the 
perception of the Russian `threat' emerged in the PWE and when eventually `the light 
of peace at the end of the tunnel of war came to be perceived as the light of the 
oncoming train of communism'. ' 
Before moving on to look at the Weekly Reports it is useful to review Lockhart's 
views on Russia and the Russian people. In Comes The Reckoning, Lockhart states 
that during the Second World War he was `brought more and more by the Foreign 
Office into Russian affairs, and it was on the subject of Russia that I had my most 
intimate conversations with Mr. Eden'. 24 As far as the Russian people were 
concerned Lockhart was quite clear, stating `I like and shall always like the 
"Merrick, `The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office'. p. 453. 
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Russians'. " However, he was concerned about the possibilities of co-operation 
between Russia and Britain and the way in which this could be jeopardised. He 
believed that Russian behaviour was often unpredictable and difficult to understand, 
and that the Russian character moved between extremes of `hot and cold, laziness and 
energy, political indifference and political fanaticism'. ' His work at PWE in 
relation to the question of Russia was characterised with a sense of uneasiness about 
East/West relations, believing that `the Russians regarded any agreement with a 
capitalist state as temporary and opportunist'. " For Lockhart `inter-Allied unity was 
held together only by the cement of a common danger. It was not difficult to foresee 
that, as the danger receded, the divisions both in Britain itself and between the Allies 
would become accentuated'. " 
The defeat of the German Army at Stalingrad signalled the beginning of the advance 
of the Red Army into occupied Europe. It also marked a turning point in the 
relationship between the partners of the Alliance. During the previous year tensions 
between Russia and the West had increased as a result of the failure of Britain and 
America to launch a second front in Europe in order to relieve the military pressure 
on Russia. In 1941 it had been assumed that the Russians would be weak and in 
need of the support of the West after the end of the war. After Stalingrad the success 
of the Red Army and their continued military successes had forced a rapid reappraisal 
of this conclusion. According to Lockhart, 
`The agitation [for the second front] caused considerable anxiety 
amongst the Russian experts in this country to whom a new danger had 
now presented itself. Until two months ago both the British and the 
American Governments had assumed that Russia would need abundant 
Allied help during and after the peace because, although she would 
have been the main instrument of victory, she would be badly crippled, 
u Ibid. p. 93. 
Ibid. pp. 229-230. 
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there was now at any rate a possibility of her winning the war without 
us and not needing our help at all'. " 
In the first months after Stalingrad the intelligence officers reported the outpourings 
of the Ministry of Propaganda regarding Britain's new position within the Alliance. 
On the one hand the Ministry argued that `everyone realises that Britain would not be 
able to check a victorious Russia on the Continent. Britain is bound to come out of 
this war crippled and impotent whatever happens... they are inhibited by their hatred 
and fear of the young Powers and peoples [Germany? ] which prevents them from 
seeing their "strong man" Churchill in his true historical shape; a political adventurer 
who is throwing a world empire quite unnecessarily, and even against national 
interests, into a war situation which will destroy this Empire'. -, On the other hand 
Goebbels warned that `the British Empire will in any case be on the losing side at the 
end of this war - whether it is beaten by the Axis Powers (n=: not Tripartite) or by 
the U. S. A... Britain has already lost too much power, prestige and possessions to be 
able to win'. " Three pieces of German propaganda were included in the Weekly 
Report report to illustrate the way in which the Nazis were attempting to undermine 
British morale. The first was a full page feature and map entitled `Inheritance 
during lifetime' which showed the tentacles of the U. S. stretching out to all parts of 
the Empire; the second was a cartoon showing a hyena (the U. S) tearing a piece of 
meat (Africa) away from a sick lion (G. B); and the third was a full page article 
entitled `Africa as the aim of Dollar Diplomacy'. " It was claimed that that 
Roosevelt wanted `an armament monopoly for the U. S. A, a world dictatorship with 
fire, sword and hunger, a total suppression by force of great nations and a negation 
of all the laws of life and of nature - in short, a super-Versailles, such as can only 
" Ibid. p. 231. 
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arise from a diseased brain'. " German propaganda prophesied the eventual loss of 
the British Empire and the inevitable weakening of Britain's power and prestige 
abroad at the end of the war. 
But of more importance to the intelligence officers were the reports of the beginnings 
of a change of opinion in Germany towards Russia as a result of the victory at 
Stalingrad. An `indiscreet' article in the German Press had asked `how is the 
gigantic Russian armament production possible in a country of comparatively primitive 
development.. perhaps the German with his well-known passion for absolute 
" ct vi might be inclined to see something like -a positive achievement 
by the 
Bolshevists... this in fact might bear the stamp of positive constructive work. worthy 
o winning the respect of the adversary'(emphasis as in original). " Goering's 
`almost admiring reference to the Russian conduct of the first war in Finland which 
he described as `perhaps the cleverest and greatest camouflage in world history 
hitherto' was recognised in the German Section as `his practical admission that the 
German leadership had been completely deceived as to Russia's strength'. " Any 
change of attitude in Germany which was favourable towards the Russians was 
monitored closely by the German Section. Another Russo-German pact was always 
considered a possibility, particularly as German successes turned to defeat. In the 
report for the first week of February the intelligence officers commented that there 
were `several important indications' that this opinion was already gaining some ground 
in Germany. " Goering's attack on the `idiots who think that you could make an 
agreement with the Bolsheviks', and propaganda which exposed Stalin's attempt to 
`de-Bolshevise Bolshevism in order to deceive the outer world', suggested that strong 
measures had been required to counter this opinion. 
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The possibility of Russia taking control in Europe was a constant issue on the agenda 
for both the PWE and the Ministry of Propaganda, and in early February the Ministry 
published an article from Pravda in which Russia rejected as `grotesque' the 
accusations being made by the Nazi regime about their intentions for the conquest of 
Europe. Nevertheless, the officers also noted that the Russians had incorporated into 
this rejection their long-term strategy for Europe, in which they pointed out that it was 
`natural' that they would wish to recapture Bessarabia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia. " For Lockhart this confirmed his fears that `Russia, conscious now of her 
final victory, was determined to have her say - and a big say at that, in the future 
settlement of Europe - either in agreement with her Western Allies or without it'. " 
At the end of February the intelligence officers commented wearily that the 
fundamental themes of the failure of the Western Powers to save Europe from 
Bolshevism continues `at the same barrage strength as before. No further illustration 
is needed'. " Completely contradicting this statement, and indicating the concerns 
of the intelligence officers, the report included at least four pages of analysis of 
German propaganda and their statements about Britain's current and future position 
in Europe. The British people, and the Germans, were being told that one day 
Britain would thank Germany for her steadfastness and eventually have to admit that 
`we have backed the wrong horse, we should have gone in with Germany'. The 
intelligence officers illustrated their concern at what was being said, and warned the 
readers that `it is impossible to dismiss this just because the line is a very old one ... 
many other propagandists, including Goebbels, have said and are saying the same 
thing. 40 
The German Section recognised the symbolic assertion that Britain was `backing the 
37 Ibid. For week 8.2.43 - 14.2.43. 
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wrong horse' as a direct reference to the situation in 1918 where Britain had made a 
serious tactical error in their support of the White Russian Army against the 
Bolsheviks. Lockhart, like Goebbels, also linked the problems of the Alliance to this 
issue. He recognised the parallel being made between the British intervention in the 
internal affairs in Russia , giving material and 
financial support to the White Russian 
Army in the Civil War, with the feeling at that time that Britain had 'backed the 
wrong horse'. " German propaganda now suggested that history was being repeated 
and that Britain, once more, had made a grave mistake in her choice of ally. 
Lockhart was also concerned about the suspicion of Churchill in Moscow who, after 
1918, been seen as the 'great white hope of anti-Bolshevik Russians'. The Russian 
attitude to Churchill was, understandably, grounded in his involvement in their affairs 
in 1918 and summarising this Lockhart stated that 'the present rulers of Russia 
obviously disliked his past. They welcomed his present, because they knew he was 
determined to fight the Germans to the last. They almost certainly suspected his 
future'. 42 
The German Section were provided with details of Russian strength, with German 
propaganda describing the Red Army as a `gigantic war machine ... the most perfect 
tool of destruction ever devised ... driving the Soviet masses towards the West' in its 
commitment to a world revolution. " For England the message was clear. Through 
her partnership with Russia and America she had betrayed Europe, and in doing so 
had sealed her own fate since `The post-war political order has, in the American view, 
a purely American and Bolshevik aspect. Europe will be given to the Bolsheviks as 
payment, and America will take over the Empire'. " Whilst the intelligence officers 
suggested in this report that it was merely `more of the same' propaganda they also 
included a lengthy analysis a broadcast by Goebbels on 26th February, 1943 in which 
"Lockhart, Comes The Reckoning. p. 176. 
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he argued that an international discussion of the danger of Bolshevism was now 
emerging with more and more voices in Europe pointing to the menace of the Red 
Army, a `steamroller from the East'. German soldiers in the East were now `fighting 
not only for the security of German lives, but for the future of Europe'. " 
Reporting the way in which Red Army Day in was celebrated in Britain the German 
Section noted that `broadcasts and the press fumed for several days about the 
celebrations'. Some of the more colourful interpretations of events as supplied by the 
Ministry of Propaganda were included, such as : `With horror and disgust the entire 
civilized world witnessed the spectacle of official England - her King, Minister, 
Bishops - bowing down before the Bolshevik murderers'. ' England's conduct had 
created an `unbridgeable gulf between herself and Europe'; she had stabbed the West 
in the back. News broadcasts ridiculed Stalin's Order of the Day (23rd February, 
1943) and his assertions that the Red Army had always respected the rights and 
independence of other peoples. The German propagandists reminded British ministers 
that `he had omitted to mention the bloody attacks on Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia and Rumania... and that Stalin had pointed out to the West that the Red Army 
was bearing the burdens of war alone, in the absence of the Second Front, thus 
hinting that the Soviet Union intended to enjoy the fruits of victory alone'. (emphasis 
as in original)47 A further review on the same day insisted that in fact because of 
the absence of the second front Stalin had rejected the `glorification' of Red Army 
Day in London and instead `reasserted the political programme of Bolshevism, with 
ght to conquer and destroy Europe'. (emphasis as in original)" 
At the beginning of March the German Section noted that the Ministry of Propaganda 
was expanding its repertoire to include the political 






emerging from the advance of the Red Army into Poland. " The differences were 
pointed out between the Russian aim of retention of the frontiers of 1941, and the 
`secret' promises given to the Poles in London that the frontiers of 1939 would be 
restored. The Ministry claimed that the demands for the restoration of the pre-war 
frontiers were irreconcilable with Anglo-American promises to Moscow and that the 
Poles were now in `sharp conflict with London and Washington'. Germany accused 
Britain of betraying the Polish people, reminding them that `Once upon a time, 
Britain praised the Poles and gave them guarantees against Germany; today she is 
willing to sell the Poles to the Soviets'. Reflecting the concerns in Britain about the 
seriousness of the situation and the way in which British principles were now being 
questioned, German propaganda claimed that `in a sense Poland has become a test 
case for the moral reliability of English-Soviet relations as Allies. For England, 
Poland was nothing but an insignificant piece on her chessboard of world politics'. " 
Britain stood accused of sacrificing `the very country which was the first to be sent 
to the battlefields to fight for British interests. Confronted with a dilemma she must 
commit herself to the betrayal of Europe or she must start preparing at once for a war 
with her present Bolshevik ally, her future foe and enemy of tomorrow's' 
Goebbels used the failure of the West to provide a second front as evidence of the 
way in which Britain was still an enemy of Russia. He gave voice to Russian fears, 
claiming that the West was unwilling to come to Russia's aid in the hope that 
Germany and Russia would exhaust each other before a second front could be 
launched and before she would have to commit British soldiers to the war in Europe. 
In an article in Das Reich he insisted that `It is well known that in England there exist 
influential circles which had imagined that the war in the East would result not in the 
victory of either side but in the gradual bleeding to death of both sides. These people 
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desire the predominance of the Bolsheviks no more than that of the Germans'. 52 
`England has lost her freedom of action - Churchill has made Britain into an auxiliary 
state of Bolshevism.. The gravedigger of the Empire is becoming the gravedigger of 
the United Kingdom itself. 
The Ministry of Propaganda's efforts to prove that America planned to push Britain 
from her position of influence was illustrated with the argument Britain was using up 
her Navy and merchant shipping whilst the USA was expanding civil aviation and 
'nursing' her transport vessels and building a `gigantic fleet'. Britain was reminded 
that although `London used to imagine US rule could be limited to the Pacific. The 
USA was out for all the seas, even the waters around India and Australia'. " The 
war, it was argued, had meant a considerable loss of influence in world politics and 
economics and Britain was warned that the `USA and the Soviet Union will decide 
which of the two is to play a leading role in Europe'. "' The officers also noted that 
`considerable prominence' was given to an article by Kingsbury Smith in the Readers 
Digest in which he claimed that Gibraltar and Suez should no longer belong to Britain 
alone, and that the protective customs barriers of the British Empire must be removed. 
This, for the Ministry of Propaganda, was enough to confirm that America had plans 
to take over the Empire, and that `Roosevelt's demands for British Empire bases 
makes this perfectly clear'. " 
The possibility of a negotiated peace between Germany and Russia was raised once 
more in March with a suggestion from the German Section that `evidence of the 
existence of this feeling cannot be ignored'. "' Information available suggested that 
`certain German officers in Paris' had repeated rumours that Germany had asked for 
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an armistice with Russia, and that Russia had refused. Additionally, prior to the 
battle of El Alamein in October 1942, London had received reports of rumours 
amongst German troops in Egypt that Hitler had already rejected a request by Stalin 
for an armistice. A German airman in North Africa, who according to the 
intelligence officer, was a` qualified Nazi' had expressed the view that Russians 
would be ready to make peace when they had occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
A report, believed to be `reliable', confirmed that a `relatively unimportant 
proportion of Germans were consoling themselves with the hope that the Russians 
would be ready to conclude peace after recapturing the greater part of the territory she 
had lost'. The intelligence officers ended this survey by stating that `these latter two 
pieces of evidence should be set against - though they do not of course outweigh - the 
much stronger evidence of the German fear of occupation by Russia in case of 
defeat'. ' The recognition of the possibility of another Russo-German pact is clear 
from the reports, and the German Section was not inclined to dismiss it out of hand. 
The reports of the murders in the Katyn Forest which appeared in the Weekly Reports 
included the details of a campaign identified as `one of the most sudden and intense 
in German home propaganda since the war began' with newspaper articles, news 
items, special talks, bulletins focused on the murder of Poles in the Katyn Forest. " 
Enormous stress was laid on the horrors of the dead, and German propaganda accused 
the Alliance of a `conspiracy of silence', occasionally interrupted by the `stammering 
denials of Moscow and London', and the `Kremlin Jews' who were trying to make 
the European people believe that the Germans were responsible. The intelligence 
officers believed that the amount of propaganda surrounding this was due to at least 
four current problems facing the Nazi regime. The first was the need to increase 
support for Germany as the shield against the Bolshevik danger; the second was to 
rouse the feelings of Poles at home and abroad and create more problems for the 
Alliance; the third was to incriminate England and the USA (who were portrayed as 
handing over Europe to a similar fate and powerless to protect their allies anyway); 
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and finally to produce qualms amongst the Western Powers. " They also commented, 
sarcastically, that `In the interests of truth and humanity the German authorities were 
suddenly eager to do anything for the Poles' and had set up an enquiry to look into 
the murders. The officers predicted that the Ministry would use this as evidence of 
the excesses of the Red Army as a vital part of their campaign to eliminate any pro- 
Russian tendencies amongst the German people and to re-inforce the message that they 
must continue with the war, or suffer the same fate as the Poles at Katyn. However, 
whilst the German Section was correct in their analysis of this, the very fact that this 
amount of energy and time was given to this issue suggest that the elements of truth 
carried within German propaganda were arousing some anxiety within the PWE. The 
facts were that Stalin vy conducting the war in Europe alone, the Red Army 3M 
liberating occupied territories and neither Britain nor America appeared to be in any 
position to influence Stalin in his methods. 
At the beginning of May more details of the atrocity at Katyn were published in the 
German Press. It was estimated that twelve thousand Polish officers had been killed 
in either March or April, 1940 thus confirming for the Germans that the Russians 
were responsible. The German Section was not, however, willing to accept this 
interpretation and added that `careful study (of the Protocol of the European experts 
involved in the Enquiry) reveals that, in fact, the experts do more to expose than to 
support the German accusations'. ' But the events in the Katyn Forest had not 
eliminated talk in Germany about the possibility of a peace with Russia, and the 
German Section began to receive reports that talks of an `imminent' peace with Russia 
were again in the forefront of public discussion in Germany. " From a `neutral 
businessman living in Germany with good opportunities of contact with highly placed 
Germans' the German Section received information of rumours that the Germans 
were having conversations with the Russians who, it was believed, would be willing 
to negotiate a peace before the end of the year. Furthermore, it was claimed that 
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Stalin was now beginning to move towards the opinion of his military advisers that 
Russia's interests would now be best served by retiring from the war - if only to 
recover and refit. 
The intelligence officers advised that `even if these rumours are only designed as part 
of the `war of nerves' directed against the United Nations, their actual or possible 
influence on German opinion is not to be disregarded'. They warned that" `to the 
intelligent and well-informed in Germany it may well appear that there is a much 
better hope of a compromise peace with a Russia exhausted by heavy casualties and 
the loss of its most productive industrial and agricultural districts than with the 
Western Powers'. " The extent to which the PWE was concerned about such a 
possibility is illustrated by the inclusion in the reports of a large amount of German 
propaganda, and importantly by their own analysis of the situation. The way in which 
Russia had been weakened economically and militarily as a result of the failure of the 
Second Front was identified by the German Section as a potentially serious problem 
for the Alliance partners. The intelligence officers considered that it might be 
responsible for bringing about the conditions under which she would make a separate 
peace with Germany. 
In the first week of August, 1943 the intelligence officers reported that `the most 
outstanding development has been the threat of a Bolshevik German-Soviet Alliance' 
which was mentioned by Seyss-Inquart speaking at the enrolment of the Dutch Nazi 
Land Army on 1st August. He had stressed the indignation in London and Washington 
at the setting up of the `Free Germany' National Committee saying , `It irritates the 
British and Americans to read that the German people are promised a powerful and 
strong, although of course Bolshevik, Germany. Dimly their intellects begin to realise 
that the dissolution of the Comintern was a farce, and that the Soviet Union aims at 
the creation of a Soviet Germany attached to the USSR - that is the creation of an 
immense European-Asiatic Soviet bloc as the starting-point for the Bolshevisation of 
61 Ibid. 
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the world'' The report added that this was not the first time Seyss-Inquart had 
threatened a Bolshevik German-Russian alliance against the West, but now there 
appeared to be alternative reasons. Whilst the Ministry of Propaganda has initially 
warned that this would be as a consequence of a German defeat, now German leaders 
were warning that such an alliance could be brought about by the failure of the West 
to come to Germany's aid in defending Europe against the East. Hoping to dissuade 
the West from any finther action which would aid the Soviet Union, Seyss-Inquart 
warned that the use of the `Free Germany' Committee by Russia was the forerunner 
of the type of governments which would emerge in Italy, the Balkans and other 
countries - in other words, the establishment of governments sponsored and supported 
by the Russians, rather than the Alliance agreement that governments would only be 
`sympathetic' to Russian interests. 
The timing of the Quebec Conference, August 18th-19th 1943, was chosen by the 
Ministry of Propaganda to remind the Russians of the failure of West to provide the 
Second Front, and to remind the West of the cost of this failure. Propaganda insisted 
that the `continuous difficulties with their troublesome Moscow ally' had forced the 
West to surrender Europe to Stalin as compensation for the massive losses he had 
incurred on their behalf. 64 Lockhart confirms the increasing problems within the 
Alliance, particularly with Stalin, who was now pressing publicly and privately for 
a real Second Front. According to Lockhart, Stalin `disliked the Quebec talks and 
already saw in the close co-operation of the British and the Americans a post-war 
Anglo-America grouping against Russia'. ' For Lockhart the Quebec talks were 
impost in increasing the mistrust between the East and West : 
`And, as always happens when Russian susceptibilities are hurt, he 
(Stalin) had begun to make his own counter-moves. Freed from his 
fears of a German victory, he had already broken off relations with the 
Polish Government in London and was moving forward his own Polish 
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pawns from Moscow. Now he showed his disapproval of Quebec by 
demanding a joint commission of control for Italy and by withdrawing 
M. Maisky from London and M. Litvinov from Washington. It is true 
that both in Washington and London there were experts who believed 
that the return of the two ambassadors to Moscow was an advantage 
and that, as victory loomed in sight, Stalin rightly wished to have his 
best English and American experts at his side. But the writing on the 
wall, I think, was plain. If Russia were not to be brought 
wholeheartedly into the Anglo-American counsels, she would go her 
own way'. ' 
In September 1943 the PWE began planning propaganda and political warfare 
activities in support of the launch of the Second Front. But, in direct contrast to the 
understanding in the PWE concerning the urgent need for the Second Front Lockhart 
was told by Eden `not to go too fast' which Lockhart read as a sign that the Second 
Front `was still some way off', adding pessimistically, `I foresaw trouble with the 
Russians'. 67 He suggested to Eden that Britain should follow a policy of `putting all 
our cards on the table and being absolutely frank' with the Russians about the 
problems of the launch of the Second Front. His advice fell on deaf ears, and he 
became increasingly concerned that `our post-war problems with Russia should be 
settled during the war, preferably while Russia still desired and needed our help, and 
that every postponement increased the danger of a post-war conflict between East and 
west'. " Lockhart lamented that Churchill and Roosevelt were more concerned with 
Vnilitary strategic problems and the post-war problems tended to be `relegated to a 
background of vague and indeterminate discussion'. 1' 
Lockhart's pre-occupation with the lack of negotiations between London and Moscow 
led him to discuss the problems with Benes, President of Czechoslovakia in exile, who 
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confirmed his fears by saying that he thought Russia would settle the German, Polish 
and Balkan problems by occupation before Britain was even ready to discuss them. " 
An intensified campaign arguing that the West had been involved in a sell-out to 
Stalin continued throughout the Autumn of 1943, and the Weekly Report for the week 
ending 18th October included an article in Pravda quoted by the Ministry of 
Propaganda. Goebbels claimed Stalin had rebuked the Allied Press for their 
`speculation' on political discussions. The interpretation of the Russian position, as 
outlined by the Ministry of Propaganda, insisted that the Baltic States, the Balkans and 
Turkish control of the Straits were the main objects of Moscow's demands, to which 
Britain had already agreed and to which America would agree if bases in Siberia were 
granted. German propaganda expanded this and claimed that dissension over the 
Italian Government was a serious issue with no agreement being reached between 
London, Washington or Moscow about the type of government desired. It was 
reported in the German press that Vyshinski had denounced Badoglio and declared that 
`his government must disappear and that there was only one feasible form of 
Government for Italy, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. " 
Aware of the way in which the Ministry of Propaganda had used Alliance Conferences 
for their own purposes in the past, the German Section now began to anticipate the 
way in which Goebbels might attempt to interpret the events of the forthcoming 
Moscow Conference. This time however, the Nazi regime attempted to create 
problems for the Alliance before the Conference began. In October the German 
Section warned that `some attempt is noticeable in propaganda for overseas to counter 
a successful end to the Conference in advance, by sowing mistrust of each partner's 
integrity'. ' A number of pieces of propaganda were included in the report to 
illustrate this; one quoted a German `expert' on Russian affairs who forecast that 
Moscow would refuse to accede to Anglo-American efforts to lay down a real basis 
for post-war co-operation; another claimed that the Americans had instigated a 
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whisper campaign in Turkey to allay fears of a Russian dominated government. This 
rumour was to inform the Turkish people that whilst the Americans would apl2e to 
accede to Russian demands this was merely to keep the Soviets in the war. America 
realised that Russia would be so weak after the summer that all political problems 
would be solved after the end of the war. " It was believed in the PWE that the 
Ministry of Propaganda, by publishing the alleged `whisper campaign' by America 
sought to intensify the fears already existing in Moscow about the way in which the 
negotiations were proceeding. 
The Moscow Declaration was seized upon by Goebbels as yet another illustration of 
the increasing weakness of Britain's position within the Alliance. According to the 
ministry of Propaganda Moscow was Eden's `Dunkirk' where Britain, `the alleged 
protector of small states, had met with a major defeat'. " The German Section noted 
that the Ministry had used the absence of a statement on frontiers as proof that Stalin's 
territorial claims had been admitted. As far as the Joint Occupational Clause was 
concerned, the Wilhelmstrasse spokesman insisted that Stalin had only agreed because 
he knew that `the only decisive point is where the Soviet Armies will be on the day 
of the capitulation of their enemies', warning that in any case the Soviets would not 
cease hostilities before they had reached the desired points in Poland, Finland, etc. 
According to German political commentators the `rubber-like wording' of the 
Declaration was a smokescreen for Stalin's confidence in the revolutionaries in all 
European countries who would eventually introduce Popular Front governments as 
they had in Italy. " Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Propaganda, Britain 
and America was aware that once the `red rebellion' was let loose in Europe's 
capitals, the decisions taken by the London Commission would not be able to stop it. 
The view again was exactly what Lockhart had been concerned about and which the 
intelligence officers in their reports covering the advance of the Red Army into 
Europe appear to support. 
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Whilst the intelligence officers recognised accurately the reasons for the themes 
adopted by the Ministry of Propaganda, and the way in which German interests would 
ultimately be served by the break-up of the Alliance it is unlikely that the accuracy 
of the reflection of British thinking on the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations was not 
also apparent. The increasing amount of information included in the reports testifies 
to the pre-occupation within the German Section, as does Lockhart's emphasis on his 
fears about the future in the way that Stalin was reacting to the way in which 
communications and negotiations between East and West were conducted. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the intelligence officers began to take more 
seriously the overtures being made by Moscow to the German people in the Free 
Germany campaign. The possibility of a `negotiated peace' which was apparently 
being offered in Russian propaganda was considered serious enough to warrant 
analysis of its potential for success. The intelligence officers noted that the impact 
on German public opinion seemed favourable and that `a striking number of 
independent sources agree that in certain Party circles there is now a trend towards 
the plan of a compromise with Russia... and that rumour names Himmler and 
Ribbentrop in this connection'. "' A report received in London claimed that `actual 
contact had been made (at Stockholm or elsewhere) and that negotiations had got as 
far as discussing future frontiers'. One of the factors considered by the German 
Section which might influence public opinion in this way was that the Anglo- 
American bombing raids were now a negative factor against the West and a positive 
factor in favour of the East with people in Germany saying that `the Russians do not 
do such terrible things'. The need to monitor the possible change in attitudes towards 
the Western Powers and to Russia and the way in which the bombing raids might be 
having a potentially disastrous counter-effect in Germany continued. Reports 
concerning public opinion appeared to show that that these raids were now pushing 
German opinion into the hands of the Russians and that the pro-Russian feeling now 
being expressed was discussed in terms of the Anglo-American principal mode of 
warfare which was bombing innocent civilians whilst the Russians `fight like good 
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soldiers'. " The same source also claimed that the German working class were now 
`definitely pro-Soviet'. The intelligence officers continued that `the best evidence 
continues to suggest that the first desire of the average German is still to `keep the 
Russians out of Germany' ... at the same time the continued Russian advance seems 
to be stimulating some `wishful thinking' about Russian intentions'. This `wishful 
thinking' was reported to come from commercial and financial circles in north-west 
Germany who believed that `the Russians would not damage German towns or 
factories, because they hoped to use German machinery and personnel to rebuild the 
devastated areas of their own country. This opinion is widespread and persistent .. 
together with the alternative hope that the Western Powers will prevent Russian 
occupation' . 7, The officers were 
increasingly concerned that the policy of 
Unconditional Surrender was working against the West and possibly in favour of 
Russia who, it appeared, was offering a `hope clause' which Churchill refused to even 
contemplate when approached by the PWE early in 1944. ' 
A further sign of the concern within the PWE about Russian intentions was the 
inclusion of information about the exact locations of the Red Army, their miliary 
manoeuvres and, as we have seen, the methods adopted by Russia in liberating the 
occupied territories. This information contributed to the overall picture of the 
presence of Russia in Europe, and at the beginning of 1944 the advance of the Red 
Army over the old Polish frontier brought Poland once more to the top of the political 
agenda in Britain. The German Section advised on the way in which the Ministry of 
propaganda interpreted events, and reported that German propaganda was concerned 
to show the Russian disregard for the position of her Allies. The supposed evidence 
for this was the fact that Poland was only being discussed in London and Washington 
since Stalin had long since given up any pretence of doing so. 
6° However, German 
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propaganda inferred that the West was also in the process of disengaging itself from 
the problems of Poland and that `A particularly base game is being played in London 
- the sacrificing of the so-called Polish emigre clique, the oldest protege of British 
policy. Nobody talks any longer about. the guarantee of Poland for which Britain 
allegedly went to war'. " For the Ministry of Propaganda, the position of America 
on the issue of Poland was seen as a promising weak point which could also be used 
to damage the Anglo-American relationship. German propaganda insisted that `the 
development of the Russo-Polish conflict is watched with growing annoyance in Lh_e 
s, & ... and that the 
Russo-Czechoslovakian Treaty had not been received favourably 
in Washington and was being seen as a return to the old system of alliances and buffer 
states. (emphasis as in original)' The Ministry warned Britain that should Moscow 
continue along this line, reaction in the USA might grow strong and `might result in 
th SA again turning away from a European policy'. (emphasis as in original) 
Once more the problem of the Second Front was raised, followed by an accusation 
of double crossing by the West. In a radio broadcast from Radio Athens propaganda 
argued that `the Allies expect to fool the Soviets ... Britain is a snake and wants to 
betray Russia first and Germany afterwards. The betrayal would come with the 
exhaustion of the two main adversaries ... The British expect to win by bluffing; but 
ý, ti s air that a Second Front will never be o ned, in order to prevent the delivery 
of Europe to the Kremlin'. (emphasis as in original)" 
In his New Year Speech in January 1944, Goebbels proclaimed that Britain `imagines 
she is pulling the strings, but actually she herself is being driven ... and will emerge 
from the war completely impoverished ... 'The British Empire is rotting whilst still 
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Europe was clear, according to Goebbels, by the failure to deal with Russia in relation 
to the Polish question. Alleged proof of this was provided in a quotation from a Tass 
statement of 11th January, 1944 which, according to German propaganda, amounted 
to the proclamation of a Soviet Poland. Moscow had denounced the Polish emigre 
government in London and identified itself with the Polish patriots in Moscow, headed 
by Wanda Wassilewska. The creation of a Soviet-Poland like the Soviet- 
Czechoslovakia was intended as the springboard for further Soviet aspirations in the 
West and `Moscow's aim continues to be the establishment of a Soviet world. 
Poland is to be a stage from which the Bolshevik snowball may roll on further'. " 
The polish question continued into the next week with the Propaganda Ministry now 
making the most of the situation, claiming that the Polish people themselves were 
looking towards the Nazi authorities to save them from the Soviets. " 
The fate of Poland was used to warn those in Europe who thought Britain might come 
to their aid that the idea was an illusion. News items claimed that Stalin had refused 
USA mediation in Poland, and the failure to discuss the Polish frontier had created 
, real differences between London and Moscow'. " Whilst the problem of Poland 
continued to plague the Alliance, the intelligence officers began to try to estimate, 
from information received the possibiity of a change of German public opinion in 
favour of a separate peace with either Russia or the West. The evidence to hand 
appeared to show that there was support for both, and the officers commented that 
those who preferred a peace with the Western Powers were the `more balanced' 
military men together with all those who genuinely feared `Bolshevism'. But, the 
report also noted that peace with Russia was 
favoured by a considerable number of 
professional officers and also Party members, 
including Gestapo officials, all of whom 
believed there would be a place for them in a Communist Germany. They did not 
believe that such opportunities would be available in any 'peace with the West. 
Reports suggested that the military men had been influenced by the `Free Germany' 
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broadcasts from Moscow, particularly by the emphasis on the bombing raids of the 
West. However, the intelligence officers believed that this propaganda was designed 
to come to `Anglo-Saxon ears' in the hope that it might influence the abandonment 
of the air-bombing. The report concluded that there was no indication of expectation 
of a compromise with either East or West, `the question at issue is only the academic 
one, on which side would compromise be preferable, if circumstances made it 
necessary to compromise and choice were possible'. " 
Just eight weeks before the opening of the long-promised Second Front the German 
Section noticed that the Ministry of Propaganda was going to even greater lengths to 
prove Allied rivalry, using a description of a `fierce quarrel' over Saudi Arabian oil 
which had broken out between America and Britain as just one instance of the 
`squabbling' over raw materials. This, for the Ministry of Propaganda, proved a) 
the falsity of alleged democratic aims b) US predatory imperialism and c) British 
helplessness and her growing fear of losing the war whatever happens. " Britain was 
warned that US trade policy was damaging to Europe because the sole aim was to 
capture Europe as a market for trading goods in order to prevent unemployment in 
America. Details of a trade agreement between Moscow and Washington were 
brushed aside as American naivety with a warning that `only a people like the 
Americans, whose greed overrides their reason, could believe that the Soviets, in the 
event of their victory, would deliver gigantic quantities of raw materials to strengthen 
their only rival for world domination"'. An alleged interview with a captured Soviet 
soldier was used in German propaganda, and quoted in the Weekly Report at the 
beginning of May in which he was said to have stated that `if we succeed in 
vanquishing Germany, we shall start our war against England. England is full of old 
traditions which cannot but interfere with a revolution like ours ... In 
future there will 
only be two dominating Powers in the world, each in its own hemisphere - the USA 
and Soviet Russia. Moscow would not be satisfied with a British partnership in the 
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European business'. 91 
By this time the German Section was becoming increasingly interested in the `Free 
Germany' propaganda originating from Moscow, the intentions behind it and the way 
in which this was being received in Germany. The German Section believed that the 
shift in public opinion towards Russia and away from Britain was as a result of an 
increasing belief in Germany of Britain's weakness relative to Soviet strength, and 
admitted that `it would not be an unnatural consequence of the contrast between the 
continuing relentless Russian advance and the apparent failure (up to now) of the 
Anglo-American operations in Italy'. ' The report added that the Germans were 
`particularly impressed by manifestations of strength' and concluded that `this might 
be expected to encourage a certain `pro-Russian' trend in German opinion, in the form 
both of more or less a grudging admiration of Russia and also of preparation to make 
the best of a possible Russian victory'. Considering the effect of the bombing raids 
and the existing conditions in Germany the intelligence officers advised that the 
situation now might lead `many to feel that they and their children have no longer 
anything to lose, and perhaps even something to gain from a `Bolshevik' civilization'. 
Added to this the beliefs stimulated by the `Free Germany' campaign and the `Union 
of German Officers' broadcasts from Moscow were assuring the German people that 
`Russia, unlike the Western Powers, would not insist upon Unconditional Surrender 
and the demilitarisation of Germany'. 
" 
Further confirmation of the increasing pro-Russian tendency in Germany was given 
by the strenuous efforts made by the Ministry of Propaganda to counter the `Free 
Germany' propaganda. This began with an announcement by Rosenberg that the 
`ideological training subject for the Reich for 1944/45 was to be `Bolshevism - 
ideology and reality' and in which he stated that `Bolshevism is undoubtedly a 
tremendous phenomenon of our day ... Hundreds of questions put by our soldiers in 
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view of their experience in the East show the necessity of revising all former 
fundamental ideas'. (emphasis as original)` The intelligence officers surmised that 
the unprecedented amount of propaganda and the political programme of re-education 
was due to the very real fears within the Nazi regime about changing public opinion 
towards Russia. They concluded that `he (Rosenberg) and his school are faced with 
an ideological crisis due to the blatant contrast between their `old' picture of 
Bolshevik inferiority and the actual Russian achievements now being observed by the 
German people'. " The German Section identified the problem facing the Nazi 
regime and concluded that `the belief which it is considered particularly necessary to 
counter is one which has been mentioned in German home propaganda before - that 
Russian Bolshevism has recently changed its character, ceased to be international and 
revolutionary and has become nationalistic and respectable. Recent constitutional 
changes within the USSR have clearly made a considerable impression within 
Germany'. ' Ironically, within two years the same problem would be facing the 
British government, who had successfully influenced British public opinion towards 
a pro-Russian tendency during the Alliance. " 
The concern within the PWE of a Russo-German rapprochement was heightened after 
the attempt on Hitler's life in the July 1944 plot when reports began coming into the 
Executive that some of those involved in the plot had also been in contact with 
Russia. Information suggested that both Seydlitz and Einsiedel were working with 
Stalin and the `Free Germany' Committee in Moscow and that they also had links 
with the conspirators in the Reich to overthrow Hitler. It was also reported that the 
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amount of information coming into the PWE, the details contained in the reports all 
suggested to the intelligence officers that perhaps the `Free Germany' Campaign was 
more than propaganda. During the Summer of 1944 when the campaign was 
attracting a good deal of attention within the German Section, Lockhart attempted to 
bring about some co-operation between Russia and Britain on political warfare issues. 
It would, of course, be useful to the PWE for some co-operation with Russia not least 
because they might have been able to discover exactly what was behind the Russian 
campaign. Unfortunately it was to be a very short-lived affair, ending acrimoniously. 
Lockhart describes how the analysis of German propaganda and policy Directives for 
propaganda from the PWE were shared with the Russians for the month of August, 
1944'. He also states that he acted as interpreter to M. Saskin and General 
Vassiliev at the Anglo-American weekly policy meeting in order to get the Russians 
`to co-operate with us generally in propaganda to Germany'. 1°° However, after just 
one month the Russians failed to turn up at a meeting and also failed to keep an 
appointment to visit the various establishments of the BBC. Eventually Lockhart 
discovered that both men had been recalled to Moscow. The reason for the recall was 
given in a `blast' from M. Lozovsky, the head of the Russian propaganda services, 
who had been informed that the analysis of German propaganda had contained a 
statement that Himmler was now advocating a separate peace with Russia. According 
to Lockhart the Russians took this as an insult, and had immediately withdrawn their 
co-operation. As far as Lockhart was concerned it was also a turning point in 
relations between East and West : 
`Doubtless, the Russians had now made up their minds to go their own 
way. They had already taken their own line in Rumania and in 
Bulgaria and, although M. Mikolajczyk had at last made the journey 
to Moscow, a Russian-sponsored Polish Government was already in 
being in the Russian capital. In the absence of any agreed post-war 
plans for Europe it was clear that the new frontiers would be 
established not by treaty, but by the limits of the line of advance of the 
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Allied armies'. 101 
Having `taken their own line' throughout the liberated territories in Europe the 
possibility of the same thing occurring in Germany was obviously something high on 
the priority list within the PWE. The intelligence officers studied closely the `Free 
Germany' propaganda and compared the current feelings towards Russia with their 
knowledge of German public opinion towards Russia prior to the Nazi's seizure of 
power. 102 The conclusions they reached are interesting and offer an example of the 
way in which the discussions and thinking about National-Socialism and Communism 
in the PWE begin to merge : `Just as before 1933 there was a certain tendency for 
Communists in Germany to go over to National-Socialism, so now many National- 
Socialists may well feel leanings towards Communism, when it has on its side the 
prestige of approaching victory'. "' This, according to the intelligence officers was 
because of the differing perceptions and understanding of `Communism' in Germany 
who commented that `it must be remembered that for most young Germans brought 
up under National-Socialism, Communism (that is to say, Communism as they 
understand it, namely a ruthless dictatorship exercised in the interests of the 
unproportioned social classes) is a much more intelligible political creed than Liberal 
Democracy with its incomprehensible values of personal liberty and freedom of 
thought'. In the same report the intelligence officers quoted an article in the Journal 
de Geneve in which a high German official had said that the acceptance of Bolshevism 
was a possible way out of the present difficult position. Although the war may have 
been lost, politically Germany might have a way out though an understanding with the 
Russians and `efforts are being made to induce the Fuhrer to adopt these 
ra 'cs'. (emphasis as in original) 10` 
201 Ibid. p. 325. 




By the Autumn of 1944 the accumulation of evidence a pro-Russian tendency in 
German public opinion, the historical and practical issues between the Alliance, the 
advance of the Red Army into Central Europe and the failure of the British and 
Americans to offer any `hope clause' (as the Russians were doing to the German 
people) led the German Section to conclude that there existed a potentially serious 
situation. With the first crossings of the Reich frontier in the middle of September, 
1944 they looked for the first signs of reaction amongst the German population to a 
war on German soil. The possibility that Germany would negotiate a peace when the 
Red Army had crossed into Germany territory could not be discounted, particularly 
in view of the evidence available that seemed to indicate a large cross-section of the 
German people were asking for peace, might have a `grudging admiration' for the 
Russians and felt that they had nothing to lose by turning to the East. 
This period was also the beginning of the period about which Dick Crossman had 
written to Lockhart with details of the way in which the Germans were being badly 
treated by the Allied troops and in which he warned the Foreign Office that the 
German people `will turn to the East'. 10' However, it appeared from the first 
reports coming from Germany that this was now unlikely, and. under the heading 
`Anglo-American Occupation Welcomed' the Weekly Report for the week ending 18th 
September, 1944 began `At last the first signs are appearing of the expected reaction 
to a simultaneous approach of Anglo-American forces to Germany's western, and of 
Russian forces to her eastern frontier - namely the tendency (at least in bourgeois 
circles) to welcome the "civilized" Anglo-Saxons as a safeguard against the Russian 
"barbarians"' . 
106 
At the end of September the German Section included in their report a `flood of 
items' on the press and wireless which gave a `detailed and terrifying picture of 
"Soviet terror" in Finland where the "Ogpu executioners" were already at work to 
exterminate all "nationally conscious" Finns. It was alleged that regular man-hunts 
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were made to prepare for mass deportations of workers to Siberia and that the 
population was facing economic ruin, starvation and misery; the Bolsheviks 
interpreted the dictate just as they wished'. 107 According to German propaganda 
Bulgaria and Rumania provided similar object lessons of Bolshevik `terror', while 
reports of conditions in France, Belgium and Italy showed that Anglo-American 
occupation was just as bad. 
At the end of October the intelligence officers included in their report even more 
information of atrocity stories of the `Bolshevik' torture of the East Prussians. But 
they added sceptically that `much of it is a rehash of that formerly used' with accounts 
of murder `in practically every case as the result of a shot in the nape of the neck, 
rape, arson, looting etc. ' They commented that the propaganda campaign now 
instigated had been stepped up to `an hitherto unprecedented level', with alarmist 
stories such as : `The Bolshevik object was not merely to kill everything in Germany, 
but to torture their victims beyond description; Soviet Beasts rage in East Prussian 
Border Area; and Beasts in Human Guise'. 1° 
At the beginning of November the PWE received reports from Germany that the talk 
in Germany was that Russia no `longer bothered' to discuss either the Morgenthau 
plan nor the division of Germany into zones which was being discussed in America 
and Britain. 109 Again, the central theme of Nazi propaganda was the way in which 
Stalin was disregarding the West and making his own plans and gaining vital ground 
in Europe. German propaganda warned the West that Russia did not intend to destroy 
Germany but to `Bolshevize' her in order to gain the 80,000,000 Germans would then 
form a `gigantic reservoir' of organisers, technicians, keyworkers and engineers. The 
intelligence officers commented that `this threat of a Communist German-Russian bloc 
has been made before, in Holland and in private in an address to Military 
Commanders when Allied bombing had been singled out as paving the way for the 
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Communization of Germany'. Furthermore the Report also noted that a `live interest 
in Germany in the internal conditions in Russia and the familiar German respect for 
power and success was evident, alongside the absence of similar interests in America 
or Britain'. "0 
Another added complication for the PWE in their attempts to anticipate German- 
Russian relations arose in the middle of November when news of the formation of a 
`Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia' was announced by General 
Vlasov. The intelligence officers believed that this could be important to the German 
people since it offered a potentially new and powerful ally in their fight against 
Bolshevism (and the West). The Nazi regime argued that this was indeed the `final 
proof' of the reality of the Bolshevik tyranny -that if millions of Russians had joined 
in the fight against the `Bolshevik terror' who felt themselves in `mortal peril' this 
confirmed the peril to the German people. Together they could beat Bolshevism. The 
Ministry of Propaganda made every effort to impress upon the German people that 
this was an event of `utmost importance', and that the new Russia with a National- 
Socialist type of government is to be a permanent ally of the Reich. The German 
people were told that `the tasks which have to be fulfilled by the-Russian people can 
be solved in an alliance with Germany. The interests of the Russian people link with 
tho. of the ermans'. (emphasis as original)"' Interpreting this propaganda the 
intelligence officers noted the `grandiose claim' of `millions' and that the propaganda 
was to play an important part in clearing Hitler of guilt and folly in attacking Russia. 
Propaganda stressed that the liberation movement in Russia had been in latent 
existence for many years, and it was only Germany's championship of the anti- 
Bolshevik cause which enabled it to take shape. Propaganda for the Slav satellites 
claimed that `the immediate aim of General Vlasov, who already has the support of 
thirty Generals, is to raise a formidable army ... it will exceed 1,000,000'and the 
point was emphasized that the political programme was national and socialist. "= 
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This change in policy by the Ministry of Propaganda was attributed by the German 
Section to Himmler, who was reported to have addressed a telegram of 
congratulations to the Committee at the inaugural meeting in Prague. Additionally 
the intelligence officers identified that the two prominent SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Frank 
and Lorrenz who had attended the meeting were both Himmler's `men'. But, the 
German Section also believed that Himmler's changed attitude towards the Slav 
peoples may have been the his recognition that `desperate remedies' were now called 
for. In considering Vlasov's political programme the PWE commented that `It is 
clearly his own programme, quite untouched by German `New Order' ideas but rather 
Liberal-Democratic in tendency, insisting upon `the institution of real religious 
freedom, freedom on conscience, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press and 
the inviolability of the individual'. However, they also noted that the `typical Slav 
conceit' of which Himmler complained in 1943 still remained. The intelligence report 
concluded that the principal motive behind this new policy was one of manpower 
shortage. Himmler was acutely aware of the `alarming lack of reliable physically fit 
men' and in appearing to support Vlasov he would instantly have a huge number of 
Russians who would be utilised as mercenary forces in the war against Russia and the 
West. Many of these Russians had been in Germany for nearly three and a half 
years, deprived of all links with the homeland and would have been `persuaded' that 
Stalin regarded them as deserters anyhow. But the intelligence officers also noted 
that more than practical realities may have been responsible for Himmler's actions. 
pointing out that Himmler , of all the leaders in the Reich, was the one who would 
have been willing to come to terms with Stalin (even if it included a partial 
Bolshevisation of Germany) the officers believed that since the Russians failed to meet 
him in this he was now seeking to avenge himself on Stalin by using Vlasov and his 
Committee. 113 
Events outside Germany brought the attention of the PWE back to the emerging 
problems between Russia and Britain over the question of Greece. In October British 
parachute troops had landed in Greece to liberate the whole of the Peloponnese and, 
"3 Ibid. 
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in previous talks with Stalin, Churchill insisted on a major British influence there. 
But during December it began to look increasingly likely that the agreement that 
Churchill had reached with Stalin was about to be broken. Greek Communist forces 
who had been active as anti-German guerilla forces were now taking control and 
Churchill intervened in order to ensure that there would be no Communist-led 
government in Greece as had happened in Poland. The intelligence officers 
commented that the Ministry of Propaganda was finding it extremely hard to handle 
this to their advantage, since previously propaganda had insisted that only Germany 
could withstand the Bolshevik forces. Turning the focus away from British strength 
the conflict over Greece was used to illustrate the way in which British policy had 
changed and Churchill was now `denouncing the Communist type of democracy' and 
that Britain intended to fight these `second-class democrats' after having armed them. 
Acknowledging the emerging conflict between East and West the PWE noted that the 
Wilhelmstrasse was now being cautious on the `disunity' theme unwilling to commit 
itself further until the extent of Anglo-Bolshevik divergence was clear from Moscow's 
reaction to Churchill's denunciation of the Communists in Belgium, Italy and Greece 
was known. 114 
Churchill's determination to retain a strong British presence in Greece had, once 
more, brought home to the PWE the problems between Stalin and the West on policy 
for the liberated territories. At the end of 1944 the problems of the previous months 
as reported in the Weekly Reports identify several issues now uppermost in the minds 
of the intelligence officers in the Executive. The anxiety about the possibility of a 
Russo-German Alliance had increased, the military and political occupation of 
liberated countries had proved to be extremely difficult, and the problems over 
Poland and Greece all appeared to point to even greater problems at the end of the 
war. The German Press was not slow to take advantage of the cleavage over Greece, 
and at the end of the year used this to underline the weakness of the British position. 
Greece was described in German propaganda as: 
114 Ibid. 
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`the scene of the first great actual clash between British and Soviet 
interests, a clash with such magnitude, fierceness and potential 
developments as had never been experienced since the inception of the 
Anglo-Soviet coalition ... A vital expression of the fundamental 
contradiction of interests between the two countries'. "s 
Reviewing the situation at the beginning of 1945 Lockhart ironically mirrored and 
agreed with the feelings of the Ministry of Propaganda: 
`Although victory was now only a question of months, victory itself 
settled nothing. What mattered was the new world that would emerge 
from it... The picture was not bright. True, nearly all occupied 
Europe had been freed, and in Germany the certainty of victory had 
now given way to scarcely concealed feelings of despair. But in the 
liberated countries the Germans had left behind them a legacy of 
famine and distress, and in the economic chaos new forces had arisen 
which threatened to turn the international war into a social war. To the 
countries of South-Eastern and Central Europe the Russians, both by 
the magnitude of their war effort and by their geographical proximity, 
had appeared not only as liberators but as the architects of their 
destiny. 
And in the small nations the feeling that their security depended on an 
alliance with Russia was stronger than their fear of Communism... It 
was abundantly manifest that without a clear-cut understanding with 
Russia on the future shape of Europe there could be no peace'. "' 
January 1945 began with more information for the PWE about Moscow's `Free 
Germany' Committee. The intelligence officers a reported a change of attitude in the 
business community in Germany which appeared to contradict earlier information, and 
now suggested that businessmen pinned their hopes on Great Britain since it was 
acknowledged in Germany that the economic ruin of Germany would be contrary to 
. the interests of Britain. Therefore they expected British assistance (even more than 
American) in post-war reconstruction. Further information pointing to the change of 
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mood away from the pro-Russian tendency was also included in the report in which 
the - intelligence officers interestingly illustrate their own anticipations of Russian 
intentions in Germany. Having discussed the pro-British tendency in the German 
business community the report adds that `meanwhile, the SS, said to have shown pro- 
Russian tendencies and a disposition to talk of an alliance with Russia ... is now 
disillusioned, believing at last that the Russians really intend to put SS men to forced 
labour reconstructing the devastated areas'. (emphasis as in original)"' 
As the Red Army moved forward into Europe the German Section reported that the 
German Army now had to admit that Lodz and Cracow were lost and that Warsaw 
had been evacuated. German propaganda moved quickly to turn the events around, 
warning the British that Stalin's offensive was aimed at forcing his Allies to accept 
Russian demands on the strength of his military achievements. Furthermore, it was 
used by Goebbels to argue that Stalin had chosen his time when the British and 
American forces had been `considerably weakened by the German offensive. This 
means that Stalin is not out to win the war with his Allies, but alone and he would see 
how far he got before meeting Churchill and Roosevelt. The danger was that he 
might conquer Germany alone. 
"' This was exactly what the West feared, and the 
weekly reports contained information now on the military position of the Red Army 
and how fast they were moving and noted that the 
last day of January, 1945 was `the 
turning point in the desperate effort to halt the Red Army at the Oder before Frankfurt 
and Berlin'. "' The PWE now reported that the 
Red Army were regrouping and 
consolidating prior to renewing the assault, whilst 
German propaganda contained the 
warning that `Berlin was ready 
for battle' and included what the officers described as 
the `alarming phrase' that `The Soviets are 
knocking at the gates of the City'. "' As 
the Red Army entered Brandenburg Province and the 
loss of Upper Silesia became 
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known the PWE considered once more the possibility of a German capitulation. They 
concluded that what might. develop was a German demand for some sort of 
accommodation with the Western Allies in order to `set her free to resist the Russian 
advance'. "' The intelligence officers warned that `it must be remembered that such 
talks have no influence on the German government, which is not dependent on public 
opinion like a parliamentary government'. What is interesting is not the conclusions 
about the influence of such talks but that the intelligence officers considered it a 
possibility at all. The policy of Unconditional Surrender announced in January 1943 
had explicitly rejected any compromise or even a discussion on the possibility. The 
contents of the Weekly Reports and correspondence between the PWE and the Foreign 
office confirm the continued interest and desire to re-assess this policy. 
The concern in Whitehall about the `Free Germany' Committee and propaganda 
brought the matter onto the Agenda of the JIC's meeting on 16th January, 1945.121 
An Annexe attached to the Minutes entitled `German Generals in British Hands', 
shows that the Director of Military -Intelligence requested that the Chiefs of Staff 
should be informed of the tentative discussions which had so far taken place with 
some of the German Generals 
in British hands. From the Minutes it is clear that the 
`discussions' were centred on the way in which Moscow's `Free Germany' Committee 
had obviously influenced these generals . From the 
`discussions' it appeared that some 
of the generals would be prepared to act 
in an advisory capacity to SHAEF. They 
also believed that until a collapse 
happened, no local attempt to win over German 
commanders would succeed. The Minutes also contain the 
information that what the 
generals most wanted was a plan on 
a large scale to win over the Wehrmacht on all 
fronts, as well as within the Reich. The Director of Military Intelligence suggested 
`that the time had come to get the Russians to explain the policy underlying the 
Seidlitz movement and their plans for its future'. He suggested that the next meeting 
of the Heads of Government might afford the opportunity to 
`tackle the Russians on 
this point and the attitude of some of the German generals 
in the United Kingdom 
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might provide a ground of approach'. The Chairman, Cavendish-Bentinck suggested 
that the Sub-Committee should submit a note to the Chiefs of Staff explaining what 
had been happening, suggested that the position should be discussed as the next 
Conference `enquiries should be made at the highest level about the Seidlitz 
movement'. It is clear that the JIC were concerned about the possibility of the 
Russians making approaches to the German commanders on the Eastern Front. 
Colonel Rawlinson (War Office) reported that the generals had also suggested that the 
approach to Rundstedt should be made through British Secret Service channels, whilst 
a simultaneous approach to all German commanders should be made by broadcasts and 
all other possible means. It seems from this report that the JIC were considering the 
possibility of using the German generals in Britain to persuade Germany to surrender. 
The Minutes of the meeting suggest that the German generals in Britain did not 
suggest an approach but discussed `the' approach to Rundstedt. 
The anxiety about Russia had now turned into undisguised distrust , and 
Cavendish- 
Bentinck referred to the Seidlitz movement and said `that it would not surprise him 
if, as soon as the Russians had take some large town in Germany, -they were to set up 
a national government, as they had 
done in Hungary; and perhaps, also produce anti- 
Nazi German troops'. Major General Stewart Menzies (M16), also agreed that the 
Seidlitz movement was not a `propaganda stunt' and that `it was important to discover 
the Russian intentions with regard to it'. 
"' 
On 1st February, 1945 with the Red Army less than fifty miles away from Berlin the 
city was declared a Fortress City, and 
just three days later Roosevelt, Stalin and 
Churchill met at Yalta to discuss the problems of a post-war Europe and particularly 
those of Poland. The worry for Nazi regime was that the Alliance would decide to 
Haake an appeal to the German people over their 
heads. '24 But this did not happen 
and the PWE noted the relief 
in Germany when no such appeal was made, nor any 
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modification to the policy of Unconditional Surrender"". The PWE noted that 
German propaganda was still attempting to sow mistrust amongst the Allies, saying 
that Stalin had dominated the talks. Certainly, according to Eden Yalta had been 
difficult. Eden noted in his memoirs that he thought `Stalin, as a negotiator was the 
toughest proposition of all ... Of course the man was ruthless and of course he knew 
his purpose'. 126 In negotiations concerning the liberated territories he remarked that 
`Stalin's attitude to small countries struck me as grim, not to say sinister'. " On the 
question of Poland, Eden was depressed saying `Worst of all was the Russian 
behaviour over Poland... it was apparent that the Russians did not intend to give true 
effect to the Yalta decisions ... By the final meeting on February 5th the deadlock was 
complete'. 128 
Lockhart's view of the Conference (and all of the Conferences it seems) was equally 
depressing, believing that like all the others it was `doubtless necessary and useful, 
but never realised the expectations which the publicity given to them aroused in the 
hearts of the people. They took place in an atmosphere of unreality and with no sense 
of time and no fixed programme except the continuous physical performance of 
feasting and toast-drinking'. 129 He was particulary sarcastic in. his analysis of the 
failure to reach any agreement over Poland, concluding that `once again the 
unfortunate Poles were to learn that it was easier to die for Poland than to live in 
it 9.130 Whilst negotiations at Yalta were continuing the Weekly Report for the first 
week in February also noted the influence of 
`Free Germany' propaganda from the 
results of a small sample of opinion amongst 
German soldiers on the Western Front 
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at the beginning of January. "' It was noted that in Germany the general knowledge 
of Moscow's `Free Germany' Committee was widespread, along with the information 
that Paulus and Seydlitz had been identified as its leading members, but that on the 
Western Front there was `little knowledge or interest in its programme'. However, 
it appeared that the soldiers on the Eastern Front did know more about it, from 
Russian leaflets and other propaganda, and it was reported to be a common subject 
of conversation in the units and even with civilians. The intelligence officers assumed 
that approval of the Committee and its activities would only come from `convinced 
Communists (who clearly approve of the Committee because it is sponsored by the 
Russians) or else from elderly men who welcome anything which they think might 
mean a speedy end of the war'. 132 
The pre-occupation with Russian affairs in the JIC, Foreign Office and PWE that this 
was not merely propaganda continued. In February, 1945 it was discussed at a JIC 
meeting, and noted that Lockhart's Committee had put forward plans for using the 
German generals in captivity in Britain in an attempt to `break the will of Germans 
to resist'. "' The Director of Military Intelligence reported that the plans had been 
approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Rawlinson reported that the 
German SS Brigadier Meyer wanted to go back to Germany to use his influence to get 
a German surrender. The Committee agreed that the Director of Military 
Intelligence should select a German officer to `swop' for General Fortune (who was 
very ill) and to work with the PWE on `priming' the officer being returned. 
However, at a subsequent meeting of the JIC the proposals put forward by Lockhart 
were then rejected. The reason given was that from the proposals it `looked as though 
German generals would play a leading part during and after the surrender period'. 
The feeling in the Committee was that Ministers would not accept this, and added that 
any plans for negotiations with Germany must not contravene the policy of 
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`Unconditional Surrender'. " The reason why the JIC considered using the German 
generals to influence events in Germany was closely connected, certainly in February 
and March, 1945 to the growing mistrust within the JIC of Stalin and the `Free 
Germany' campaign. Whether the plan was to use the German generals to in a 
counter-attack on this propaganda is not clear, but the suspicions in Whitehall that it 
was in fact more than propaganda were well-founded. In fact documents in the 
Russian archives identify the department established in Moscow as Institut 99 - the 
Institut existed to recruit and train German Communists and prisoners-of-war who 
were then infiltrated back into Germany during the latter years of the war as part of 
the `Free Germany' campaign. "' 
In the middle of March the German Section received new `evidence' which had been 
produced in Germany to prove that Russia intended to Communize Germany. This 
was in the form of an alleged `training pamphlet' which had been produced in 1942 
by the Bolsheviks which argued that the Soviets were not responsible for Germany's 
defeat and that in certain circumstances it would fight Britain in order to protect a 
Soviet Germany-" The Kantian philosopher Baumgarten was also brought into the 
propaganda exercise, urging the Western world to awaken to their senses about the 
Bolshevik danger. England was warned that eventually they would see that Germany 
must be preserved and not destroyed in order to provide the necessary bulwark against 
Soviet aggression. "' 
Despite the rapidly deteriorating situation German propaganda continued to offer hope 
to the German people that Allied disunity would save them. Russian antagonism 
towards the Western Powers was featured regularly as were the thinly veiled appeals 
to the West to save Germany and themselves from the `graveyard silence of 
"' PRO/CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 17th Meeting (0) 6th March, 1945. 
"Dr. Sergei Kudryashov, Editor of Rodina. Paper given to the British 
International History Conference, Leeds. 1992. 
136 WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/187. For week 12.3.45 - 18.3.45. 
117 Ibid. 
234 
Bolshevism'. "' In desperation the Ministry of Propaganda publicised details of the 
Russian programme for the biological integration of German and Russian people. The 
alleged `plan' was that the Soviets would import German women for the purpose of 
producing children with Russian fathers, who would then be brought up by the state. 
According to Nazi propaganda the mixture of German intelligence and Russian 
fanaticism would make the Soviet Union the strongest power on earth. The only 
comment the intelligence officers had to make on this matter was that `the German 
leaders apparently presume that the Western Allies have the same racial views as 
themselves'. 139 
A new campaign by the Ministry of Propaganda was launched which claimed that the 
Russians were now encroaching on the American sphere of influence. According to 
the Wilhelmstrasse spokesman Stalin had insisted on concessions from his Anglo-US 
partners before the Kremlin would agree to denounce the neutrality pact with Japan. 
These concessions were that the Soviet Union had three special votes at the San 
Francisco Conference, America must recognise Russian hegemony in Central Europe 
and that they would also abandon all Japanese possessions on the mainland to the 
Soviet Union - Outer Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea. 10 Pondering on the desire 
in the German mind always to see the West as weak and the East as strong the 
officers in the German Section presumed this was probably because the Russians were 
`brutal'. 
In the final Weekly Report before the end of the war the intelligence officers detected 
attempts to sow discord between the Allies `even at the last moment', presumed to be 
made in the hope that they might obtain an `armistice on the Western Front which 
would permit all German forces to be withdrawn and thrown against the 
13$ Ibid. For week 19.3.45 - 25.3.45. 
M Ibid. For week 26.3.45 - 1.4.45. 
140 Ibid. For week 2.4.45 - 8.4.45. 
235 
Russians'. "` The PWE thought the Doenitz administration would attempt to save 
`as many Germans as possible from Bolshevisation and enslavement', 
`there can be no doubt that Doenitz and his associates are inspired by 
a very genuine fear of Russian "barbarism" immediately and of a 
growth of Communism subsequently ... But they may not really 
believe that they can expect immediately to win Western support for 
the expulsion of the Red Army from Eastern Germany... statements 
suggest a much more modest and immediate aim of gaining time by 
political and military rearguard actions to enable as many as possible 
of those Germans who fear `Russian barbarity' to escape into the zone 
of occupation of the Western Powers'. "Z 
The defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad had marked not only the 
beginning of the defeat of Germany, but also the beginning of the Russian advance 
into Europe. The political implications of the rapidly changing military situation were 
recognised by the German Section who became increasingly interested in Russian 
conduct as the Red Army moved across the continent into Central Europe. In the same 
way as the `image' of the German people was necessary for the foreign policy 
makers, so too was the `image' of the Russians. Stalingrad was the turning point in 
East/West relations. The strained collaboration between Russia- and Britain where 
each power understood the other as an unsavoury but vital partner entered a new 
phase. The aim of defeating Germany was the only one that had held the Alliance 
together, and after the Spring of 1943 that became a probability rather than a 
possibility. But the military success of the Red Army signalled the increased power 
and strength of Russia, which was seen in London as a potentially dangerous relative 
decrease in British strength and therefore a threat to the power and security of Britain. 
Throughout the war the intelligence officers working in the German Section observed 
-practical examples of that increased strength and power, witnessing the way in which 
the Red Army liberated and the re-occupied countries in Europe with Moscow-led 
governments. Events in Hungary, Poland and Greece were seen as practical examples 
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of what was increasingly being interpreted as a return by Russia to the ideological 
principles of world domination proclaimed in 1917. The undesirable conduct in 
negotiations over these countries, and Stalin's reluctance to adhere to the agreements 
made between the Alliance before 1943 added to this anxiety. The problems of the 
second front, publicised with great effect by the Ministry of Propaganda, fuelled the 
mistrust between East and West. When the intelligence officers began to receive 
information of the `Free Germany' Committee and propaganda campaign they 
immediately began to consider the possible effects of this on the German people - 
testifying to the concerns existing at the time of Stalin's motivations and intentions in 
Germany. The JIC reports confirm that by 1945 it was seriously considered, in some 
quarters at least, that Russia had returned to the `Bolshevik' ideology and the 
aggressive, expansionist style of foreign policy with a drive for global domination. 
The reality, as the PWE was now well aware, was that in 1944 eastern Europe was 
largely dominated by Russia. The accumulation of information collected in the 
Weekly Reports illustrated the fact that Russia's success had now destroyed the 
previous European balance of power and was in fact replacing it with a Russian 
dominated Europe. Incrementally, through 1943 and particulary 1944, the `image' 
of Russia in the Weekly Reports became the image of `bolshevism' as another 
potential `enemy' alongside Germany, with the methods and ideology of Stalin being 
equated with those of Hitler and the Nazi regime. 
The question of whether or not the intelligence reports of the PWE concerning Russia 
were influential or not is a difficult one. Recently released documents identify the 
connections between the PWE and the JIC, where the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
and Ministry of Information were always represented and where Lockhart also 
attended on specific issues. Thus it is possible to see where that the information 
. would 
have a forum for discussion. The relationship between Lockhart and Eden 
would also have allowed him to make some contribution to the discussion surrounding 
Russian policy and intentions, although it is evident from Lockhart's own writings that 
he had little, if any influence, in Downing Street. The intelligence contained in the 
reports provided the Foreign Office and JIC with the changing political and social 
conditions in Germany and also provided the information in the context of the 
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Russian advances in Europe. It can be seen, therefore, that the PWE was one of the 
departments providing intelligence about Russia during the period that the Foreign 
Office was drawing conclusions of a Russian `threat' to British interests. If the PWE 
were not themselves influential in forming or changing opinions about Russia, the 
information they provided which supported the fears and anxieties already existing in 
the departments in Whitehall was available and was discussed by those in the Foreign 
Office who were influential in formulating strategy and policy towards Russia. 
('on inui " 1943-1946. 
Although the German Section produced their last Weekly Report on 6th May, 1945 
this was not the end of their intelligence work, nor the end of the use of political 
warfare and propaganda as an instrument in British foreign policy. On 23rd 
February, 1945 Lockhart had written to Colonel Capel-Dunn at the War Office 
outlining the importance of the intelligence work of the PWE. "' He pointed out that 
as occupied countries in Europe became liberated and established their own civil 
governments, responsibility for propaganda and informational services to those 
countries passed from the PWE to the Ministry of Information. From the nature of 
its responsibilities the Ministry of Information would not need to establish the type of 
intelligence activities which the PWE had maintained. Lockhart informed Capel-Dunn 
that the plan was to `liquidate' all sectors and regions of intelligence within the PWE 
other than their work on Germany (including Austria) and the Germans. The 
consequences of this, he believed, should be considered by the JIC and its constituent 
members. Lockhart outlined the `indispensable' intelligence services involved in the 
. production 
of the Handbooks and Personality Files and urged that the work of this 
`temporary' department be continued in a post-war government. 
This was discussed at the JIC meeting on 27th February when Brigadier Peake (War 
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Office) responded to Lockhart's letter and told the meeting that he believed it would 
be `a serious loss if the intelligence functions now performed by the PWE were 
allowed to lapse'. "` This of course, was just around the time that Lockhart and the 
pWE were closely involved with the issue of the German generals and the problems 
of the `Free Germany' campaign. The JIC recognised the value of the analysis of 
German propaganda when considering other specific issues. It is not surprising then 
that it was agreed by the Committee that it was necessary to preserve the Handbooks 
and Personality Cards and that Lockhart should be asked to provide a detailed report 
for consideration by the 7IC. 
Following this, on April 5th a memorandum from PWI entitled `Regional Intelligence 
Systems: J. I. C. ' which outlined the intelligence work of the PWE, stressed that the 
work should be taken over as a single body `since the importance of political/social 
trends ... are hardly 
likely to diminish as a factor affecting the policies of European 
Governments... and as far as the department was aware, its study is still not pursued 
elsewhere'. "s The final point in the memo was to emphasise that the main objective 
was to get the units taken over as a whole - `be it by F. O. R. D. or by I. S. T. D (as 
trustee for a future Central Intelligence Organisation, responsible perhaps directly to 
some new Ministers). (As a bad second it might be best to get the J. I. C. briefly to 
defer its decision until a speedy examination by independent experts has established 
to their own satisfaction how great a mistake division would be)"'. 
A memorandum from PWI dated 17th April, 1945 suggests that a decision had been 
made. Entitled `Reallocation of the Functions and Personnel of the PWI Directorate' 
this paper set out that on the date of change over, (C) Day, Lt. Col. Hope would 
become Director of Regional Intelligence. All Regional Staffs, apart from German 
and Austria would be responsible to Hope and he was in charge of transferring them 
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to the successor bodies nominated by the JIC. (emphasis added) Walmsley was to be 
responsible for the policy and preparation of the German and Austria Handbooks and 
Handbook material, whilst Hope was responsible for all other Handbooks. Under the 
beading `Analysis of Russian Propaganda, etc. ' it was ordered that: `At `C' Day 
Walmsley should make such arrangements within his own section as he thinks 
necessary in the interests of the German/Austria section for continuing studies of 
Russian propaganda, reporting on other countries' propaganda to Germany, on 
German minorities, etc. In a final `Note' it was emphasised that as a general 
principle the work carried on within the German Division(presumably the new name 
for the German Section) is the same or substantially similar to that which before `C' 
Day was being carried on in the PWI Directorate, and that it should be continued by 
the same members of Staff and that teams should be kept together. 
A further meeting of the JIC took place on 17th April, 1945 when the future of the 
Basic Handbooks was discussed and it was decided that the ones for Germany and 
Austria should be updated and continued in the post-war government. 14" An ad hoc 
Committee of the JIC also met ten days later to discuss the reports of the PWE which 
had been submitted on the 4th April by the JIC detailing -the organisation of the 
Intelligence branch and the expenditure for the Regional Staffs, the minutes of a 
special meeting for the users of the Basic Handbooks which had been held on 19th 
April. At this meeting Sachs, Adams, Hope and Derry and other members of the 
staff met with the Committee and the minutes illustrate that the history of the 
establishment of the PWE was discussed, and the conclusion was that `it was generally 
felt that the Foreign Office would be the most suitable Department to take over the 
three functions of the General Intelligence, Handbooks and Personalities'. " The 
Committee also agreed at this meeting that `The newly established technique and 
. experience 
of the PWE Regional Sections had a value, in the field of foreign political 
and social intelligence, which alone 
justified the retention in being of a part at least 
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of the present Regional Section Staffs'. The Handbooks, Personality Files and 
Regional Staffs, reduced to the minimum necessary for the above, should not be split 
up but should be taken over by one department, which it was recommended should 
be the Foreign Office, at least pending a final decision as the future organisation of 
intelligence. 
In essence the plans made for the future of the PWE represented the continuation of 
the Executive, but under the guise of the Foreign Office Research Department. It 
would be staffed by the experts from the PWE, and the peacetime version of the PWE 
with Hope in charge who would work with Walmsley and Derry. The plan was to 
keep together the organisation which represented the `new type' of intelligence, but 
for operational purposes separate the ongoing and important work of the German 
Section (which was also to continue with their analysis of Russian propaganda etc. ) 
from the other regions, putting all regions other than Germany/Austria under the 
charge of Hope and leaving the former under the experienced hand of Walmsley and 
his team of intelligence officers. "' 
It is possible to date the timing of the transferral and location of the intelligence units 
of the PWE. On 20th January, 1946 Walsmley produced a document describing his 
experience in Section `D' (SIS) in 1938, Electra House and finally the PWE. He 
wrote this just "a few hours before my intelligence unit pupates - to reawaken in a 
new guise under the Research Department of the Foreign Office". ISO Thus the PWE 
intelligence work of the Germany and Austria Section was continued, retained with 
the same people, expertise and the facility for the continued study of Russian 
propaganda. 
Two months later, on 2nd April, 1946, the Under-Secretaries of State formed the 
Russia Committee within the Foreign Office headed by Kirkpatrick, Warner and 
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Mayhew. The committee held weekly meetings to assess Soviet action and define 
policy, particularly concerned with the Soviet propaganda campaign against Britain 
and the way in which Britain should answer . 
After the Soviet withdrawal from the Marshall Plan talks in July 1947 a 
defensive/offensive policy towards Russia was considered, linking it with the use of 
subversion against the Communist bloc. "' On 17th October, 1947 Mayhew put it 
to Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, suggesting that a special department should be 
established for this function. Bevin was convinced and Attlee, the Prime Minister 
agreed. Kirkpatrick was given the task of making the necessary appointments, no 
doubt because of his close connections with such operations throughout his career and 
most recently with the PWE. Scott-Lucas and Morris trace the development of the 
IRD and also identify the continuation of personnel from the PWE to IRD - one being 
Ralph Murray, ex PWE, who was moved into the IRD. 12 On 3rd January, 1948 
the Cabinet approved the proposals for the organisation, to be known as the 
Information Research Department (IRD) and it was funded on the `secret vote', as 
`EH' and the PWE had been, alongside M15 and MI6. 
Thus the continuity of thinking, ideas, expertise, experience and organisation for 
political warfare in the defence of British `national security' in the coming Cold War 
were assured months before the end of the Second World War. In British 
Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, Richard Aldrich confirms this continuity, 
stating that `Confronted with the unfamiliar problems of an East-West conflict 
conducted `by all means short of war', Whitehall gradually returned to the doctrines 
of the wartime subversion operations, the SOE and the PWE, for response'. "' That 
`gradual return' to subversive operations was facilitated by the continuation of the 
pWE, and as the Weekly Reports indicate from at least the middle of 1943 the 
"'Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, British Intelligence. p. 90. 
OIFO 371/77623 N3583 Minutes of the Russia Committee Meeting 12th April, 
1949. Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, British Intelligence. p. 96. 
153 Aldrich, Introduction. Ibid. P. 15. 
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`concern' with Russian intentions began and quite quickly changed into an `anxiety' 
to anticipate the impact of Stalin in Central Europe. Existing beliefs, events of the 
previous years, including the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the invasion of Finland 
without a declaration of war, the disputes over Poland, Rumania and Greece all 
worked together to increase that anxiety. Added ' to this, the `image' of the 
`Bolsheviks' was ever-present in the intelligence reports, supported by the information 
provided by the Ministry of Propaganda of the `atrocities' being committed by the 
Red Army which re-enforced the stereotypical views held in Britain about Russia and 
the `Bolshevik threat' which had been an intrinsic part of British thinking since 1917. 
In addition, the presumed success of Nazi propaganda underpinned the existing 
`belief' in Whitehall in the usefulness of political warfare as an instrument of foreign 
policy. After all, it was adopted as a major factor in foreign policy in bringing 
democratisation to Germany after 1945, it was logical therefore to assume that it could 
also be used in the psychological conflict against Russia . These factors all work 
together to explain why Britain was the first to recognise the `Bolshevik threat' and 
also the first to act on that recognition. Whitehall had - at its disposal the 
organisational structure, the people and the expertise to provide the instrument of 
political warfare and propaganda in the defence of British interests as soon as events 
provided the rationale for using it. 
The Minutes of the Russia Committee Meeting for the Ist March, 1949 illustrate the 
way in which the use of political warfare assumed a growing importance in the early 
Cold War years when it was the only instrument of foreign policy available to 
Whitehall. " It also illustrates the polarisation of opinions still existing in Whitehall 
about the use of propaganda. In a discussion about the possibility of `doing 
something' to disrupt the military build-up of the USSR, Sir J. Edelson suggested that 
, it was quite possible that the Russian development of the atomic bomb could be 
seriously retarded if we could persuade Russian scientists to defect and sabotage the 
13 `Minutes of Russia Committee', Ist March 1949. PRO/FO371/77623. 
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work being done'. Frank Roberts disagreed, pointing out the great difficulties of 
such a scheme and pointed out to Edelson that the top scientists in Russia were a 
`pampered and privileged class' and usually patriots, therefore not likely to be 
influenced by words. After some discussion the meeting concluded that `a general 
scheme to encourage defection seemed, at any rate, worthy of examination'. '" 
propaganda and political warfare was, once more, seen as an instrument of foreign 





This thesis began by arguing that the existing history of the PWE is incomplete and 
in need of revision. The central problem outlined in the Introduction, is that the 
narrow focus on the propaganda operations of the Executive and the tasks it was given 
in September 1941, has effectively marginalised the equally important intelligence 
work of the department. The omission of this `missing dimension' has resulted in a 
history and conclusions about the PWE which has failed to take into account the 
importance of the intelligence operations, and by doing so produced an unbalanced 
account. The inclusion of this element into a re-evaluation of the Executive is 
important for three reasons: the first is that a study of the intelligence function of the 
Executive has identified the emergence of a new `type' of intelligence produced in 
Whitehall during the Second World War; the second is that examination of this 
intelligence provides a contribution to German social and political history from a 
British perspective: the third is that the focus on the intelligence side of the PWE's 
operations has illuminated the diversification of the activities of the department after 
the winter of 1942. Taken together these three elements constitute the re-evaluation 
of the history of the PWE, and the conclusions will be presented following the line 
of argument outlined above. 
Before making these conclusions it is necessary to offer some comments and 
conclusions about the role of government in propaganda and political warfare 
organisations, and the close relationship between propaganda and intelligence. This 
will illustrate the way in which the PWE emerged and also the reasons for the 
evolution of this new `type' of intelligence. Finally, although it has been argued by 
those working in intelligence studies that it is a popular misconception that it is always 
necessary to provide evidence of a direct link between intelligence and policy, the 
case-studies presented in this thesis were chosen and have been considered in relation 
to specific areas of British foreign policy. As a result some conclusions can be 
reached, contributing to the work of those specifically engaged in the field of British 
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foreign policy analysis. 
The review of the emergence and evolution of propaganda and intelligence services 
from the beginning of the century to 1941 identified the particular and mutually 
beneficial relationship between these two activities. It is clear that overt government 
involvement in propaganda and intelligence was, and still is, regarded with suspicion. 
The rhetoric and reality of the Waldegrave initiative and the recent problems and 
controversy surrounding the Scott inquiry have only served to highlight this problem, 
influencing public perceptions and creating further mistrust of the 'secrecy' 
surrounding the activities of the British government in 1995. Nevertheless, during the 
inter-war period, events at home and abroad forced a reluctant acceptance of the 
potential power of propaganda as an important instrument of government policy. At 
the same time Whitehall was becoming increasingly aware of the need for accurate 
information of the `enemy', for economic and military reasons as well as for the 
preparation of effective propaganda campaigns. The tensions and contradictions 
between the acknowledgement of the power of propaganda and information control 
and the reluctance to be seen to be involved in such activities was instrumental in the 
ad-hoc way in which organisations emerged in the inter-war period. 
The Ministry of Information which was set up in 1936 is an example of this. For the 
first three years of its life little progress was made and, despite several attempts by 
Tallents, no clear Ministerial directive or policy was forthcoming. It seems that no 
one really wished to be too closely involved with the Ministry and few took the work 
it was set up to do very seriously. The rash of Director Generals and Ministers who 
were appointed to head the organisation, and who either left after a few weeks or 
months, illustrates the problem at government level of finding someone who would 
be willing and able to organise and run the Ministry effectively. It also helps to 
explain why, at the outbreak of World War Two, the system for information control 
set up by the CID within the Ministry of 
Information immediately broke down. The 
continuing problems within the Ministry, exacerbated 
by the inter-Ministerial 
wrangling between Cooper and Dalton, can also 
be seen to be a contributory factor 
for the slow and disjointed way in which the organisation for enemy propaganda 
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emerged. It must be concluded that the lack of serious attention and interest in 
government concerning the control of communications and media during this time 
resulted in confusion and a lack of direction, a trend which was only reversed when 
Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. 
Although the PWE was established in 1941, this thesis is concerned with the period 
from January 1943 to January 1946. This period has been identified as important for 
a number of reasons. The first sixteen months of the Executive were dominated by 
the battle between Cooper and Dalton, then between Bracken and Dalton and finally 
by the constant re-organisation and re-location of different sections of the department. 
The decisions to move personnel from Woburn to London, from the BBC to the 
pWE, and from the Foreign Office (PID) to the PWE no doubt added further 
problems to an already difficult situation. It has been argued that these two factors 
were influential in the failure of the Executive, but this assertion does not take into 
account the changes brought about by the Ministers and government officials which 
in effect resolved these initial organisational problems. 
By the end of 1942 the internal conflict over control of the PWE. was solved by Eden 
and Bracken, essentially by the `promotion' of Dalton to the Board-of-Trade and the 
appointment of Lockhart as Director-General. Additionally, the composition of the 
Executive Committee working for Lockhart which included Leeper, Kirkpatrick and 
Dallas Brooks ensured that the PWE for all intents and purposes was a 'Foreign 
Office' organisation. During the winter of 1942-43 the appointment of Brigadier 
Sachs as Director of Intelligence resulted in the intelligence operations of the PWE 
being expanded and re-organised in order to satisfy the demands of the increasing 
number of tasks it was given by the JIC and the Foreign Office. It was during this 
. period 
that Walmsley's embryonic research into quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of social and political conditions in Germany progressed and was recognised as an 
important addition to existing intelligence operations in Whitehall. This expansion of 
the intelligence operations of the Executive occurred in conjunction with the re- 
alignment of the aims of the Executive to 
include planning for the post-war world, a 
re-alignment that eventually 
included the monitoring of Russian propaganda and the 
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continuation of government involvement in propaganda and political warfare activities 
in the early Cold. War period. 
What then are the conclusions of the three areas of research pursued in this thesis into 
German resistance, occupational rule and the Cold War? Regarding the German 
resistance to the Nazi regime, the PWE concluded in 1944 that there were no 
indications of the presence of a potential resistance `movement' in Germany which 
would be able to challenge or overthrow the regime. This conclusion was arrived at 
by the application of a strict criteria of assessment which would only identify and 
acknowledge `fundamental' resistance as politically significant. That is the form of 
resistance which would be led by the elites in Nazi Germany, probably the 
Wehrmacht, and supported by the majority of the German people. By adopting this 
`operational' definition of resistance the analysis of the German Section disregarded 
all other forms of opposition to the Nazi regime, and resulted in the general 
conclusion was that there was `no resistance' in Germany. The wider implication of 
this conclusion was that `the other Germany' had disappeared and that all Germans 
were, in some way, supporting the regime. But, as illustrated in Chapter Four, 
there is a problem with this supposition. The reality was that the reaction and response 
of the German people to the Nazi regime was far more complex. The information 
in the Weekly Reports included sufficient evidence of dissent, protest, non-conformity 
and individual cases of resistance in Germany to suggest that the criteria adopted was 
too narrow and was in fact producing a misleading picture. 
If we remove the constraints of the criterion used in 1944 and consider the social and 
political conditions in Germany in the context of the `varieties of resistance' 
recognised by historians as valid today, then the conclusion of `no resistance' is 
inaccurate. It is clear that all Germans did not support the regime and many often 
challenged it. The PWE and the Foreign Office accepted at the time that all 
Germans were not Nazis, that `the other Germany' still existed, and suggested that 
this should be publicly recognised. They argued that although `the other Germany' 
did not have the power to otherthrow the regime, nevertheless a declaration should 
be made to offer `hope' to these people. Churchill's rejection of this proposal was 
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pre-determined by the political and strategic policy of the Alliance, and in this 
particular area of policy intelligence clashed with policy and was ultimately 
disregarded. 
The work of the PWE in the planning and implementation of occupational rule began 
in late 1942 when the government turned its attention to the problems it would face 
in a post-war world. Immediate post-war propaganda policy to Germany was 
formulated in terms of education, and the information in the Weekly Reports provided 
important indications about public opinion in Germany towards the Nazi regime. This 
was identified as one of the potential obstacles to the long-term plan of establishing 
democracy in Germany. The immediate aim was to provide the public with direct 
information about Germany's crimes and to ensure that the re-education process began 
with their acceptance of the part they had played in those crimes. It was believed 
that the German people should be made aware of the completeness of Germany's 
defeat, their `culpable responsibility' for Nazi crimes, and the power and 
determination of the Allies to enforce their will. 
The PWE was also involved in producing practical plans for the re-education of the 
German people by the censorship of books, films, radio and the media. These plans 
which were characterised by disagreement over policy and strategy, were 
extraordinarily ambitious and ultimately proved impossible to implement. In addition 
to this, information and conclusions regarding German resistance was now used to 
provide a categorisation of `political reliability' of the German people. This took the 
form of basic `black', `grey' and `white' lists of those who could or could not be used 
in the initial occupational phase to help the British administrators with the task 
running the country. The information collected in the Personality Index files were 
used to identify Nazis and, as we have seen, the PWE provided information to the 
United Nations War Crimes Committee. One of the most important tasks for the 
British administration was to re-start economic life in Germany, and this could not be 
done without the help of those already actively involved, especially the German 
industrialists. The Weekly Reports contained details of the economic conditions in 
Germany and, through interviews with businessmen, provided information about the 
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attitudes that this sector of society were likely assume towards the occupying powers. 
The PWE supplied information about the possibility of a resurgent nationalist 
movement, particularly the immediate threat to the occupying troops of the 
underground resistance of the 'Werewolf' rganisation. One of the most important 
pieces of work the PWE was engaged in was the production of the Basic Handbook 
for Germany, which was seen as the `bible' for the Commander-in-Chief and those 
involved in the immediate post-war phase of the occupation of Germany. It can be 
concluded that the PWE's involvement in relation to occupational rule was a drastic 
departure from the initial task in 1941 of using propaganda to undermine the morale 
of the `enemy'. After 1943 they were engaged in a variety of ways, ranging from the 
provision of policy suggestions and plans to their practical involvement in the 
application of occupational rule after the defeat of Germany. 
Regarding the role of the PWE in the early Cold War period, it is clear from the 
intelligence reports and Lockhart's own writings that the potential problems between 
Russia and Britain were recognised within months of the defeat of the Germany Army 
at Stalingrad. The increasing pre-occupation in the German Section with the advance 
of the Red Army into Europe and the way in which Moscow occupied the `liberated' 
territories illustrates a growing concern in the PWE about Stalin's motivations and 
intentions. This concern turned to anxiety as reports of alleged `Bolshevik atrocities' 
were received in the PWE, reviving memories of the methods employed by Stalin to 
control the Russian people in the purges of 1936-1939. Incrementally, an `image' of 
the Bolshevik Russia of 1917 began to emerge as events in Hungary, Roumania, 
Poland and finally Greece appeared to confirm this. Goebbels use of propaganda, 
particularly his use of reports in Pravda which asserted Russian territorial ambitions, 
reinforced the feeling of apprehension in the PWE. Gradually events in Europe 
combined with the anxiety of the intelligence officers, and together resulted in a 
climate of opinion in the PWE that Russia was pursuing a dual foreign policy. It 
appeared that whilst working within the Alliance toward the principle aim of defeating 
Germany, Russia was at the same time returning to the ideology of communism with 
a foreign policy aim of world revolution and 
domination. 
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A turning point for the PWE came with the setting up of Moscow's `Free Germany' 
Committee and propaganda campaign. Breaking a critical agreement between the 
partners in the Alliance, Russia appealed to the German people and appeared to be 
offering more favourable treatment for Germany at the end of the war than the West 
were willing to offer. The mistrust of Russia engendered by the actitivites of the 
`Free Russia' Committee was heightened with reports that Moscow had been involved 
in the July '44 plot. By the Autumn of 1944 the anxiety and concern in the German 
Section concerning the possibility of continued co-operation with Russia mirrored the 
grave misgivings voiced on numerous occasions by Lockhart regarding Stalin's future 
plans in Europe. In conclusion, the perception of the `Bolshevik threat' to British 
interests which the PWE documented in their Weekly Reports confirmed the anxieties 
which were emerging at the same time in the Foreign Office. The timing of the 
beginning of these anxieties confirms that the PWE were one of the first departments 
in Whitehall to perceive this threat, which contributed to the rapidly changing climate 
of opinion towards Russia and the beginning of the early Cold War period. 
The final question raised in this thesis is the importance of the work of the intelligence 
of the PWE in relation to foreign policy. The conclusions here are problematic 
because, despite extensive scholarship and research, the relationship between 
intelligence and the crafting of policy remains unresolved. The case studies presented 
in this thesis concerning the intelligence output of the German Section represent only 
one element in the complex process of decision-making. Any firm conclusions about 
the influence this might have had on British foreign-policy could only be made by 
incorporating these into a methodological framework for the evaluation of specific 
foreign-policy decisions. This is not the remit of this thesis, and is the domain of 
those academics who specialise in foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, some general 
conclusions can be made from the perspective of the PWE and German Section. 
Regarding the German resistance to the Nazi regime, the conclusion of `no resistance' 
in Germany supported the policy of Unconditional Surrender. Despite evidence of 
the continued existence of `the other Germany' this `establishment' view supported 
the imputations made in the early post-war years that all Germans had, in one way or 
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another, supported the Nazi regime. In relation to occupational rule, it can be 
concluded that in some areas the PWE used the intelligence produced by the German 
Section in a positive way. For example, forewarning the occupying troops of potential 
dangers, using propaganda to inform and include the German people in the occupation 
of their own country, and the de-nazification process. But in other areas, most 
notably the Basic Handbook for Germany, it is clear that the intelligence work of the 
German Section was disregarded. The Handbook provided a politically biased and 
racist interpretation of the history of Germany so far removed from reality that it has 
to be concluded that no accurate or up-to-date information about the German people, 
their past nor their relationship with the Nazi regime could have been used by the 
people responsible for preparing it. With this Handbook the PWE supported the anti- 
German `vansittart' views and beliefs in Whitehall about the German people, and 
supported existing policy rather than informing those making policy. The only area 
in which the German Section and the PWE appeared to concur with the emerging 
climate of opinion in Whitehall was in relation to the perception of the `Bolshevik 
meat'. Whilst it is impossible here to come to any conclusions in relation to 
changing British policy towards Russia during this time, it can be concluded that the 
pWE did have an input into the JIC and Foreign Office in this area. The monitoring 
and analysis of Russian propaganda in the very early stages of the Cold War, and the 
continuation of this work suggests that some value was placed on this intelligence 
contribution. The emergence of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the IRD in 1947 
were both engineered, in part, by Kirkpatrick. His work in the PWE singled him out 
as the best person to organise and recruit the expertise necessary for the rRD, the 
`peace-time' version of the PWE, and he used his past experience to suggest strategy 
and policy directives for effective `psychological warfare' against Russia. 
. 
The research concluded above has identified and illustrated the chronological and 
issue-led expansion of the role and function of the PWE during the latter half of the 
Second World War. This thesis has confirmed that if the intelligence work and 
subsequent diversification of the operations of the 
PWE are taken into account, then 
a different history of the PWE emerges. 
That is a history of an organisation which 
began its life as a propaganda department but which increasingly became involved in 
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unforseen and unexpected activities which in turn required further expansion of the 
Executive. As a result of this the PWE became more and not 1= important after the 
announcement of Unconditional Surrender as a result of the incremental re-alignment 
of activities it became involved in. The decision of the JIC and Foreign Office to 
transfer personnel and. to continue the operations of particular sections of the 
Executive after May 1945 supports this conclusion. However, it would be unwise to 
make the apparently logical conclusion that the PWE must then have been successful. 
Whilst it has been concluded that the German Section were successful in fulfilling 
their role as an intelligence agency working within and for the PWE, it has to be 
concluded from this research that the PWE had no influence in Whitehall with those 
responsible for the formulation of foreign policy. When the intelligence of the 
German Section clashed with existing policy it was disregarded, and in the final 
analysis the PWE supported existing views in government and served only to 
implement policy decisions made in Whitehall. 
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BALFOUR, Michael, [1908-1995]. Formerly Professor of European History at the 
University of East Anglia. Temporary Principal in General Division of Ministry of 
Information March 1939 - March 1942. Assistant Director of Intelligence in the PWE 
from April 1942, moving from there to the Psychological Warfare Division of 
SHAEF in 1944. At the end of the Second World War he became Director of Public 
Relations and Information Services, Control Commission, British Zone of Germany 
where he stayed until 1947. Awarded CBE in 1963. 
BRACKEN, Brendan Rendale, Viscount Bracken, [1901-1958]. Adopted as 
Conservative candidate for North Paddington in 1929. Staunch imperialist and 
supporter of Churchill, opposing the appeasement policy of Baldwin and Chamberlain. 
parliamentary private secretary (P. P. S. ) to Churchill at the Admiralty at the outbreak 
of World War Two, and in May 1940 went to Downing Street with Churchill as his 
P. P. S. He was appointed Minister of Information in May 1941 and became one of 
the three Ministers responsible for the PWE. At the end of the war he was made 
First Lord of the Admiralty. 
BROOKS, Brigadier R. A. D, [1896-1966]. A Marine officer, worked for `EH' 
and then on executive of PWE with responsibility for liaison with the JIC, M15 and 
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from 1939. until moved over to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign 
Office in 1941. 
COOPER, Alfred Duff, first Viscount Norwich, [1890-19541. Foreign Office, 
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He saw active service in the `Battle of the Mist' in 1918, and was awarded the D. S. O. 
in recognition of his gallantry and service during the First World War. On 
demobilisation he re-joined the Foreign Office. In February 1922, he was appointed 
private secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary but resigned from the Foreign 
Office in 1924 and in the same year was elected Conservative member of Parliament 
for Oldham. In January 1928, he was appointed Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, but lost his seat in the General Election the following year. In 1931, as a 
protest against Baldwin's leadership, Cooper volunteered to stand as the official 
Conservative candidate for the St. George's Division of Westminster, won the seat and 
kept it until 1945. In September 1931, he returned to the War Office as financial 
secretary, in June 1934, he was promoted to the Financial Secretary of the Treasury, 
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and in November 1935, he became Secretary of State for War and a privy counsellor. 
In May 1937, he became First Lord of the Admiralty until he resigned his post over 
after the Munich agreement. When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, 
Cooper was made Minister of Information, a post he held for only one year, leaving 
to become Duchy of Lancaster in July 1941. He spent some time in the Far East on 
behalf of the War Cabinet, and after Pearl Harbour was made resident cabinet 
minister at Singapore. In September 1944, he moved to Paris as British Ambassador 
where he stayed for the following three years. He was appointed G. C. M. G in 1948 
and raised to the peerage as Viscount Norwich, of Aldwick, in 1952. 
CROSSMAN, Richard Howard Stafford, [1907-1974]. Educated Winchester and 
New College, Oxford. Leader of the Labour group on the Oxford City Council from 
1936 to 1940 when he was drafted into the Ministry of Economic Warfare by Hugh 
Dalton to organise the British propaganda effort against Germany. Worked for `EH' 
and then PWE until 1944 when he became Assistant Chief of the Psychological 
Warfare Division, SHAEF until the end of the war. In 1946 he was nominated by 
Ernest Bevin to serve as a member of the joint Anglo-American Palestine commission. 
Elected Labour MP for Coventry East in 1945 which he retained until his death in 
1974. 
DALTON, (Edward) Hugh (John Neale), Baron Dalton, [1887-1962]. Dalton 
joined the Middle Temple and was called to the bar in 1914. At the outbreak of war 
he joined the Inns of Court OTC and served in France in 1916 and 1917 until he was 
transferred to Italy where he served until the end of the war. In early 1919 he was 
demobilised and returned to the London School of Economics as a lecturer. Dalton 
entered politics in 1922, and in 1924 won his seat as Labour candidate at Peckham, 
before moving on to win the seat at Bishop Auckland in 1929. In Ramsay 
MacDonald's Labour government he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
under Arthur Henderson, but he did not serve under MacDonald's `national' 
Government of 1931. In the general election of 1935 he regained Bishop Auckland 
and was chairman of the Labour Party in 1936-37, in 1940 he was appointed Minister 
of Economic Warfare and given the additional task of setting up the Special 
Operations Executive in the same year. In February 1942, he was `promoted' to the 
Board of Trade, and after the General Election of 1945 when he retained his seat at 
Bishop Auckland he was given the Treasury. 
DELMER, (Denis) Sefton, [1904-1979]. In 1927 began work for Lord 
Beaverbrook on the Daily Express and the following year moved to Berlin as head of 
the newspaper's new bureau. In 1933 he was sent to Paris as correspondent and in 
1936 was despatched to Spain to report on the civil war. By 1940 Delmer was 
already engaged by the BBC working on broadcasts for the German Service and it was 
from here that he was recruited to the Special Operations Executive to organise `Black 
propaganda' broadcasts to Germany. At the end of the war Delmer spent a short time 
working for the Control Commission in Germany before rejoining the Daily Express 
as chief foreign affairs reporter. Appointed OBE 
in 1946. 
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EDEN, (Robert) Anthony, first Earl of Avon, [1897-1977]. In September 1915, 
Eden joined the King's Royal Rifle Corps, in 1917 he was awarded the MC for 
rescuing his sergeant under fire and also became adjutant of his battalion. In 1918, 
at the age of twenty, he was made brigade-major, the youngest in the British Army. 
In 1922 he stood as Conservative candidate for Spennymoor, County Durham in the 
General Election and lost, but the following year was adopted for the safe seat of 
Warwick and Leamington. In October 1924, he became Parliamentary private 
secretary to Godfrey Lampson in the Home Office until he was appointed 
parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Marquess of Reading in 1931. In 1934 he 
represented the Foreign Office on a visit to Paris, Berlin and Rome, in early 1935 
he visited Moscow. In June 1935, Eden entered MacDonald's Cabinet as minister 
without portfolio, responsible for League of Nations affairs, and later that year 
became the youngest Foreign Secretary since Lord Granville. When the Second 
World War broke out Chamberlain dashed Eden's hopes of a place in the Cabinet, 
instead appointing Churchill to the War Cabinet. However, after Chamberlain's 
resignation and after Halifax's departure to Washington, Eden was eventually 
appointed Foreign Secretary and entered the War Cabinet. He retained this position 
until the end of the war, and accompanied Churchill on all the major Conferences 
except for Casablanca. He was also one of the three Ministers responsible for the 
pwE, taking policy decisions, whilst Bracken took care of the administration. At the 
end of the war Eden was exhausted, but did go on to become Prime Minister in April 
1955. 
GISHFORD, Anthony Joseph, [1908-1975]. Educated Westminster School, St. 
Gallen, Switzerland and Wadham College, Oxford. On the outbreak of the Second 
World War Gishford was enlisted into the Intelligence Corps. He had worked for 
Russell at Illustrated Newspapers Ltd. and at the beginning of the war he became 
Stuart's personal assistant at `EH', also enlisting the help of Russell in finding suitable 
accommodation for the organisation. 
GREENE, Sir Hugh (Carleton), [1910-1987]. Daily Telegraph Berlin staff in 
1934, becoming Chief correspondent in 1938 before being expelled from Germany in 
1939. Joined the BBC as Head of German Service in 1940 until the end of the war 
when he was appointed Controller of Broadcasting in the British Zone in Germany 
where he stayed until 1948. Appointed OBE in 1950. 
HOPE, Henry John, Lord Rankeillour, [1899-1967]. Educated Oratory School, 
Christ Church, Oxford. Hon. Attache HM Legation Berne in 1917. Served 
throughout the Second World War and became Administrative Secretary to 
Preparatory Commission of United Nations Organisation in 1945. 
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KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone Augustine, [1897-1964]. In November 1914, at 
seventeen years, old Kirkpatrick was commissioned into the Royal Inniskillin 
Fusiliers, and in 1915 he was severely wounded in action against the Turks. He spent 
the rest of the war in propaganda and intelligence work, the last year being spent in 
neutral Holland in charge of a network of British agents operating in German-occupied 
territory. From 1920-1930 he worked for the Western Department of the Foreign 
Office and made himself a reputation as a reliable and eager worker. From there he 
went to Rome for three years, and in August 1933 left for Berlin as First Secretary 
to Berlin where he stayed for over five years. In 1938 he returned to London and 
became involved again in propaganda and intelligence work, working as the Director 
of the Foreign Division of the Minister of Information 1940-1941 and as Government 
Adviser to the BBC on External Affairs. From 1941-1944 he was the BBC European 
Controller and also acted as a Regional Director of the PWE, responsible for liaison 
between the PWE and BBC. From 1944 he was in charge of organizing the Control 
Commission for Germany and spent a few months as British political adviser to 
Eisenhower at the Supreme Allied Headquarters. He returned to London and worked 
for the following two years as Under-Secretary in charge of Foreign Office 
information work, from 1947-1949 as deputy under-secretary for Western Europe, 
followed by a year as Permanent under-secretary of the German Section of the 
Foreign Office. During these three years Kirkpatrick was instrumental in the 
discussions and setting up of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the Information 
Research Department in 1947. In 1953 he succeeded Sir William Strang as 
Permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office. 
LEEPER, Reginald (Rex), [1888-1968]. Began his diplomatic career in the 
Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office in 1917 where he stayed 
until 1919. In 1939 he became head of PID and in 1940-1 was a Director of SO1, 
the forerunner of the PWE. In 1941 he was appointed to the Executive Committee 
of the PWE and was appointed Regional Director, responsible for the `Country 
Headquarters' at Woburn. He stayed with the PWE until 1943, when he was 
appointed Ambassador to Greece where he remained until 1946. 
LOCKHART, Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce, [1887-1970]. Lockhart entered the 
consular service in 1912, when he was sent to Moscow as vice-consul. In 1917, just 
six weeks before the Bolshevik Revolution he was recalled to London. Early in 1918, 
when the British government wished to establish unofficial relations with the Soviets 
he was returned to Russia, where he was arrested and held in the Kremlin for a 
month. In 1938 Lockhart worked at `EH', and in 1939 he rejoined the Foreign Office 
and in 1940 was appointed British representative with the provisional Czechoslovak 
Government in exile. In July 1941 he became deputy under-secretary in the Foreign 
Office and in August 1941 was appointed an executive member of the PWE under the 
triumvirate of Ministers Eden, Bracken and Dalton. In 1943 he was made Director- 
General of the PWE and awarded the KCMG. 
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MALCOLM, Sir Michael Albert James, [1898-1976]. Educated at Eton and 
became a Major in the Scots Guards. Severley wounded in the First World War 
Malcolm worked for the Attorney General's Department in the War Office between 
1940 and 1944 before moving to the Foreign Office to work for the Political 
Intelligence Department. 
MACMILLAN, Hugh Pattison, Baron Macmillan, [1873-1952]. Educated at the 
Collegiate School, Greenock and Edinburgh University, gaining LL. B at Glasgow 
University in 1896. Brief spell as Minister of Information 1939-1940 before returning 
to House of Lords in 1941. 
MURRAY, Ralph. Worked for the BBC with Crossman on broadcasting to 
Germany, particularly the Freedom Station `Dawn Edge'. He also worked alongside 
Harold Robin setting up `Aspidistra' station located in Ashdown Forest, near 
Crowborough in 1942 and was in charge of the PWE's recording studios at 
Wavendon. At the end of the war Murray worked for the Control Commission for 
Germany and for a short time was Head of the Far Eastern Information Department 
of the Foreign Office before being recruited into the Information Research Department 
O'NEILL, Hon. Sir Con (Douglas Walter), [1912-19881. Educated Eton College; 
Balliol, Oxford. Called to the Bar, Inner Temple in 1936 and also entered the 
Diplomatic Service during that year. Third Secretary, berlin in 1938 but resigned 
from the Service in 1939. Between 1940 and 1943 he worked in the Intelligence 
Corps. of the Army and then joined the Foreign Office where he stayed until 1946. 
For a brief period, 1946-1947 he worked as Leader-writer on the staff of the Times 
before rejoining the Foreign Office in 1948. 
RADCLIFFE, Cyril John, Viscount Radcliffe, [1899-1977]. Educated New 
College, Oxford and fellow of All Souls from 1922 to 1937. Became Director of 
Press and Censorship Department of the Ministry of Information in 1940, Deputy 
Director General of the Ministry of Information from 1940 to 1941 when he was 
appointed Director General of the Ministry -a position he retained until 1945. 
REITH, John Charles Walsham, first Baron Reith, [1899-1971]. Educated at 
Glasgow Academy, Gresham's School in Norfolk and the Royal Technical College, 
Glasgow. Served in First World War and at the end of the war took a post in the 
Ministry of Munitions. Reith joined the British Broadcasting Company (later to 
become the British Broadcasting Corporation) in 1922 and became the first Director 
General of the Corporation where he remained until Neville Chamberlain appointed 
him Chairman of Imperial Airways in 1938. In January 1940 Chamberlain appointed 
Reith the Minister of Information which was to last only until May 1940 when 
Churchill became Prime Minister and moved him from the Ministry of Information 
to the Ministry of Transport. 
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RITCHIE-CALDER, Peter Ritchie, Baron of Balmashannar, [1906-1982]. 
Educated Forfar Academy. In 1922 he came a police court reporter for the Dundee 
Courier; worked for D. C. Thomson Press in London in 1924 and Glasgow in 1925; 
Daily News 1926-1930; Daily Chronicle 1930; and the Daily Herald 1930-1941. 
Worked for the Foreign Office from 1941 to 1945. Ritchie-Calder headed the small 
Directorate of Plans at the PWE which was responsible for producing a Central 
Directive for the European Service as a whole. 
ROBIN, Harold, [1911- ]. Educated Oundle and London University's City and 
Guilds College where he studied communications engineering. Robin's first job was 
at the Standard Telephone Company and from there he moved to Philco where he met 
Hope and was invited to run a radio station at Vadiz. Robin was in charge of PWE 
secret broadcasting operations, involved in the building and operation of the recording 
studios at Wavenden Tower which Delmer used and was also sent to America to 
investigate the technicalities and specifications for increasing the power of the 
`Aspidistra' station which he worked on with Hope. 
RUSSELL, Leonard, [1906-1974]. Editor and Chief Literary editor of Sunday 
Times and Director of Times Publications Ltd. Also a Director of the Illustrated 
Newspapers Ltd., and as a friend of the Duke of Bedford arranged for `EH' to occupy 
the Riding Stables at Woburn. 
SACHS, Sir Eric Leopold Otho, [1898-1979]. Born in London, Sachs 
grandfather, a banker, had come to Britain from Germany. He joined the Royal 
Artillery and served as a gunner officer in the First World War from 1917-1919. He 
was seriously wounded in his left hand, and on demobilisation studied at Christchurch, 
Oxford, where he read law. He was called to the bar in the Middle Temple in 1921 
and took the silk in 1938. At the outbreak of war he immediately rejoined the army 
and served in the various departments of the War Office. In 1942 Sachs moved into 
the world of intelligence, and was appointed Director of Political Intelligence of the 
PWE where he produced the Basic Handbooks. On demobilisation he returned to the 
bar. 
SCARLETT, Sir Peter William Shelley Yorke, [1905-1987]. Educated at Eton 
and Christ Church, Oxford. Worked for the Foreign Office as third Secretary in 
1929; Cairo, 1930; Baghdad, 1932; Lisbon, 1934. Promoted to Second Secretary 
in 1934 he acted as Charge d'Affaires in Riga in 1937 and 1938. Promoted to First 
Secretary in 1940 he was captured by enemy forces in 1940 and returned to work in 
the Foreign Office in 1941 where he stayed until his departure to Paris in 1944. In 
1946 he then moved to the Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta. 
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STUART, Sir Campbell Arthur, [1885-19721. Director of The Times from 1919 
to 1960, during which time he fulfilled a succession of roles in imperial and 
Commonwealth communications. At the end of the First World War he was Deputy 
Director of Propaganda at Crewe House where he had worked as Northcliffe's 
Deputy. Stuart was summoned by Chamberlain to take charge of enemy propaganda 
and in 1938 he set up `EH' where he stayed until his departure to Canada in July 
1940. 
TALLENTS, Sir Stephen George, [1884-1958]. Educated Harrow and Balliol, 
Oxford. From 1903 to 1912 Tallents held a commission in the Surrey Yeomanry and 
he then moved to the reserve battalion of the Irish Guards. He was severely wounded 
at Festubert in 1915 and on recovery was recruited into the Ministry of Munitions. 
In 1916 he was transferred to the Ministry of Food and in 1918 became the Chairman 
of the new Milk Control Board. In 1931 Tallents was appointed to the Post Office 
telephone publicity department following a successful period working in the Empire 
Marketing Board and in 1935 he transferred to the BBC as Controller of Public 
Relations until 1940 and of the Overseas Service from 1940 to 1941 when he 
resigned. He was also director-designate of an embryonic Ministry of Information 
and was disappointed that Radcliffe and not he succeeded Reith as Director-General 
in 1938. 
WHEELER-BENNETT, Sir John Wheeler, [1902-1975]. Began his career as an 
unpaid personal assistant to General (Sir) Neill Malcolm moving to work in the 
publicity department of the League of Nations. In 1924 he established his own 
information service on international affairs with a fortnightly `Bulletin of International 
News' and became involved in the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham 
House). In 1929 he went to Germany to make a special study of conditions and in the 
course of the next few years cultivated the acquaintance of leading Germans of various 
backgrounds and political persuasions. Between 1939 and 1940 he was attached to 
the British Library of Information New York and was appointed Assistant-Director of 
the british Press Service, New York from 1940 to 1941. From 1941 to 1942 he acted 
as Special Assistant to the Director-General of British Information Services in New 
York and from 1942 until 1944 he was Head of the New York Office of the British 
Political Warfare Mission in the United States. In 1944 he was appointed European 
Adviser to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office and then 
Assistant Director-General in 1945. In addition he was also Assistant to the British 
Political Adviser to SHAEF from 1944 to 1945, and was attached to the British 
Prosecuting Team at War Criminal Trial, Nuremberg in 1946. 
WILSON, Sir (Archibald) Duncan, [1911-19831. Educated Winchester and 
Balliol, Oxford. After a brief spell teaching Wilson became Assistant Keeper at the 
British Museum before being recruited in 1939 to the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
where he stayed until 1941, becoming involved in the work of the PWE. Between 
1941 and 1945 he was employed by the Foreign Office and served in Berlin with the 
Control Commission 1947-1949. 
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WILLIAMS, Valentine, [1883-1946]. Educated Downside School and privately in 
Germany. Became sub-Editor for Rueters in 1902, acting as their Berlin 
correspondent between 1904 and 1909. In 1909 he moved to Paris to work for the 
Daily Mail where he stayed until 1913 when he was appointed war correspondent for 
the Daily Mail covering the Balkan War. In March, 1915 he became the first 
accredited correspondent at British GHQ. After being domobilised in 1919 he was 
put in charge of the Daily Mail Staff at Versailles. During the inter-war years 
Williams wrote and acted in radio plays for the National Broadcasting Co. of America 
and broadcast extensively in America and Britain. On the outbreak of the Second 
World War he joined the Foreign Office where he stayed until 1941 when he was 
appointed to the British Embassy in Washington. During this period he was enlisted 
by Stuart into `EH', working as Leeper's Deputy at Woburn. His move to America 
coincided with some moves to establish SOE offices abroad. In 1942 he returned to 
London and between 1942 and 1945 published numerous works and continuing his 
work for the Foreign Office. 
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